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INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ANNUAL

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A Special Number on Śaiva Siddhānta

C.S.S

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL ANNUAL

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Editor

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PREFACE

Part I of this Volume contains a special article on "The Methodology of Research in Philosophy" contributed by Dr T. P. Ramachandran, a senior Faculty member of the Radhakrishnan Institute.

The Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy conducted an All-India Seminar on "The Epistemology of Śaiva Siddhānta" on 8th, 9th and 10th August 1979. Some of the papers presented in that Seminar as well as some articles relating to Śaiva Siddhānta in general, and the Siddhānta epistemology in particular, have been included in Part II of this Volume.

We are thankful to the Government of Tamil Nadu for the financial grant to the Radhakrishnan Institute, and to the Vice-Chancellor and other authorities of the University for providing the necessary facilities, for the publication of the present Volume. I am thankful to the Avvai Achukkoodam for expeditiously executing the printing work.

Madras
March 9, 1982

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN
Editor

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PART ONE

THE METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY

THE METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY

T. P. RAMACHANDRAN

PART ONE

PRELIMINARY METHODOLOGY

1. *The term 'research'*

In older English the term 'research' was equivalent to 're-search', or 'searching again'. But in current usage the prefix 're' is obscured or pronounced lightly, so that the word carries a different meaning, viz. 'intense investigation'. This difference is like the difference in meaning that results from the variant stress on 're' between the nouns 're-cession' and 'recession' or between the verbs 're-cover' and 'recover'. The *Oxford Universal Dictionary* (1974) defines 'research' (sb) as 'the act of searching (closely or carefully) *for* or *after* a specified thing or person'. The *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English* (1980) gives the following definition: 'investigation undertaken in order to discover new facts, get additional information, etc.' The noun may also be used as a countable, i.e. with an article, to denote a particular case of research as in 'a research/researches into modern values'.

Thus it is the manner of searching rather than the repetition of an earlier search that characterizes research. It is a more penetrating search than the one we ordinarily undertake in any field to gain general acquaintance with it. It is critical — marked by a questioning attitude — so as to unravel hidden truths which are ordinarily missed or glossed over in a general study of a subject. The purpose of research is thereby to advance over the knowledge already possessed in a subject.

Such an intensive investigation assumes that one already knows in a general way about the field under investigation. There can be no question of a deeper look into something with which one is totally unfamiliar. A knowledge of the basic elements of a field is a necessary preliminary to closer scrutiny.

The requirement of intensity in research leads us to another implication. The area of research has necessarily to be limited. If the investigator is obliged to run his mind over a wide area, his treatment would naturally be diffuse and in no way different from his preliminary knowledge of it. The area of research will thus necessarily be narrower than the broad field in which the investigator is expected to have basic knowledge. It will belong to that field and will have to be carefully chosen.

Summing up the three ideas we have stated above, we may define research thus : *a critical investigation into a chosen area within a familiar field for the purpose of furthering the knowledge about that area.* The furthering of, or contribution to, knowledge may be either by discovering new truths or by revising and correcting existing knowledge of truths.

2. *The methodology of research*

We may distinguish between two aspects of a research undertaking — its content and its method.

The content is *what* you intend to present to a learned audience. It is the substance of a research work, its subject-matter. The method is *how* you set about dealing with the subject, the manner or form of your work.

Between the two, the content is of primary, or intrinsic, importance in the sense that this is your contribution to knowledge. The importance of the method is secondary, or instrumental. The method is good, not in itself, but to the extent that it subserves the interests of the content. Any method cannot be arbitrarily imposed on the content. The method must take after and suit the nature of the content. It must be adequate to the content.

Even when we speak in broad terms, we find that the method that is followed in one discipline cannot apply to another. The method of a physical science like chemistry such as experiment in a laboratory cannot be adopted for a social science like economics, which has to depend on the observation of a large number and variety of facts, or statistics. In a subject like philosophy, where we deal with fundamental problems, which occupy a very abstract level of inquiry, the method has necessarily to rely on a type of reflection which is far removed from laboratory and field work. If we think of divisions within a branch of knowledge, there again methods vary. A special feature of classical Indian philosophy which distinguishes it from modern Western philosophy is that it relies on scriptural texts as sources of knowledge. Without going into the merits of the case, we might note that this class of philosophy calls for exegetical interpretation and cannot depend entirely on logical analysis or speculation as in the other case. The same variation in methods applies to specific topics discussed by research investigators.

Thus the criterion for the excellence of a method is its adequacy to meet the demands of the content. To the extent it is adequate, the method enhances the value of the research work, and to the extent it is not it can detract from that value. For this reason, a research worker has to pay attention not only to *what* he deals with but also to *how* he deals with it. Hence the study of research method as such becomes necessary for a research scholar.

The term 'methodology' means 'the systematic study of method', 'the science of method', or 'the theory of method'. The methodology of research is the special study of the methods adopted in research. It may be possible to identify certain features which are common in the methods adopted in various fields and areas while they maintain their distinctive characteristics in these different fields and areas. And the purpose of a research methodology is to identify the general and constant features of research method on the one hand and the particular and varying features of it on the other. The basis of this inquiry consists in the concrete cases of research already done. Such an investigation will enable us to know the strengths and weaknesses, the successes and failures, exhibited in the implementation of methods by research workers. The importance of methodology, which in essence is profiting by the experiences of previous researchers, is that it helps us to avoid the wastage involved in the trial and error procedure. Methodology of research is a growing science, taking in every helpful method newly discovered.

3. *The finished product of research*

This is called by various names, such as 'thesis', 'dissertation', 'research report', 'special study', 'monograph'. These names, however, are not sure indications of the length of the products. In any case, these are much longer than a 'research paper', which would occupy anything less than about fifty pages. For our convenience we may classify the research products other than a research paper into two types. The longer one, say about two hundred and fifty pages, may be called a 'thesis' and the shorter one, say about a hundred pages, may be called a 'dissertation'.

The term 'thesis' applies to the theme as well as to the work which critically treats of it. 'What is your thesis?' means 'what is your argument, your contention?' In 'what is the argument of your thesis?' the term 'thesis' refers to the work. By a 'monograph' is meant a treatise on a single theme. Though this term is conventionally applied to the shorter research product of about a hundred pages, in essence every research product is a monograph. The critical nature of a research work requires that it confine itself to a single theme. 'Research report' and 'special study' may represent a product occupying the size of what we have described as a thesis or of the one we have called a dissertation.

All these products are characterized by critical investigation, which qualifies them for the status of research work and contrast them from purely expository accounts of known facts like text books.

4. *Choosing a topic for research in philosophy*

Random and haphazard decision on a topic may lead to unforeseen difficulties. Careful and systematic selection of a topic will contribute to success. The time spent on choosing a topic should not be regarded as wasted.

4.1. *Guiding principles in choosing a topic*

4.1.1. *Interest in the topic*

Research is exacting work. Delays and temporary disappointments in arriving at results are quite probable in any topic. But if the researcher is really interested in the topic, his interest will sustain him in his efforts and enable him to withstand and overcome difficulties. Interest does vary. And it is worth spending some time in self-analysis to locate the area and problem of one's own maximum interest. The prospective research worker may not be able to formulate his topic in precise academic terms — in this he will, in most cases, require the help of a guide. But he must at least be able to identify and express the area and problem in which he is most interested.

4.1.2. *Potentiality of the topic for original contribution*

The aim of research is to contribute to knowledge. A restatement of existing knowledge for the understanding of beginners does not amount to research. Therefore the topic chosen must not only be one which interests the candidate but one which will yield *new* information, either by addition to or by revision of old knowledge. To make sure that the topic possesses novelty, the candidate has to check the topic up for two features.

The topic must call for discussion by presenting unresolved difficulties. It must present problems of 'what', 'how' or 'why' and demand discussion. A frequent sign of discussibility is *objection*—either actual or possible, either from another person or from oneself. An objection calls for answer — it cannot be brushed aside by any intellectual. To meet an objection is to discuss. If the discussion is within oneself, it is reflection.

Again, the topic should not have already been worked upon by any other person, at least in the same way in which the candidate proposes to work upon it. This means that the researcher should examine to the extent possible previous contributions by others in the broad field to which his subject belongs, so as to minimise the chances of repetition and to feel sufficiently secure that his choice is fresh and will enable him to make original contribution to knowledge.

A word about originality in the realm of philosophy is desirable at this stage. In general, original contribution to knowledge may consist either in the discovery of a new fact or in the discovery of a new relationship between facts. This distinction, however, is only relative. Actually, facts and theories involve each other. The distinction made between the two kinds of originality is therefore only a question of prominence. In the sciences there is scope for both these kinds of original contribution. The discovery of a new species of plant or animal, a new substance or a new heavenly body is of the first type. When a new fact has been discovered, the scientist is obliged also to explain its relation to already known facts. This may lead to a revision or enlargement of an existing theory of relationship, which to that extent is the discovery of a new relationship. For example, when a new planet has been discovered, it may call for an adjustment in the existing astronomical theory of planetary movement or even of the origin of the cosmos.

In philosophy the scope for original contributions lie mostly in the realm of relation between facts. We start with the facts we are already in possession of in common life. And new facts are supplied to us by scientists, artists, and mystics. It is in how we relate all these facts, interpret them, and explain them in increasing orders of generalization that we as philosophers mostly contribute to knowledge. In view of this special nature of originality in the realm of philosophy, a word of caution seems to be necessary. In so far as we seek originality in interpreting facts, especially at high degrees of generality, there is always the risk of letting the interpretation become far-fetched or crazy, so that it sometimes becomes originality for the mere sake of originality. To avoid this pitfall, the researcher must constantly check whether the interpretation is germane and natural to the facts.

4.2. *Steps in choosing a topic*

4.2.1. *Break-down*

Critical investigation calls for a manageably limited area. Therefore the first step is to divide philosophy so as to identify an area which satisfies the requirements of interest and novelty. The principles of division are many. And they cross one another's path. More than one principle may have to be applied, so that their intersection will ultimately throw up a suitable area. The following are some of the principles of division.

(a) *Tradition,* i.e. dividing philosophy into European, Indian, American, Far-Eastern, Mid-Eastern, etc.

(b) *Period,* such as ancient, medieval, and modern.

(c) *Aspects*, or *branches*, namely theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and philosophy of values, and their *sub-divisions* such as logic, ontology, psychology, ethics, and aesthetics.

(d) *Schools*. For example, in the Western tradition there are broad trends such as idealism and realism (in both epistemology and metaphysics), empiricism, rationalism, etc. (in epistemology), monism, pluralism, naturalism (in metaphysics) or specific historical schools in general philosophy such as Platonism, Neo-Platonism, Thomism, Existentialism, Phenomenology, Logical Postivism, Linguistic Analysis, and Pragmatism. In the Indian tradition there are the traditional schools, Cārvāka, Jainism, Buddhism, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta and its sub-varities, namely Advaita and schools of Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava philosophy.

4.2.2. *Adjustment*

In a formal time-bound research undertaking the research worker is bound to keep in view the kind of research product he intends to produce. The area selected may be suitable for research. But its scope has to be determined in the light of the product aimed at. A topic covering a wider circle of facts and consuming more time may be offered for the preparation of a thesis of two hundred and fifty pages. For a shorter product of a hundred pages, a dissertation, to be produced in a shorter period a topic of less scope is called for. Very often the same subject may admit of being extended or curtailed in scope by a suitable formulation of its wording. For example, 'The concept of time in Indian philosophy' admits of a larger research product than 'The concept of time in (say) Sāṅkhya'.

4.3. *Kinds of topics for research in philosophy*

A perusal of a large number of existing research products in philosophy, theses for instance, would reveal that topics for research in philosophy fall into two broad categories. The difference between them is not absolute but relative. They are not mutually exclusive types. They represent rather two trends which involve each other but which differ in regard to their focus and margin. One type has its focal attention on a *thinker* or *text* and proceeds to discuss the philosophical concepts specially occurring in that thinker or text. The other has for its focus a *concept* and examines the nature and significance of this concept taking into account the views offered by a variety of thinkers and texts. Here are two examples just to show the contrast: (1) 'Advaita in *Śrīmad Bhāgavata*'; (2) 'Dream — its character and import according to clasical Indian philosophy'.

4.3.1. *Thinker- or text-based projects*

The thinker or text chosen is usually one less known than others, so that there is plenty of room for contribution to knowledge. All the facets of thought found in a less known thinker or text are worthy of being brought out. But this does not mean that a thinker or text that is well known should as a rule be excluded. For even of a well-known thinker or text there may be aspects that are not well known. If the researcher is confident that there is some facet in such a source which has not received sufficient attention, nothing prevents him from dealing with such a subject.

4.3.2 *Concept-based projects*

The project may turn round a single important concept or even a system of concepts. The concept or concepts may be the less known ones, to provide scope for new knowledge. Even the more prominent concepts may be chosen if the researcher feels that there are implications in them which are not so well known.

4.3.3. *Comparative projects*

The two categories of topics distinguished above have been cited so far only with an 'individual' point of reference. That is to say, one has been explained with reference to an individual thinker or text, and the other with reference to an individual concept or system of concepts. It may be observed at this stage that both these categories of topics admit of being adopted on a comparative basis. The comparison, again, may be from within the same tradition or from two different traditions. Thus, a thinker in one tradition may be compared with another either in the same tradition or in a different tradition. The same applies to a text. Likewise a concept or system in one tradition may be compared with a near concept or system in the same tradition or in another tradition.

It is true that even the individually oriented types, which we have explained previously, involve comparison. For example, when dealing with a thinker or text, one may have to consider him/it in relation to some others. Likewise, when dealing with a concept or system of concepts, one may have to examine how it stands to other concepts or systems. But such comparisons are incidental to the topic. What we have in mind when we speak of comparative projects are those where comparisons are deliberate and are intended to constitute the topic. Good comparatively oriented research projects observe the following principles.

(1) Comparisons should not be forced and arbitrary. Comparisons would be natural only if they are instituted between two areas which have common ground. For example, one may compare Śaṅkara and Bradley in view of the metaphysical thought in both but not Saṅkara and Marx who have little in common.

(2) Comparison should be intellectually purposeful, the purpose of comparison being to bring out less known features in either of the phenomena compared or in both of them. Comparison should not be made for inflating the scope of the product or for extra-academic purposes such as denigrating one of the persons or positions compared.

(3) Comparison will add to knowledge only if it is analytical. That is to say, instead of physically juxtaposing the two things in two parts of the thesis, they should be compared aspect by aspect.

4.3.4. *Inter-disciplinary projects*

All the types of projects discussed so far are within the discipline of philosophy. Apart from these intra-disciplinary projects, we have to provide for a new demand: inter-disciplinary projects. Inter-disciplinary investigation is a feature of modern knowledge. The special scientists were responsible for this type of investigation. Apart from investigation in the old beaten tracks of the distinct branches of science, there is an increasing tendency to work between the tracks, as it were, i.e. between branches which have common areas of interest. This interaction among specific sciences has led to the development of new branches, e.g. bio-chemistry, bio-physics, ecology, oceanography, meteorology. Following the sciences, the liberal arts, or the humanities, also have begun to provide for this kind of research. How far can philosophy accommodate it? We have to make a cautious approach to this question in view of certain special difficulties connected with philosophy.

At first, we may consider whether there is scope for team work in philosophy in case an inter-disciplinary project is thought of. In the exact sciences, where the subject-matter is factual, the collaboration of scientists belonging to various branches is quite possible. Space research, for instance, is the work of a large body of various scientists — physicists, chemists, biologists, mathematicians, astronomers, engineers, medical scientists, and psychologists. But when we consider the nature of philosophy, there is reason to doubt whether team work is possible in an inter-disciplinary project involving philosophy. Since philosophy deals with the fundamentals of the universe and of life, the subject-matter is of a highly conceptual kind requiring reflection of an abstract nature far removed from the level of bare facts. Reflection is an individual process, but, while in the sciences the close contact of reflection with factual demonstration leaves much room for collaborative endeavour, in philosophy the abstract nature of the reflective process leaves little scope for joint ventures. Joint ventures among philosophers are usually for the compilation of bibliographies, source books, and so on, i.e. for the construction of tools for research. Creative philosophic endeavour, or philosophizing, is essentially an individual effort.

On this consideration, when we contemplate an inter-disciplinary project involving philosophy, the project may have to be undertaken by an individual rather than by a team. The implication of this recognition is that this individual, who would speculate on the link between philosophy and another discipline, would have to be equipped in both the fields. This does not mean that he should possess a formal degree in both, but that he should possess substantial basic knowledge in both the fields. Research presupposes basic knowledge, and the time meant for research should not be expended on acquiring basic knowledge in either of the fields sought to be connected.

The second difficulty is that of relating philosophy with another discipline on a reciprocal basis. Philosophy is not one among the many branches of knowledge. It is love of wisdom as such — *jijñāsā*, as it is called in Sanskrit. Hence it encompasses the whole range of knowledge — not of course by adding up the different branches of knowledge but by organizing them at a deeper level in terms of fundamental principles. In this special sense, philosophy itself is inter-disciplinary in character. For this reason, the inter-disciplinary contacts of philosophy with other disciplines are bound to be different from the conventional reciprocal type. What, then, is the special nature of the contact?

Apart from the hard core of philosophy represented by metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of values, there is an ever-growing periphery of philosophy where we make specific philosophies of a variety of disciplines. Let us elucidate the nature of this periphery. Any branch of knowledge has the tendency to go beyond its original confines and develop into a philosophy of itself when its investigations are stretched to questions of wider scope and deeper import than originally contemplated. We have thus come to know of a philosophy of science, a philosophy of fine art, a philosophy of history, a philosophy of education, and so on. The point of departure from the original branch into its philosophy can be identified in terms of the change in the nature of the problems dealt with. While the special sciences, natural and social, are concerned with various aspects of the universe, the philosophy of science examines science itself—how it works, what its premises are, its methods, its concepts, its language, and its conclusions. History centres round the actual developments in human society at definite periods; when we begin to ask the whys and the wherefores of these developments, whether there is an inner meaning in historical movement, we make a philosophy of history. While art criticism is concerned with the merits of individual works of art, a philosophy of art begins when we search for the nature and significance of artistic beauty as such. So long as we are engaged in discussing the contents and methods of education at various levels, we are in the realm of the science of education, or pedagogics. But when we begin to discuss the goal of all education, we construct a philosophy of education. This movement towards the building of a peripheral area to philosophy from other disciplines may be diagramatically represented. (See Diagram 1.)

It is in this periphery of philosophy where other disciplines merge when pursued deeper that the scope for inter-disciplinary studies connected with philosophy lies. The general nature of inter-disciplinary projects here would then consist in examining how other disciplines serve as avenues to philosophy when a search is on for their foundations. On this recognition the nature of the inter-disciplinary project answers to a focus-margin model rather than to a balance model. The focus will be philosophy and the margin the other discipline. An approach may be made from a particular non-philosophical discipline towards the construction of a philosophy for it in terms of deeper principles of explanation for its subject-matter.

What has been indicated so far is only the broad framework for inter-disciplinary projects involving philosophy. The exact nature of the project will have to be decided by the researcher in the light of his special interest and equipment, the viability of the topic and the facilities available for working on it.

4.3.5. *Meta-philosophical projects*

Philosophy discusses reality, knowledge, and values. The discussion about philosophy itself is meta-philosophy. It is well known that philosophers differ among themselves on almost every important question though there are agreements also. Why do they differ? And in so far as they differ, which philosophy is more sound than others in regard to every question? Such are the problems to which meta-philosophy addresses itself. In order to meet these issues, it has to dig into the very foundations of philosophy. Thus meta-philosophy examines the origin, presuppositions, goals, methods, results, and limits of philosophy by comparing the achievements of different philosophers. This being the nature of meta-philosophy, research in this area requires sufficient experience in the pursuit of philosophy as such.

5. *Equipment for research in philosophy*

Everyone cannot be a good researcher just because he is interested in a branch of knowledge. Mere interest may prompt one to acquire knowledge. But to contribute to knowledge calls for appropriate disposition, or aptitude. The disposition for research consists of both general and special qualifications. By general qualifications we mean those that are expected in any researcher irrespective of his field. The special qualifications are those which are demanded by the nature of each field.

5.1. *General qualifications*

5.1.1. *Heuristic motivation*

The researcher must be curious to discover. Curiosity is of course present in a general way in all individuals in the sense of a desire to know. But most people will be satisfied with knowing from others who happen to know. The more intense type of curiosity is the desire to discover for oneself something about which anyone is hardly aware. Even this may be present in many. But in most cases it is short-lived —after a time the desire to find out something may fade out. In a genuine researcher the curiosity to discover is persistent. In spite of distractions, delays, and even disappointments, he will not rest without finding a solution to the problem agitating his mind. This quality may be discerned in a good researcher even at the beginning, for one endowed with the motivation to discover will exhibit a flair for the right kind of topic for research and come out with one only to be touched up by the guide.

5.1.2. *Reflective ability*

To be able to fulfil such curiosity, the researcher must possess ability to think systematically. In a general way, all individuals are given to reflection. But in most cases it is casual and haphazard. This may be sufficient in common life in meeting the requirements of action. But to find a solution to an intellectual problem, reflection has to be systematic. It must proceed from step to step in a coherent and cogent manner until a solution opens up.

5.2. *Special qualifications*

The special qualifications required by one who desires to conduct research in the region of philosophy are the following.

5.2.1. *Capacity for high degrees of generalization*

The distinguishing mark of philosophy which contrasts it from other disciplines is that it goes to the fundamentals of the universe and of life. It seeks the structure of being, the principles of knowing, and the purposes of living at their basis. Thus the organization of facts that it attempts goes beyond the level of organization which we can expect in any branch of knowledge. This calls for a type of reflection that steadily keeps up the concept of the whole while still scanning the parts, whether of reality, knowledge or values. Thus, although reflection is indispensable in all disciplines, philosophic reflection ought to be more synthetic and synoptic in its application than other cases.

5.2.2. *Language of source*

In philosophy the main sources of information are written materials. There is no scope for experimentation and very little for field studies. Abstract concepts are found discussed in written records — handwritten, printed, typed or inscribed, on paper, palm leaf or stone slabs, published or unpublished, and in various languages. The written sources are primary and secondary. The sources in which a particular idea first occurs is primary or original. The primary sources are explained, interpreted, and even translated in secondary sources. A researcher may make use of secondary sources in the beginning. They are useful aids in leading him to the primary sources. But ultimately, the researcher must depend on the primary sources so as to get the ideas just as they were originally expressed. There is no guarantee that a secondary source is entirely faithful to the original. Going to the originals requires the researcher to know the language of the original source, such as Sanskrit, Pali, Tamil, German or Tibetan. Expert knowledge of a language is a field by itself. The researcher in philosophy, if he happens to possess it, stands at a definite advantage. But at the minimum he should possess a fair working knowledge of the language, so that he could follow the trend of a text and grasp the general sense of each passage. If there is a specific difficulty in regard to a word or a phrase or even a section, the help of a language expert could be utilized. A work that is made merely out of secondary sources, just because linguistic proficiency is lacking can never lay claim to the title of research.

5.2.3. *Language of reporting*

This is of course a general qualification. A research scholar in any discipline is expected to possess proficiency in the language in which he is required by the establishment to report his findings. Without adequate power of expression in that language he may not succeed in communicating his discoveries to the reader. Still, we may describe this requirement as a special qualification for the researcher in philosophy because in philosophy we depend more on language as a tool of communication than in any other field. Symbols, formulae, visual aids, etc. would do part of the job in other fields, But in the rarefied atmosphere of abstract concepts as in philosophy we cannot succeed in communicating our ideas without a very carefully framed language. Graphic representations, though not ruled out, have only limited use in this case.

Command of language for the researcher does not mean his being a literary artist. The language of a thesis is not meant for delight but for clear understanding. Hence what the writer is expected to possess is the capacity to express himself in correct language. He should know the right words for the ideas, follow the rules of grammar and punctuation, and observe the logical sequence of sentences and paragraphs. Correct expression alone ensures clear comprehension. If the language happens to be pleasing also, so much is it better, because it will then mitigate the tedium of the reader. In fact, the clear prose of a correct writer is itself felicitous. But mere felicity of language is no substitute for clarity.

Part Two

THE METHODOLOGY OF EXECUTING A RESEARCH PROJECT

1. *The stages in the execution and their interconnection*

There are broadly three stages in the execution of a research project. We may call them Collection, Organization, and Presentation. Collection is gathering the data that will go to make the substance of the thesis. Organization is the task of bringing the material into meaningful relationship. Presentation is rendering the organized material in a form fit to be placed before a learned audience.

The three stages are not exclusive of one another. The succeeding one is already implied in the previous one and the succession only represents the actualization of what was already implicit in the previous stage. So the real movement from one stage to another is like drawing out the parts of a telescope or a microscope. Collection involves a measure of both organization and presentation. Likewise, organization involves its succeeding stage of presentation.

Let us consider collection first. Organization is present in it in three ways. (1) The facts collected are not collected in a haphazard way. On the contrary, they are classified in terms of the different aspects of the problem into which the researcher has visualized it. (2) The research worker would have thought of some possible answer to his problem and the collection of data is guided by the needs of testing out this hypothesis. (3) The facts collected may either justify the hypothesis or call it into question. When they go against the hypothesis, the researcher has to replace the hypothesis by a better one or revise it in such a manner as to accommodate the new facts. Collection involves a degree of presentation also. The facts collected have to be immediately recorded under suitable classes along with information on their sources.

If we consider the second stage of organization, we shall see that this involves presentation. After the data have been collected, we concentrate on thinking out a meaningful relationship in which to present them. As we have already noted, even while collecting the data, the researcher would have conceived of an organization in a general way. But once the collection is substantially over, the organization of material must acquire a specific and particular form. To articulate the organization, the research worker has to try it out in writing. Writing is an excellent aid to thinking, for then we, so to say, 'see' our thoughts for ourselves. Thus organization requires its expression in writing. Such an implication does not mean that the presentation as it happens now is final. The provisional presentation calls for repeated revision in terms of every new turn in the pattern you think out. So it only means that at the stage of organization you draft the thesis and revise the draft as many times and in as many places as you find necessary.

When the facts collected have been well laid out through drafting, there follows the final stage of presentation, or presentation proper. This represents the formal preparation of the thesis if the first two stages stand for its substantial, or material, preparation. What are called the 'mechanics' of thesis-writing relate to the conventions to be followed in constructing this external element, the form, of the thesis. When the final draft has been touched up to fulfil the requirements of formal presentation, the thesis is ready for judgement.

2. *Collection*

2.1. *The sources of material*

Research in the physical sciences calls for a wide range of experiments. In the life sciences wide observation supplements experiment. In the social sciences the investigator depends mainly on field work or observation. Some of the humanities like history also involve field work. In all these fields the use of written sources is present in varying degrees. In the realm of philosophy the research worker has to depend largely on written sources. Written sources, or documents, i.e. sources of information through the medium of language, include manuscripts (handwritten matter) on paper, palm-leaf, etc., typewritten records, printed books and articles, stray notes, speech recorded in discs or tapes, inscriptions on stone, and so on.

All kinds of documents may be classified under two heads, primary and secondary, i.e. sources in which the ideas first occur and sources in which the ideas are subsequently explained or summarized or translated. The researcher should always aim at collecting information from the original, or primary, sources because a secondary source, however good, cannot guarantee exactness to the original. Data may also be collected from secondary sources, especially in the early stages. But these should always be regarded only as aids to the location and understanding of the data from the originals.

It may be added that the terms 'primary' and 'secondary' as applied to written sources are relative. If a source regarded as secondary with reference to the work on which it is based itself contains original ideas and as a consequence assumes an importance of its own through the years, it becomes a good basis for further works of interpretation. With reference to these latter works, it becomes primary. This feature is frequently observed in the history of Indian philosophy, where schools have developed through a series of commentaries and commentaries upon commentaries, apart from other classes of works.

2.2. *The need for a working bibliography*

A bibliography is a list of written sources on a subject. A bibliography has to be appended to the finished research product so as to convince the reader that the thesis is based on definite evidence. But apart from this bibliography proper, or final bibliography, it is good to prepare one even at the commencement of research. The purpose of this preliminary, or working, bibliography is to enable one to know what sources are to be consulted. Reference material is usually mentioned under appropriate heads in encyclopedias, dictionaries of special subjects, anthologies, and source books. Experts in the field may also suggest suitable sources. The investigator himself may come across information on sources in the course of his preliminary studies. Articles in learned journals, secondary sources, etc. carry references. Whatever source the research worker feels may be useful may be taken note of in sufficient detail, such as author, editor or translator, full title, details of publication, custody of copy available, call number etc. Every item listed initially may not actually be found useful for one's purpose. Hence the list is tentative and will require frequent deletion and addition. Incidentally, if the working bibliography is preserved, it could serve as the basis for preparing the final bibliography.

2.3. *Hypothesis — the guiding principle of collection*

Even in common life fact-finding is a selective process. Though innumerable objects and events come into our view, we pay attention only to certain facts in the light of our dominant concerns. Research is even more selective about facts. What is it that guides the selection of facts in research?

Problem-solving is the essence of research. The investigator has a central question in mind for which he seeks a satisfactory solution. Although the final solution to his problem emerges only at the end of his investigation, he is not without any solution till then. To think of a problem is also to think of a possible answer. To entertain a solution even before the investigation is begun or completed does not amount to prejudging the issue. It would amount to prejudgement only if the solution is taken for granted. But a true researcher will regard his solution as purely tentative until the very end of his work. (Even then it is in principle tentative, because there is always the possibility of someone being able to call it into question.) A provisional solution to a problem is called a hypothesis. The prefix 'hypo-' indicates that it is 'less certain than' a thesis, or established contention.

In research it is the hypothesis that guides the selection of facts. Facts which have some bearing or other on the hypothesis are taken note of. The relevant facts need not all be in accord with the hypothesis. There may be many among them that go to support and strengthen the hypothesis. But we may also light upon some which are contrary to it. A relevant fact that does not square with the hypothesis reveals that the solution to the problem is defective either partially or wholly. In such a contingency the hypothesis has either to be revised or to be replaced by a better one to provide for the difficult fact. The revised or new hypothesis guides the further collection of facts, which in turn put it to test. In this manner the gradual perfection of hypothesis leads to the careful build-up of material to go into the substance of the research product.

2.4. *Classification of data*

The collection of facts in the light of and with a view to testing the hypothesis cannot afford to be haphazard. A research problem is bound to have many aspects. Hence the researcher has to ask himself at each stage whether the solution tentatively offered by him will do justice to all the aspects of the problem. In other words, he has to test the hypothesis with facts relating to every aspect of the problem. To provide for such composite verification, the facts, even as they are collected, have to be classified. They have to be grouped according to their inner affinities, each class of facts representing a different aspect of the problem and put under a suitable head.

2.5. *Recording collected material*

The facts, even as they are collected and classified, have to be recorded for further treatment. The records, or notes, may be in different sets, each set for a class with an appropriate heading.

The recording may be done on cards, sheets of paper or note-books according to the nature of the subject and the convenience of the investigator. Cards are suitable where the classes under which the facts are proposed to be arranged are many. Sheets of paper of uniform size to be put on different files may be used where the classes are not many.

It is good to enter only one idea on one card or sheet. This will facilitate transfer of data from one class to another or even from one place to another within the same class whenever the researcher feels that a better arrangement is possible. Subject to such transfers, the title given to each class may be entered in abbreviation on the top of the card or the sheet so as to avoid mix-up.

It is also desirable to enter the idea on one side only of the card or the sheet. If the idea is not contained in one side, it may be continued on the next card or sheet indicating the continuation. This will make easy revisions in expression when the notes are later rendered into draft. Only places where there are too many corrections will need to be re-written. The notes at other places could as such be taken into the draft. In this way much writing time could be saved.

The research worker will do well to record not only the information collected from a source but also the information about the source. One of the essential items of a research product is citing the sources of information, which will go to show that its contention is not arbitrary and is thus different from popoular opinion. The only exceptions to this practice are when (i) the investigator's own views are stated and (ii) accepted general truths, e.g. the well-known laws of nature, are mentioned. Even while recording the data collected, it is necessary to set down the exact sources from which they have been gathered. Otherwise, there will be the additional burden of having to find them out again when drafting the work.

3. *Organization*

3.1. *The nature of the organization*

The hypothesis which the investigator entertains as a tentative and open solution to his problem is the constant principle that binds the facts which he gathers. Thus even in the stage of collecting the material there is a measure of organization. When the investigator is fairly satisfied that sufficient material has accumulated to make the body of the thesis, his emphasis must shift from the facts as such to their interconnection. Additional facts could be sought and fitted into the structure if the organization demands. Now, what is the organization that we expect in a research work?

There is no doubt that the whole set of data will be held together by one theme as in a literary composition. But this general underlying unity in terms of the topic is not adequate for a research work. The appeal of a research work is to reason, intellect, and not to imagination and feeling as in the case of a literary work. It is useful here to refer to the distinction that Sanskrit writers make between a *kāvya* and a *śāstra*. Though both employ language as a medium, the criteria by which they are judged are different. *Kāvya*, or *sāhitya*, is literary art, such as poetry, essay or drama. It is valued for *rasa*, the aesthetic delight which it yields. By *śāstra* is meant a scientific, or systematic, treatise. It may be either expository, or critical. Its value lies in *jñāna*, the information it gives. A research work is of the class of *śāstra*. Hence the intellectual standard alone should count in organizing the material for a thesis. Over and above the general unity in terms of the subject, a research work must aim at a logical relationship among its parts such that it is able to convince the reader about its contention. The different classes of data and even the individual data within each class must follow one another in a rational sequence representing an argument.

Even in a work of an expository nature a logical sequence of ideas is necessary so as to secure intellectual contact with the reader and carry conviction with him. But a research work is even more logical than an exposition. An exposition is for the beginner or the general reader. But a research work is addressed to a knowledgeable person, who, though not particularly conversant with the discovery of the investigator, is a specialist in the field to which the investigator belongs. Its aim, therefore, is not to supply the special knowledge which the reader lacks but to demonstrate that the researcher has found new truth in that knowledge. The essence of the work is therefore criticism — not mere statement of fact but judgement involving defence of a contention and refutation of rival ones. The work must be able to make out a case for itself before the learned reader.

The chief indication of the logic of the thesis is the coordination between the introduction and the conclusion. Where there is logical necessity, the conclusion will naturally and spontaneously accord with the introduction. It will strike the same note as the introduction. Both the introduction and the conclusion will make the same claim. The only difference will be that the one is preliminary and the other final, as in the structure of a Nyāya syllogism. The writer makes a claim in the introduction, demonstrates it through chapters, and, on the strength of the argument running through the chapters, reiterates the claim in the conclusion. Thus the organization in a thesis is the achievement of logical sequence in the material such that the conclusion inevitably follows from the material.

The close relation of the argument to the evidence should always be borne in mind by the investigator. The argument should never be allowed to become arbitrary and baseless. It should follow from the facts gathered and should in turn explain the facts. In other words, it should judiciously combine inductive and deductive methods within the framework of material. We may also speak of different stages in the argument of the thesis. There is an argument within each chapter dealing with each class of facts. Together these arguments represent the main argument of the thesis. The interrelation of argument and evidence in the progress of the thesis through its different chapters may be represented diagramatically. (See Diagram 2.)

3.2. *Methods of organizing*

Now, the question before us is how we can carry out the logical organization of the thesis. The immediate temptation is to render the classified data directly into the chapters or divisions of the thesis. The research worker may mentally arrange the classes of his material in a certain sequence and write them out one by one into full-fledged chapters. The thesis is thus made chapter by chapter, part by part. This method has the advantage of quickness. But one cannot be quite certain that the unity achieved thus is free from defects.

A safer method would be to let the classified data pass through an intermediate stage of synopsis before they become the chapters. We may first make the nucleus of the thesis by writing out an outline of it, and then enlarge this outline by supplying the details. The utility of making the thesis in essence first is that its internal unity is more easily ascertained and checked within a small compass than in a wide area.

When the full thesis comes to be drafted after the investigator has in this manner assured himself about the unity, the chances of his losing his way are much less than in the other case.

The actual mode of implementing this method may be described as follows. Suppose there are four classes of facts to form four chapters or divisions in the thesis. Within each class there would be at least two grades of data, which we may call 'primary' and 'secondary'. The primary facts are those that are absolutely essential, foundational, which we cannot afford to omit. It is these that make the framework of the thesis. The secondary facts are the details which build up the primary ones through illustration, substantiation, clarification, etc. The primary data in each of the four classes could first be drawn upon to make a synopsis of the thesis in four parts. By writing them out in a logical sequence, we would be ready with the framework of the thesis. The synopsis could then be subjected to close scrutiny for its organic integrity. After making such revisions as are called for by requirements of organization, the synopsis could be uniformly expanded by fitting in the secondary data in the appropriate parts and places within parts. This means that the investigator now writes the thesis in full, incorporating the substance of the synopsis and supplying the details at each relevant step in the sequence. If a diagram would help in highlighting the two stages of this method, reference may be made to Diagram 3.

This method of organization, unlike the one earlier mentioned, proceeds from the whole to the parts. It necessarily takes more time. But it has the advantage of greater systematization because of the assumption that the whole is more important than the parts and that it informs and determines the nature of the parts. Perhaps the only exception to the need for a synopsis would be a text-based project of such a nature that the researcher has no need to alter the order of the contents in the text in order to interpret them.

Most establishments nowadays require that the candidate who supplicates for a research degree submit a synopsis a few months before he submits his thesis. Now, this synopsis should be distinguished from the synopsis we have referred to. The synopsis we described in our discussion on method comes in advance of the thesis. It is intended to prepare the ground for the thesis. It is therefore subject to revision, sometimes major revision. But the formal synopsis demanded by the establishment is intended to give to the adjudicator an idea of the contents of the thesis which he is shortly to assess. It should therefore be more or less final and fairly represent the thesis. This means that it can be prepared only after drafting the thesis.

4. *Presentation*

4.1. *The structure and form of the thesis*

As indicated earlier, presentation consists in attending to the externals of the thesis, its body. Several items go to make the physical structure of the thesis. There are good books which give the research worker guidelines on how to attend to these items. In this section of our article we shall make only brief observations on the matter. The main parts of a thesis and their arrangement may be shown as below.

(Preliminaries)

Title page, table of contents, preface, and list of abbreviations (if notes are given within the text).

(Text of thesis)

Introduction, chapters, and conclusion (all with notes if preferred in text).

(Back matter)

Notes (if preferred here) preceded by abbreviations, appendices (if any), and bibliography.

The text and notes contain quotations and transliterated words. The text may also contain illustrations. Titles are given for each part and sub-part. Permeating the parts, is the style of writing the thesis.

We shall now briefly discuss the methodology of all these ingredients in a thesis.

4.1.1. *Title page*

The title is given in capital letters on the top of the page and centred in the line. The title should be short but indicative of the scope of the thesis. If it happens to take more than one line, the lines should form an inverted pyramid. In the middle of the page should be given the information about the establishment to which the work is submitted, the degree for which it is submitted, and by whom, in this order. At the bottom of the page should come the name of the institution or department through which it is submitted and the month and year of submission.

4.1.2. *Table of contents*

This should show the titles of all the items of the preliminaries, the text, and the back matter with the pages where they begin. The number and wording of the titles should be identical with those given inside the work.

As regards the items of the text, it is desirable that the table is analytical, i.e. showing not only the main headings but all the subheadings also. The heirarchy of headings and sub-headings could be indicated by suitable indentation.

4.1.3. *Preface*

A preface is not part of the body of the thesis. It stands out and makes known the thesis. It should therefore be brief. It may contain the background to the writer's choice of the topic and the chief object of his undertaking. But it cannot afford to explain in detail the nature of the problem, the method of treatment, the solution offered, and the material relied upon. All these should be reserved for the introduction. Besides referring to the topic, the preface must also record acknowledgements for help received from persons and institutions.

4.1.4. *List of abbreviations*

Titles of works frequently referred to in the notes need not be stated in full every time. The writer is free to invent suitable abbreviations for them. But a key to the abbreviations should be provided in advance. The list of abbreviations should come among the preliminaries if the notes are given at the foot of the relevant pages in the text. The list goes into the back matter if all the notes are placed there.

There is no rule for devising the abbreviations of titles. Their only principle is that they should avoid needless complexity. Often the first letters of the key words of the title are combined and written in italic capitals (e.g. *BG* = *Bhagavad-gītā*). Subsequent letters could be added in lower cases to distinguish two instances of works that have the same first letters in their names (e.g. *Kau. U* = *Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad*; *Kena U* = *Kena Upaniṣad*).

4.1.5. *Introduction*

With the introduction begins the actual text of the thesis. The introduction explains in detail the nature and importance of the problem proposed to be discussed, the particular method adopted by the investigator to deal with it, his solution, and the nature of the sources from which he has drawn his material. It also shows how the work is a contribution to knowledge. The introduction is substantially the first chapter of the work. Formally also it may be described as the first chapter unless the writer prefers to call the next one by that description. It may occupy the length of a chapter. It may be entitled 'introduction' or given a suitable alternative title. In any case, it should serve the purpose of introducing the rest of the chapters. The introduction should be written with much care. The manner in which the introduction is composed will set the trend for the rest of the work. A good introduction will enable the reader to have the whole work in perspective and stimulate his interest.

4.1.6. *Chapters*

The chapters represent stages in the argument of the thesis, each stage resting on a distinct class of data. The nature of the argument contained in a chapter should be reflected in the title of the chapter. A chapter may be divided and sub-divided according to topics and their aspects, each division and sub-division carrying its own title. The heirarchy of titles may be indicated by a suitable variation in types, placements, and also numbers. Some measure of uniformity may be maintained in the size of the chapters.

4.1.7. *Conclusion*

Like the introduction, the conclusion may be formally described and numbered as a chapter or denoted separately. It could occupy the length of a chapter or even less. Again, whether it is called 'conclusion' or given an alternative description, its purpose is to bring finality to the product. It should recall to the reader the claim made in the introduction and then, on the basis of the whole argument of the work, it should reiterate that claim. For this purpose it has to restate in summary form the findings of each chapter, and the logic of this restatement should be such as to highlight the soul of the argument in the thesis. In doing this work, the conclusion must, of course, adopt a different form of expression. If it repeats the words of the introduction and chapters, it will only be stale. In addition to this main task, the conclusion may also refer, where necessary, to problems that have arisen in the course of the thesis but which lie beyond its scope.

4.1.8. *Notes*

Notes are devices for supporting the text of the thesis. Unlike the matter for an appendix, to which we shall refer next, the matter for a note is essential to the argument of the text but not so important as to be incorporated into the body of the text. It is for the writer to decide whether something is sufficiently important to be part of the text. If it is not, its inclusion in the text may interfere with the smooth readability of the text. Its right place, then, is the note.

Notes should be employed sparingly and only on purpose. Too many, too frequent or too long notes can distract the reader's attention from the more important elements in the argument. Notes may be employed for two purposes: citation and explanation.

The occasions for citation are the following.

(1) To acknowledge the source which is directly quoted or from which information is drawn.

(2) To refer the reader to further sources of information on a point which has been sufficiently discussed from the point of view of the author.

Notes are employed for explanation on the following occasions.

(1) To clarify, supplement or comment on a point in the text of the thesis when such a procedure, if adopted in the text, is likely to interrupt the main argument.

(2) To refer the reader to another part of the thesis which is connected with the point at issue (cross reference).

(3) To refer to the prevalence of a rival view on a point of controversy if it is not necessary to discuss that view.

(4) To give the original version of the material that has been translated or paraphrased in the thesis.

Notes may be entered (1) at the foot of a page, (2) at the end of a chapter or (3) at the end of the work. In the first alternative it is specially called 'footnote', not in the others. Each method has its practical advantages and disadvantages for the writer and the reader. But whichever system the writer chooses must be maintained consistently for the whole work.

There are conventions to be followed in entering notes, some of them being general and some special to one or another of the three alternative procedures. We may cite them below.

(1) Reference to notes is made by super-scripts (small-type numerals raised one half space above line) in the text at the place where a note is called for.

(2) Footnotes may be numbered independently for each page, consecutively for each chapter, or consecutively for the whole work. Notes at chapter end are to be numbered consecutively for the whole chapter. Notes at end of work may be numbered consecutively for the whole work if they are not many. Otherwise, they may be numbered consecutively for each chapter.

(3) All notes, whether they are complete sentences or not, are terminated by a full stop.

(4) The first line of a note is indented like a paragraph. Note and text in the case of footnote and two successive notes in all cases are separated by a double space.

(5) If a footnote overflows a page, it is good to break it in mid-sentence. The broken sense will then easily lead the reader to the continuation of the note in the next page. A footnote that is intended to clarify, supplement or comment on a point in the text sometimes tends to be long. But a footnote should not appear more prominent than the text. And it is

not desirable to continue a footnote beyond two pages. Hence in a case like this, its conversion into an appendix is to be considered.

(6) The minimum details needed for a citatory note are author/editor, full title of source, and page(s) to which reference is made. The first two of these items are covered by an abbreviation where one is employed. The use of other labour-saving contractions, such as *ibid.*, *op.cit.*, etc. may be learnt. Other details about sources can be reserved for the bibliography, because the aim of a citatory note is only to point to the specific location of an idea or a statement.

4.1.9. *Illustrations*

The word illustration could mean either example or picture. We are now using the term in the latter sense: visual representation on plain surface. Pictorial representation is broadly of two types: tables, or information in tabular form, and figures. Figures include photographs (plates), paintings, maps, charts, graphs, and diagrams. Any illustration by the hand is called graphic representation.

Illustration should be purposive, Irrelevant illustration merely to inflate the size or produce an impression on the reader will only detract from the worth of the product. The purpose of illustration is not to substitute the verbal matter but to assist it. In some subjects illustration is indispensable; in philosophy it is optional. Moreover, graphic representation in philosophy is difficult, the subject-matter being abstract. Care should be taken to see that the representation does not become either redundant or confounding. If the verbal account is by itself comprehensible, illustration is not called for. It should be resorted to only if it will help to fix the idea for which words have to be strained. But the illustration will really help only if it is made as simple as possible. Complex and cramped illustrations will confuse rather than clarify. Graphic representation in this field therefore requires much circumspection.

Illustrations, used as aids to discussion, are best inserted at appropriate places in the text of the thesis unless practical considerations compel their transfer to the end of the text. All illustrations should be suitably introduced in the text. Illustrations inserted in the text should follow as closely to their introduction as possible. Illustrations placed at the end of the text should be presented in the same order in which they are introduced.

4.1.10. *Appendices*

In general, appendix means any matter that is added to the body of the work at the end of the work. In this wide sense it includes the bibliography, which is found in published and unpublished works, and the index and glossary of published works. But in a particular sense, the term is applied to any matter at the back which is specially connected with the theme of the work and which is other than the bibliography and so on. This additional back matter may be in the form of illustrations (other than those given in the text), lists or running matter. As the name itself suggests, an appendix is any matter which is relevant to the subject but not essential to its treatment. Being not essential, its inclusion in the text will interrupt its readability. But, being relevant, the author is reluctant to discard it altogether. Hence it is annexed to the text at its end. The author has to decide for himself whether something is to be included in the text or relegated to the appendix. The test in each case is whether the omission of the matter from the text will in any way weaken the argument. If the argument can stand without it, it means that the matter supplies only additional information. All that is then required in the text is to direct the interested reader to this supplemental matter in the appendix.

Besides the title 'appendix', a suitable descriptive title may be given. If there are more than one appendix, each appendix should be lettered, such as A, B, C. Appendices(xes) may be placed either before the bibliography or after it at the discretion of the writer.

4.1.11. *Bibliography*

A bibliography is a complete and detailed list of written sources consulted for producing the work, whether they are cited in the work or not. The sources should be entered in alphabetical order. The bibliography may be made as a single comprehensive list or divided into two or more parts according to classes of sources. If the latter practice is adopted, a separate alphabetical order is followed for each class. A sample classification would be primary and secondary sources or classics and modern works or books, articles, and unpublished sources.

There is no absolute rule regarding the order of details in a bibliographical entry. There are different practices, but whichever practice is chosen, it should be followed consistently in a work. The details to be given in the case of published works are at least the following: author, title, and imprint, i.e. details of publication. Some general conventions may be mentioned here.

(1) For alphabetical arrangement the author's name is given with the surname or (where there is no surname) the own name coming first, e.g. Datta, D. M.; Hiriyanna, M. (whereas in the note the name is written in the natural order: D. M. Datta; M. Hiriyanna).

(2) The title of a book or journal is underlined or italicized, but the title of an article is put in single inverted commas. All titles are written in full with the key words beginning with a capital letter.

(3) Each entry begins flush with the left margin. Subsequent lines, if any, in the same entry are indented.

(4) One entry is separated from another by a space.

(5) If two consecutive entries are works of the same author, the author's name is either repeated or represented by a short solid line.

4.1.12. *Quotations*

Quotations could occur both in the text of the thesis and in the notes. Quoting should be on definite purpose. The occasions for quoting are the following.

(1) When the quotation itself is the subject of discussion.

(2) When the quotation will lend support to one's own argument.

(3) When the writer quoted has expressed something in such a brief and effective manner that his words cannot be improved upon.

(4) When the original statement is such that a paraphrase of it might lead to misinterpretation by the reader.

Quotations must follow certain conventions. The more important ones may be stated here.

(1) Quotations must be accurate to the word, spelling, and punctuation. When there is an obvious error in the original, the reproducer can indicate that the error is of the original author, not his own, by inserting the word *sic* immediately after the error. (*sic*=so, thus)

(2) Any insertion made in the original by the user out of absolute necessity should be put in square brackets, e.g. [*sic*].

(3) Any omission made in the original by the user, e.g. to drop words or sentences not relevant to his purpose, should be indicated by three spaced full stops, called ellipsis. Omission should be made with great care, so that the spirit of the original is not altered.

(4) Except when the quotation itself is under discussion, if quotations are too long or too frequent, they will tend to usurp the place of the investigator's own words. But extensive quotations from a published work require the previous permission of the copyright holder.

(5) Short quotations, say upto four lines of prose or one line of verse, should be run on in the text and enclosed in inverted commas. Long quotations should be introduced by a colon, marked off by change of line, indented uniformly from the left margin, and presented without quotation marks.

(6) Quotations in footnotes should be as short as possible. Notes given at the end of a chapter or of the whole work could afford to carry longer quotations.

4.1.13. *Titles*

The title of the work or of any part of it should not be constructed as a complete sentence. A title is not terminated by a full stop. Again, it should be in the form of a statement and not in the form of a question or an exclamation. It should be as short as possible and at the same time clearly indicate the content of what follows. Catchy or misleading titles should be avoided in research productions. Titles should be plain and at the same time crisp.

4.1.14. *Pagination*

Every page in a thesis has a page number, whether the number is actually entered or not. The usual practice is to give one series of numbers for the preliminary matter and another series for the text and back matter. The differentiation is made by using small Roman numerals for the preliminaries and Arabic numerals for the text. The first series begins with the title page and ends with the last page of the preliminaries. The next series begins with the first page of the text and ends with the last page of the back matter.

4.1.15. *Transliteration*

'Translation' is giving the meaning of something said or written in one language in another language. But when a word or a passage written in one language in its own characters is rewritten in the characters of another language, the act is called 'transliteration'. To an investigator working on Indian philosophy transliteration is unavoidable additional work. Technical terms and passages from sources in Sanskrit, Tamil, and other classical Indian languages have to be transliterated for reproduction in the thesis. When the language in which the thesis is presented is English, difficulties will be encountered in typing or printing the foreign (foreign to English) words and sentences in between. At the most, indented passages may be produced in the original characters. But individual words, phrases, and short passages that run on in the text have necessarily to be transliterated. The consideration here is not only practical but also aesthetic. A mixture of Roman and non-Roman letters in the same line would be ungainly.

The transliteration of Indian letters into Roman ones involves the use of diacritical marks. These marks are used to distinguish the different sounds intended to be conveyed by the same letter (diacritical = capable of distinguishing). There are special sounds in each language. Hence the need for these marks when one language is rendered in the characters of another. The details of the technique as applied to Indian languages are too many to be presented within this limited article.

The transliterated words, because they are foreign to English, must be underlined or italicized. But when such a word has been anglicized, for instance by the addition of an 's' to yield a plural, or when the writer prefers to use a capital letter to indicate a proper name, the word need not be underlined. Examples: *jīva*; jīvas; Brahman.

4.1.16. *Style*

We have so far been concerned with the matter of the thesis, its parts and their arrangement. The manner of writing the thesis is its style.

There are certain qualities that mark the good style in *any* kind of writing.

(1) The language will conform to current usage.

(2) It wlll observe the rules of spelling, grammar, and punctuation.

(3) It will avoid needless verbosity, and thus will be simple and direct.

Besides possessing these general qualities, research writing is expected to maintain certain special features. Reporting research is by a scholar to a scholar. Scholarly writing is both formal and courteous. The conditions of formality and courtesy may now be indicated.

(1) The writer must avoid being casual in tone. Colloquial expressions, exaggerations, rhetorical questions, exclamations, witticisms, informal abbreviations, and broken sentences should be avoided, and an attitude of serious purpose should be maintained. Connected with this attitude is the avoidance of the personal pronoun, which projects the writer rather than the subject. The manner of constructing the sentences should be impersonal, so as to let the subject speak for itself. The observance of these conventions makes for formality. However, care should be taken to avoid excessive formality. Too much anxiety to be formal may make the style needlessly rigid and gritty or pompous and pretentious.

(2) Courtesy to the reader and to other writers is another distinguishing mark. The research writer should always remember that he

is writing for learned persons. He should therefore avoid labouring the obvious and supplying elementary information on the subject. He should keep to the level of his contribution to knowledge. Even here he should be careful. The author has both the right and the duty to bring to the attention of the reader the originality of his contributions But he should avoid making tall claims about the importance of his findings and slighting the work of other researchers in the same area. It may be necessary for him to criticize their conclusions in order to establish the significance of his own, but such criticism should purely be in the interests of truth and therefore observe academic respect. Strong language is to be avoided while criticizing others. The recommendation here is not that the writer should be meek and apologetic. He should emit confidence but not arrogance. It is not easy to keep one's balance on these conventions. Good research writing is thus an art by itself.

LIST OF DIAGRAMS

Serial No.	Description	Place of Introduction
1.	The development of peripheral branches of philosophy	Part One 4.3.4.
2.	The interrelation of argument and evidence in organizing the thesis	Part Two 3.1.
3.	A synoptic method of organization	Part Two 3.2.


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Meta-physics
Phy. of Values
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Special Sciences

DIAGRAM 1


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Argument
Evidence
Argument
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CHAPTERS
INTRODUCTION

DIAGRAM 2


THESIS
Synopsis
I
II
III
IV

DIAGRAM 3

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PART TWO

ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA

1

BASIC CONCEPTS OF ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA

V. A. **Devasenapathi**

I

BASIC CONCEPTS

Worship of Śiva has its origin in the distant past. Traces of it are found in the *Vedas*. Seals discovered at *Mohanjodaro* are suggestive of the worship of Śiva as *Paśupati* — the Lord of the flock. If the date of the *Mohanjodaro* civilization comes to be finally established as anterior to the Vedic period and, if likewise, the seals are identified conclusively as those relating to Śiva, then the worship of Śiva could be said to be earlier than the Vedic period. It is remarkable that age has not withered the charm of *Śaivism* but has actually contributed to its rich variety. It has flourished in its *Pratyabhijñā* form in Kashmir and hence it is known as *Kashmir Śaivism*. This form of Śaivism represents monistic idealism. In the South of our country, especially in *Tamiḻnāḍu,* it has developed as *Śaiva Siddhānta* with strong theistic and pluralistic features. As *Vīraśaivism*, it is the living faith of a large number of people in the *Karnāṭaka*. *Paśupatināth*, and *Kedārnāth* in the North, *Somanāth* in the West, Banaras in the East have been important centres for Śaivism. *Tamiḻnāḍu* abounds in temples which have been celebrated in the songs of reputed Śaiva Saints. Outside our country, Śaivism is found in Srilanka and Malaysia.

Rudra Śiva

The early hymns of the *Vedas* speak of Rudra, not of Śiva. But some of the features associated with Śiva in later times are found in Rudra — such features as Śiva having braided hair, wearing a hide, dwelling in the mountains, etc. Interpreting the name Rudra to mean 'howler' (one who howls), some Indologists have taken him to be the personification and deification of the destructive powers of nature as seen in storms and lightning, diseases and death. They hold the view that Vedic Aryans tried to appease him by worship so that instead of being the terrific Rudra, he could become the auspicious Śiva and accordingly the name Śiva occurs in the later portions of the *Vedas*.

C. V. Narayana Iyer, in his book, *Origin and Early History of Śaivism* deals with the view of the Indologists referred to above. He does not accept the interpretation of the name Rudra as howler. He says that these scholars failed to discover the real characteristic of the Vedic deities because they took these deities to be personifications of atmospheric phenomena. He observes that two functions are attributed to Rudra — one is bestowing prosperity and the other is destroying suffering. He quotes the English translation given by Muir of one of the explanations given by Sāyaṇa for the root *rut* from which Rudra is derived: "*rut*" means suffering or sin, etc., which causes suffering. 'Thou art the god so-called, who drives this away'. Narayana Iyer says: "If this view be correct, it becomes possible to explain how Rudra of the *Ṛg-Veda* became Śiva of the later period; for the etymological explanation of the word 'Śiva' bears a correspondence to that of Rudra. According to the *Siddhāntakaumudī*, the root '*so*' means 'to make thin' or 'to attentuate'. In the *Śabdakalpadruma*, one of the meanings given to the word 'Śiva' is 'he who attenuates sin (*aśubha*),' and this meaning is derived from the root '*so*' as explained above. Both Rudra and Śiva therefore mean, 'he who removes sin or suffering'."[1] It is probable that the early Aryans connected suffering with sin and invoked the grace of Śiva to overcome suffering, and more importantly, sin which is the cause of suffering. Śiva is no more responsible for a disease with its attendant pain. Diseases occur by the violation of rules of hygiene and health. Likewise sins arise by violation of rules of morality and of healthy spiritual living. The grace of Śiva is invoked to get rid of suffering and sin, not merely physical illness and death, as in the following utterances of the *Ṛg-Veda*: "I hear that thou art the great physician of physicians", "carrying in his hand most choice remedies, may he give us protection, defence, shelter." Even as a doctor treats some diseases with sweet medicines and some by painful surgery, God dispenses worldly prosperity and adversity or suffering. Śaivite texts compare Śiva to parents and rulers also to clarify this point. Parents are kind to their children. But even kindness calls for punishment to reform children when they err. Likewise rulers of a country reward or punish citizens according to their exemplary behaviour or infringement of the laws of the land citizens. Viewed in this context, the references to Rudra as responsible for diseases, etc., could be understood as really implying the punitive or stern aspect of grace. Suffering and punishment are for the purpose of reformation and redemption. Tamil texts use two expressions *ar̤akkaruṇai* and *mar̤akkaruṇai*, to indicate the tender and tough aspects of grace. It is helpful to recall the expression *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* in this connection. There is the fascinating or attractive aspect in God. There is the terrific aspect. Beyond both there is mysterious aspect. Thus, Rudra or Śiva is not to be viewed exclusively in His terrific aspect or His benign aspect. He is these and yet infinitely something more than these. The *saulabhya* (accessibility) aspect goes with the *paratva* (infinite majesty or supremacy) of God.

The following *mantra* of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* is worth recalling:

> May He Who created the Gods and supports them, Who is the origin also of the cosmic soul, Who confers bliss and wisdom on the devotees, destroying their sins and sorrows and punishing all breaches of law — may He, the great seer and the lord of all, endow us with good thoughts! (III, 4)

There are references to Rudra as the Lord of the paths and of robbers who frequent them. *Śrī Rudram* (which occurs in the *Yajur Veda*) has the following expressions:

Kakubhāya, *Stena*, *Taskara*, *Vañcata*, *Parivañcata*, *Stāyu*, etc.

These words are applied to clever thieves, those who steal hiding themselves, who rob (in an open manner), who steal something from their masters occasionally by deception, who steal all the time and so on. Understanding them literally, Rudra is taken to be a robber chief.

There are two other ways of understanding them. One is along the lines of seeing God in everything, good and bad. If He is in evil things and evil beings, it is to redeem them ultimately. Needless to say He is the very breath of good things and good beings. The other is along the lines of mysticism, especially bridal mysticism. Tamil Śaivite devotional poetry refers to him as "One who steals the heart" "One who robs maidens of their bangles", and so on. These two interpretations are more in accord with the history of Śaivism in its entire range than the literal interpretation according to which a wild, ferocious and marauding spirit (Rudra) is tamed ultimately into a benign and auspicious one (Śiva) by propitiation.

Paśupati

This term literally means 'The Lord of the flock'. *Paśu* refers to all souls, in the state of bondage. *Pāśa* is the threefold rope or cord by which the souls are bound. *Pati*, or *Paśupati* is the Lord who is ever free and Who helps the souls to overcome their bondage. *Pāśa* is the threefold cord of *āṇava*, *karma*, and *māyā*.

The following *mantras* of the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* lend support to the Śaivite categories of *Pati*, *Paśu* and *Pāśa*.

> "...What is praised (in the *Upaniṣads*) is the highest Brahman, and in it there is the triad. The highest Brahman is the safe support, it is imperishable."
>
> "The Lord (*Īśa*) supports all this together, the perishable and the imperishable, the developed and the undeveloped. The (living) self, not being a lord, is bound, because he has to experience (the fruits of his deeds), but when he has known the Lord, he is freed from all fetters."
>
> "There are two, one knowing (*Īśvara*), the other not-knowing (*Jiva*), both unborn, one strong, the other weak; there is she too, unborn, who is engaged in bringing about the relation of the enjoyer and the enjoyed (in recompense of works). There is the Infinite Self, under all forms but itself inactive. Where all these three are realized, the self becomes infinite, universal and free from the sense of agentship." (I. 7,8 and 9)

> "...There is Rudra only; they do not allow a second, who rules all the worlds by his powers. He stands behind all persons, and after having created all worlds, etc., the protector, rolls it up at the end of time." (III. 2)

Śaiva Siddhānta draws its support not only from *Vedas* and the the *Śaiva Āgamas* but also from Tamil works. In the *Tolkāppiyam* considered to be the oldest among the extant Tamil works, there is a reference to *Kandali*. *Kandali* is explained thus: "It is the pure effulgence free from blemish, beyond the reach of word, body and mind (*vāk*, *kāya*, and *manas*). It requires no support for itself but is the support of everything. It is ever of the nature of bliss."[2] By way of further clarification a standard commentator quotes the following lines[3] from the *Tiruvācagam*, a great Tamil Śaivite devotional work. "The supreme Reality is the living presence in the body and, like the fragrance arising from a sweet smelling flower, it cannot be laid hold of."

In the concept of *Kandali*, three features are worth noticing: (1) The pure effulgence — the supreme spirit which is ever free from blemish (*Pati*), and by implication (2) other spirits suffering from blemish (*paśu*), and (3) the blemish (*pāśa*). The nucleus for *Pati*, *paśu* and *pāśa* can thus be found in the concept of *Kandali*. We could see similarly these three in the following verse of the *Tirukkuṟaḷ* which is an ancient Tamil classic. "If one knows the true support and lives avoiding dependence on (false) supports, the disease that will otherwise approach one will not do so."[4] The true support is the Lord (*Pati*). The false supports causing the disease are the bonds (*pāśa*). Souls (*paśu*) are those afflicted with the disease.

We have references to *Śiva* in ancient Tamil works known as the *Saṅgam* classics, not so much directly by name as by phrases giving characteristics distinctive of Him — such as, "The unwinking three-eyed one who has Umā as His consort, and who destroyed the three castles" "The one sitting under the banyan tree", and so on. We have the first clear outline of Śaiva Siddhānta in Tirumūlar's *Tirumandiram* (5th CenturyA. D.). One of the verses therein is to this effect:[5]

> Of the three spoken of as *Pati*, *paśu* and *pāśa*, like *Pati*, *paśu* and *pāśa* also are beginningless. *Paśu* and *pāśa* cannot draw near *Pati*. When *Pati* draws near, *paśu* and *pāśa* cannot abide.

Source Books for Śaiva Siddhānta

The main source books for Śaiva Siddhānta are the *Vedas* and *Śaiva Āgamas* in Sanskrit. While ancient Tamil culture and literature have nourished the origins of Siddhānta, inspirational support is found in the Śaivite devotional works in Tamil collectively known as the *Panniru Tirumuṟai* (Twelve sacred works). Of these, the *Tēvāram*, the *Tiruvācagam*, the *Tirumandiram* and the *Periyapurāṇam* have received greater attention than the two anthologies, reckoned as the ninth and eleventh of the *Panniru Tirumuṟai*. In another set of works doctrinal in character and collectively known as the fourteen *Meykaṇḍa Śāstras* (or *Siddhānta Śāstras*), we have systematic treatment of the *Siddhānta*. The *Śivajñānabōdham* of Meykaṇḍār is regarded as the basic text of Śaiva Siddhānta. The *Śivajñānasiddhiyār* is a commentary in verse on this text. It consists of two parts, *parapakṣa* and *svapakṣa*. The *parapakṣa* states and refutes from the standpoint of the Siddhānta other systems from the *Cārvāka* to the *Pāñcarātra*. The *svapakṣa* is an exposition of the Siddhānta with incidental criticism of other systems. The *Śivaprakāśam* is based on the *Śivajñānabōdham* and the *Śivajñānasiddhiyār*. The *Tiruvaruḷpayan* is another popular work in this set. It consists of ten chapters, each chapter consisting of ten couplets. It has been translated into English by G. U. Pope and forms part of the introduction to his translation of the *Tiruvācagam*. There is a prose commentary on the *Śivajñānabōdham* by Śivajñāṇa-munivar on the model of *bhāṣyas* in Sanskrit like those of Śrī Śaṅkara and Śrī Rāmānuja. In fact this is the only commentary of its kind in Tamil.

The Tamil devotional works, referred to above, provide like the *Upaniṣads*, the experiential support to the philosophical truths systematically explained in the doctrinal works. The *Periyapurāṇam*, which is the twelfth of the devotional works is a remarkable one. It is a narrative of the lives of Śaivite saints. These saints constitute a fraternity, without geographical and temporal limits. Through the rich variety of their lives runs a golden string of utter selflessness and dedication to the Lord and His devotees.

Philosophical Technique

The period of the heterodox and orthodox systems (*nāstika* and *āstika darśanas*) in Indian philosophy witnesses systematic attempts to establish one's own system by showing how it is free from the inadequacies of other systems. In other words, each system states the *pūrvapakṣa* (the standpoint of others) and establishes its own conclusion (*siddhānta*) after refuting the former. It is usual, in the traditional exposition of Śaiva Siddhānta, to claim that the word *Siddhānta* as part of its name, shows that it is the final or accomplished end. But such an interpretation does not accord with the history of Śaiva Siddhānta which shows that the *ācāryas* are sensitive to the philosophical and religious trends of their times and that in stating their position they take those also into consideration. Thus in the *Śivajñānasiddhiyār* (*parapakṣa*) we find refutation of *nāstika* and *āstika darśanas*. But in the *Saṅkarpanirākaraṇam* by Umāpati Śivācārya who was the disciple of the author of the *Siddhiyār*, we find that with the exception of *Māyāvāda* the views refuted are those of various schools of Śaivism. Presumably, by this time Śaiva Siddhānta did not have to contend with alien schools but had only to define itself sharply in relation to other schools of Śaivism. Time has not stood still after 1313 A.D. when the *Saṅkarpanirākaraṇam* was written. Hence in any statement of Śaiva Siddhānta there is need for exposition of its basic tenets in comparison and contrast with contemporary systems, Indian and non-Indian.

What are the basic concepts in Śaiva Siddhānta? These are *Pati*, *paśu*, and *pāsa* (as said earlier). In establishing these, the Siddhāntin passes in review the various systems, heterodox and orthodox.

The systems differ in the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇas*) they accept. The number ranges from one to six or more. The Siddhāntin accepts three: (1) *pratyakṣa* (perception), (2) *anumāna* (inference), and (3) *śabda* (verbal testimony). But these are considered auxiliary to the over-all *pramāṇa*, unique to the system, viz. *jīva citśakti* (the soul's Intelligence Energy) illumined by *Śiva citśakti*. The Siddhāntin endeavours to show how *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* are inadequate and need to be supplemented by *śabda*. At the same time, he tries to show how *pramāṇas* like *upamāna* (analogy), *arthāpatti* (presumption) and *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension) can be subsumed under the three he recognises.

The Siddhāntin's view that the ultimate *pramāṇa* is the soul's Intelligence Energy (*jīva citśakti*) as illumined by the Lord's Intelligence Energy may be understood in comparison with (a) light (b) eye and (c) spectacles. Spectacles enable the eyes to see; but in the absence of light neither the eye, nor the spectacles nor both together will be of any use. The commonly accepted *pramāṇas*, like *pratyakṣa* are like the spectacles; *jīva citśakti* is like the eye; and *Śiva citśakti* is like light. The soul is unlike matter in being an intelligence but is unlike God for the reason that He is a self-luminous intelligence whereas the soul is an intelligence requiring illumination. The comparison of the soul to the eye is apt insofar as it is the eye which unlike other organs can see objects. Alike in the state of bondage and in the state of release, it is *Śiva citśakti* which enables the soul to have knowledge. In this connection, the Siddhāntin speaks of Śiva's help as two-fold — (a) showing objects to the soul and (b) seeing to it that souls perceive them and by making them experience pleasure, pain and delusion. We may recall the words of saint Appar (a seventh century Tamil Śaiva saint): "Who will fail to see if You show? O, Thou with an eye on Your forehead, who can see, if You fail to show?"[6]

The help of showing consists in Śivaśakti pervading the soul and illumining its thinking and willing. The help of seeing consists in controlling the soul and pervading the objects. This is like light illumining not only the eye but also the objects.

The Siddhāntin's views in regard to truth and error may also be noted briefly. The Siddhāntin's theory of truth is like the coherence theory of truth in Western Epistemology. There are two important factors in coherence. They are inclusiveness and harmony. The Siddhāntin endeavours to include all standpoints from the Cārvāka to other schools of Śaivism by arranging them as outermost, outer, inner-outer and inner. This is a matter of haphazard combination. He tries to bring the various views in a harmonious way. The insight of each school is taken in a stair-case arrangement, each lower step leading on to a higher one. His theory of error is like the *anyathākhyāti* of Naiyāyikas. Unless there are two separate entities with some similarities between them, (*e.g.* shell and silver, rope and snake) one cannot be mistaken for another. Consequently the Siddhāntin argues that Brahman cannot be mistaken for material objects (*acetana*) like pot, etc. The Siddhāntin subscribes to the theory of intrinsic validity (*svataḥprāmaṇya*) of knowledge. Truth is intrinsic to knowledge. To look for its validation outside is to be launched on an infinite regress. It is error which is extrinsic.

Pati (God)

With the foregoing epistemology, the Siddhāntin gives arguments for the existence of God (*Pati*), souls (*paśu*) and bonds (*pāśa*). The arguments are advanced in such a manner as to strengthen the faith of those who believe in these verities and to meet the objections of those who reject them or suggest substitutes for them. When objections are met satisfactorily, the ground is prepared for faith in those who originally did not accept the verities. It should be noted that faith is not generated by arguments. Neither is it self-generated. It is God's gift.

The Siddhāntin takes the world as real and proceeds to give its efficient (*nimitta*), auxiliary (*sahakāri*), material (*upādāna*) and final (*prayojana*) causes. The efficient cause is *Pati* (Śiva). The auxiliary cause is Śivaśakti. The material cause is *māyā*. The final cause or purpose (*prayojana*) is the purification and perfection of souls. In taking the world as real and as subject to the processes of creation *sṛṣṭi*), maintenance (*sthiti*), and periodic destruction or involution (*saṁhāra*), the Siddhāntin rejects the views of (i) those who maintain that it is a void (*śūnya*), (2) those who maintain that the world has always been in existence — has been never unlike its present state and thus does not require to be created and (3) that is a natural combination and natural dissolution of four elements (earth, water, fire and air), and thus needs no spiritual agent for either of these processes. Likewise, in giving *māyā* as the material cause, the Siddhāntin rejects the views of those who suggest (1) atoms (*aṇu*), (2) *prakṛti*, and (3) *Brahman* (*i.e.* rejects both *Brahmapariṇāmavāda* and *Brahmavivartavāda*). It is through His Śakti as an auxiliary of cause that Śiva engages in the activities of creation, and dissolution of the world. The dissolution is periodic to give rest to the souls. These activities are *līlā* (sport or play) for Śiva, not in the sense that it is a pastime or idle play. It has redemptive purpose. The word, *līlā* is used to show that there is no strain involved in the process. It is, as we might say, child's play for Him. The redemptive purpose has two features: *tirobhāva* (obscuration) and *anugraha* (bestowal of grace). Creation, maintenance, destruction, obscuration and bestowal of grace are the five activities of the Lord (*pañcakṛtya*). The first three are in respect of the physical universe, (*acetana prapañca*), and the last two are in respect of souls (*cetana prapañca*).

The Siddhāntin says that the world is classifiable as 'he' (masculine), 'she' (feminine), and 'it' (neuter). It is a whole consisting of these three parts. The assembling of these parts must be due to an intelligent spirit. Besides, it is subject to changes. In other words, it is brought into existence, maintained and withdrawn. These changes are not self-made. They are made by an intelligent spirit. It may be objected that it is not right to affirm of the entire world changes witnessed in regard to individual things. The Siddhāntin suggests an analogy to clarify and reinforce his point. We see an entire species of plants or insects coming into existence in a season, staying for some time and going out of existence. His contention is that change is ingrained in the world. It is usual to give the potter as an example in this context. The Siddhāntin anticipates the objection that it is not right to give the potter, as a finite being, is ignorant in many respects. The Siddhāntin replies that the potter may be ignorant of many things but not of making a pot. Similarly, since the universe is all that is (besides God and souls), God cannot be ignorant of the universe or of the mode of its creation.[7]

The foregoing argument is based on the existence of the physical universe. The Siddhāntin advances another argument on moral grounds. The Lord subjects the world to the processes of origination etc., to enable the souls to get rid of their impurity. Acting from a sense of egoism, they accumulate *karma*. They are subjected to births and deaths till they learn the lessons of morality and spirituality. *Karma*, being an inert principle, cannot apportion its fruits properly to souls. Souls, in their state of bondage, are not likely to apportion the fruits properly to themselves. Hence a moral governor (*karmādhyakṣa*) is required. That moral governor is Śiva.

Though these are the arguments usually given in the Siddhānta works, for the existence of God, it is possible to build up two more arguments from the devotional works referred to earlier, as the *Panniru Tirumuṟai*. In the *Tirumandiram*, we have the nucleus for a teleological argument or argument from design. One of the verses of the *Tirumandiram*[8] speaks of God as the Mighty One Who has placed a fire in the midst of the sea to prevent its overflowing on land. Anticipating the objection that there are occasional cases of coastal erosion, of sea submerging the land, the author says suggestively that nonetheless, the Lord showers His grace day and night, — ceaselessly. Here we have a stimulus at once to our faith and to our intellect. The stimulus to faith is whether it can respond to the presence of God as it ought to, by remaining unshaken despite calamities on a limited or even cosmic scale. In the devotional works we find the firm declaration of such faith in spite of calamities. The stimulus to the intellect is to stir it to see the divine plan as a whole. Thus what appear to a short range view as cases of dysteleology and seem contrary to purpose or design are really seen to be necessary, from a long-range view. 'Out of evil cometh good'. In short, the physical world is designed to serve the purpose of spiritual advancement.

It is possible similarly to construct an ontological argument also. The ontological argument is to the effect that the idea of a perfect Being, than whom nothing higher can be conceived, carries with it existential necessity, not merely logical coherence. M. Hiriyanna and S. Radhakrishnan in their works on Indian Philosophy have drawn attention to the similarity of an argument in the Yogadarśana to the ontological argument we come across in European Philosophy. There is a line in the *Tēvāram* verse of Saint Appar. It is in the form of a question which carries its own answer. "How can I declare that He who has entered and who abides in the ambit of my intellect is false (is non-existent)?"[9] In other words, Appar is certain that the idea of God is not a mere figment or fabrication of his mind. It is so central that it gives meaning to and validates the very idea of existence. God exists. He is a necessary Being. Souls and the world derive their existence from Him.

The foregoing arguments may serve the purpose of strengthening faith where it exists or preparing the ground therefor. The accounts of the lives of some of the saints given in the *Periyapurāṇam* make it clear that the Saints required no arguments to support their faith. The life of Saint Kaṇṇappar is remarkable in several ways, not the least being that he felt the *Śivaliṅga* to be a living presence, pulsating with life. Totally illiterate in the worldly sense, he was yet aware of that by knowing which everything else can be known. The devotional verses of the Śaiva Saints are vibrant with a sense of the presence of God.

Paśu (Souls)

The conception of soul, as is well-known, is not restricted in Hinduism to the human level. Any thing alive is a soul. In fact, as Māṇikkavācagar sings about his own experience, souls pass (and sometimes repass) through all levels, from that of the inanimate stone to that of the celestials. The question of the existence of souls is raised only at the human level. This question has given rise to various answers, ranging from outright denial of an enduring entity to the soul's total identification with the Infinite. We may start with a free paraphrase of a few selected lines from a Śaiva devotional work,[10] by Paṭṭinattār (9th century A.D.) before we list and briefly explain the various answers.

Starting at the periphery of the body, the analysis regarding 'Who am I' or 'What is the soul?' proceeds thus: "Is it the collection of the hairs (on the surface of the body)? Is it the spread of the skin on which these hairs sprout? Is it the flesh (like a sore) beneath the skin? Is it the surge of blood underneath the flesh? Is it the bones spanning the intervening spaces? Is it the brain stern? Is it the marrow within the bones? Is it the array of worms slowly creeping within? Is it the collection of impurities in the fluid (or watery part of the body)? Is it the rope of nerves tying up all these? Is it the disease inside the body ceaselessly tormenting one? I knew not the answer, I did not know what I was. I sought myself in any and every thing. I could not find myself in any one of them.

Seeking thus to find himself by his unaided intellect, Paṭṭinattār could only report failure. But when God's grace takes him by the hand, so to say, the situation changes marvellously. He proclaims joyously his discoveries. Possessed by the Lord's grace he says, "I was able to pierce the screen of *māyā*, and, obtaining spiritual sight, I was also able to see the Lord's eminence. Beholding It, I saw myself also. I saw others also. I saw everything of the Lord's state. Alas! All those who fail to see the Lord are also those who fail to see themselves."[11]

Meykaṇḍār, with his characteristic brevity, draws attention to the affirmation implicit in the very denial of the soul. Paradoxically, denial carries affirmation. He says, "It (the Soul) exists, because it is denied."[11] There are two points here. The first is that denial can be meaningful only when there is the possibility of the existence of the thing denied. Bare denial has no significance. We deny horns of a hare because we have seen horns elsewhere. If there are no horns at all, anywhere, any time, how can one come to deny them? The second point relates to the rejection of every thing suggested as soul. When the body, the sense organs, internal organs, etc., are all rejected, what is it that abides through all the rejections to deny the existence of the soul? Analysing away everything as not soul when one says there is nothing, still there is that one who says there is nothing. So the Siddhāntin argues that the doctrine of the soul as void (*śūnya*) is logically untenable. What about the physical body? Don't we, for the most part, identify ourselves with our body? We do, but this is a misidentification. If the body were the soul, would there be any difference between a corpse and a living person? Everything is intact in the corpse. Still it is disposed of. Besides there is the usage 'my body'. This shows that there is something other than the body which possesses it. This point may call forth the retort, "What about the expression, 'my soul'?" The Siddhāntin's reply is that the expression 'my soul' is like the expresion 'Rāhu's head,' where Rāhu *is* the head, nothing apart from it. Since we are aware of the world only through our sense organs may we not take these to be the soul? The Siddhāntin replies that each of the sense organs can do only its respective function, not that of another. Hence none of them can be the soul. Even the aggregate of these cannot be the soul, because (1) there would be no coordination and (2) the question of primary among these would crop up. Can the internal organs (*antaḥkaraṇas*) *viz.*, *manas*, *citta*, *ahaṅkāra*, and *buddhi* be taken as the soul? No; the difficulty is the same as in the case of the sense organs, *i.e.*, each has its own function and cannot take over the function of another. As an aggregate they will be deficient in coordination and each will start a fight for supremacy over the others. It may be thought that the subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra*) which functions in dreams may be the soul. If that were so, there would be neither failure to recollect them on waking nor confusion regarding what is recalled. In other words, we must be able to recall the dreams exactly as they occur. The next claimant is the vital breath (*prāṇavāyu*). If this were the soul, there could be no loss of awareness in the state of sound sleep. At this stage, it may be suggested that the aggregate of body, sense, and internal organs, subtle body, and vital breath may be the soul. But this would land us in the old difficulty once again — that is, failure of coordination and problem of supremacy. Yet another suggestion is that while the soul is none of these physical and psychical factors, it is the Supreme Intelligence. Were this so, how could we account for ignorance, partial knowledge and lapses in knowledge? Thus the Siddhāntin, after examining various views starting with outright denial of such an entity as a soul, to its complete identification with the Supreme Intelligence, concludes that the soul is an entity different from physical and mental organs and also from the One Supreme Intelligence. It is a presupposition of Indian Philosophy that souls, whether one or many, finite or infinite, are eternal. They are not created. They are indestructible.

Plurality of Souls

The Siddhāntin goes on to argue that there is a plurality of such souls. It may be recalled that all the orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy (*āstika darśanas*), except Advaita Vedānta accept a plurality of souls. It must be noted that in Advaita Vedānta also, plurality of souls is denied only at the transcendantal and, not at the empirical level. The main objection to acceptance of plurality is that the soul as an intelligence (*caitanya*) in its essential nature cannot be distinguished from any other intelligence as such. All the differences noticed between one soul and another are in respect of the differences relating to sensory and mental equipment and the incidence of birth and death not simultaneously but at different times. Since these are not the soul, there is no way of recognising plurality and differences. In other words there is no way of distinguishing one soul from another. It may be said in reply that these objections overtook the spiritual history of the souls. The sensory and mental equipments are different according to the *karma* (previous deeds of the souls). Some souls take longer than others to attain salvation. It is not as if salvation is simultaneous for all souls. In brief, souls are distinguishable by virtue of their spiritual history,which is rich in its variety. Unless bondage, though terminable is taken to be actual, and not illusory, it is difficult to understand why spiritual practices are prescribed in a graded manner. We may see three views in contrast here. One is to accept the fact of bondage but deny that there is a permanent entity affected by it.

Freedom would consist then in realizing that since everything is momentary, there is no permanent soul to be bound. In other words, to put it crudely, it is like saying that there is sickness (desease) but no sick person. The other view is the direct opposite of it. This view accepts a permanent entity but denies that it is subject to bondage. It only *appears* to be bound. It is ever free but mistakenly conceives itself to be bound. Otherwise, what is unbound, may get bound once again. This view is like saying that since health is the normal state, sickness is only imaginary. This seems to be dissolution of the problem, not a solution of it. The third view, which is roughly the theistic position, is to accept health as no doubt the natural state but as exposed to the incidence of disease, which fortunately is curable. In other words, souls are essentially free. But, through ignorance inevitable in the early stages of evolution, they misuse and abuse their freedom and thus bind themselves. By God's grace, through spiritual practices they find that their freedom consists in acting as instruments of God, completely redeemed from conceit — *i.e.*, redeemed from acting from a sense of 'I' and 'mine'. This is for the majority of souls a slow and long process involving many births, up and down in the scale of spiritual evolution.

Pāśa (bonds)

Pāśa literally means rope. Even as cattle are tied by ropes, souls are bound by *pāśa*, which like a threefold cord, consists of three strands, *viz.*, *āṇava*, *karma* and *māyā*. *Pāśa* is a common name for all the three strands. These three are like a rope restricting the free movement of cattle. They are comparable to fetters round the hands and the feet of persons. *Āṇava*, as the main obstruction, is said to be *pratibandha*. *Karma* as what follows the souls in their moral and spiritual career is said to be *anubandha*. *Māyā*, as the primal stuff out of which the bodies of the souls, and the world in which they live are made, — as that with which they are associated, is said to be *sambandha*. *Pāśa* is also known as *mala* (impurity) as defiling the essential purity of the souls. *Āṇava* is *mūlamala*, the primal impurity. It defiles *karma* and *māyā* which by themselves are neutral. *Āṇava* is also called *sahajamala* (as co-born, so to say with souls) whereas *karma* and *māyā* are called *āgantuka* (those which come later). It is usual to say that *pāśa* is *anādi* (beginningless). Though their attachment to souls is said to be without beginning, it is not endless.

What is meant by saying that *āṇava* is natural to souls? If it is natural, will not its removal involve the destruction of the soul? It is usual to compare *āṇava* to the green matter (verdigris) in copper. Even as the brightness of copper is affected by the green matter, the intelligence, freedom and natural love of souls are affected by *āṇava*. We can understand the expression 'natural' along the following lines. Souls have the potentiality to develop their personality. This development to be perfect, must be theocentric, not egocentric. But the usual tendency is for souls in their state of immaturity to inflate their ego with claims 'I' and 'mine'. In thus trying to be the chief actor in every situation and sole possessor of all things, souls really dwarf their real stature. Even as a self-styled great man is looked upon as petty-minded, the soul which is *mahat* (great) and *vibhu* (pervasive) becomes atomic by its egocentricism (*aṇu* is a name sometimes used as a synonym for the soul in the state of bondage). Like weeds growing with useful crops *āṇava* generates the conceit of 'I' and 'mine' in the soul. *Āṇava* is so insidious that it hides its presence in the soul very effectively. Whereas physical darkness at least reveals itself, though it prevents us from seeing other things, *āṇava* which is spiritual darkness hides itself also. It makes the soul claim agency for its deeds promoting not a sense of moral responsibility but arrogance and possessiveness. These, as we shall see, are transformed in the state of release. The sense of 'I' and 'mine' in the state of bondage pervades all one's talk and hence is compared by Saint Appar[12] to the figure 9. It will be noted that the figure nine tends to perpetuate itself in any multiple of itself, *e.g.*, 9×9=81: 8+1=9, 16×9=144: 1+4+4=9 and so on. Because of *āṇava*, *karma* is tainted. Likewise, the body and world which are products of *māyā*, instead of being used in worshipping God and serving His creatures, are used in selfish enjoyment and gratification of the senses. As obscuring the intelligence of souls, *āṇava* is said to possess *āvaraka śakti*. It is comparable to a cataract that hides the vision of the eye. As deluding souls and perverting their sense of values, *āṇava* is said to have *adho niyāmaka-śakti* (energy which drags souls down). *Āvaraka-śakti* is said to be the special nature of *āṇava* (*svarūpa*). *Adho-niyāmaka* is the general nature as it functions when it is associated with *karma* and *māyā*. It is because of the *adho niyāmaka śakti* of *āṇava* that souls seek things without real value instead of those whose value is abiding. Blindness to things of worth and craving for worthless things are so common in the early stages of moral and spiritual evolution that their root-cause *viz.*, *āṇava* is said to be (*sahajamala*) co-born with the soul. Their natural tendency is not destroyed but sublimated in the state of release. Hence *āṇava* (and *pāśa* as a whole) is said to be eternal.

Karma

Karma means 'what is done'. 'What is done' may be by thoughts, words and physical action. The Siddhānta speaks of three states of souls, *kevala, sakala,* and *śuddha.* In the *kevala* state, souls are totally devoid of awareness and activity. They are completely covered by the darkness of *āṇava,* like a diamond dropped in black ink. In the state of *sakala,* the Lord in His mercy, endows them with bodies (*tanu*), sensory and mental faculities (*karaṇa*) and makes them live in a world (*bhuvana*) with objects of enjoyment (*bhoga*). This is a period of partial illumination provided by the products of *māyā.* It is when souls are thus equipped, that they act and accumulate *karma.* If their thoughts, words and physical deeds are beneficial to other souls, they acquire spiritual merit (*puṇya*); if harmful, they acqure sin (*pāpa*). So long as *karma* is done with (i) sense of agency and (ii) desire to enjoy rewards and escape punishment, souls have to experience the fruits of their deeds in celestial abode (*svarga*), this world and hell. *Karma* and the cycle of births and deaths seem to be endless. But though in most cases the spiritual pilgrimage continues through several *aeons*, ultimately every one attains salvation. *Karma* can be made an ally in our spiritual endeavour when we go the right way about it. What is given as an aid to our salvation becomes an obstacle, thanks to the influence of *āṇava.* But early or late, souls overcome the influence of *āṇava* by God's grace.

Māyā

The ultimate stuff of the material universe is *prakṛti* for the Sāṅkhya and *paramāṇu* for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The Siddhāntin argues that if the ultimate means what is unitary and indivisible, neither *prakṛti* nor *paramāṇu* can be ultimate. For, *prakṛti* according to the Sāṅkhya has *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* as its constituents. *Paramāṇu,* insofar as it is linked with another *aṇu* to join compounds, must have parts for the link-up. What has parts cannot be ultimate. The Siddhāntin says that the ultimate stuff is *māyā*, spoken of in the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas*. The Siddhāntin holds *māyā* to be real in contrast to the Advaitin who says that it is indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*) as real or unreal or both or neither. The Siddhāntin speaks of *śuddha māyā*, *aśuddha māyā* and *prakṛti māyā*. Besides recognising the twentyfour *tattvas* of *prakṛti māyā* as in the Sāṅkhya, the Siddhāntin recognises five *tattvas* (called *Śivatattvas*) of *śuddha māyā* and seven of *aśuddha māyā* (called *vidyā tattvas*). *Śivatattvas* are directly actuated by the Lord. The *vidyā tattvas* and the twentyfour of *prakṛti-māyā* called *ātmatattvas* are actuated by deities under the authority of the Lord. The five *śiva-tattvas* are called *prerakakāṇḍa* (the directive part); the seven *vidyā tattvas* are called *bhojayitṛkāṇḍa* (the part that brings about enjoyment); and the *ātmatattvas* are called *bhogyakāṇḍa* (the part consisting of objects of enjoyment). Appropriate to the status of the Lord and the deities acting under His authority the material acted upon is subtle, gross and very gross. One commentator compares *śuddha-*, *aśuddha-* and *prakṛti-māyā* to silk, cotton and jute. *Śuddha māyā* has no taint of *mala* and hence is fit to be actuated directly by the Lord. The Siddhānta works give justification for recognising twelve categories more than the twentyfour given by the Sāṅkhya. As the evolutes of *māyā* help souls plunged in total darkness by *āṇava*, to have at least partial illuminations of their faculties, they are compared to a lamp that sheds a little light in darkness. The state of release is like sunrise overcoming darkness and illuminating everything. If through the experience made possible by association with the evolutes of *māyā*, souls work out their *karma* in the right spirit, there comes about maturation of *āṇava mala*. This is the stage when the soul is fit for removal of *mala* by the grace of God. Even as a cataract of the eye can be removed only when it is ripe, *āṇava* can be removed only when it is mature.

It is usual to compare *āṇava*, *māyā*, and *karma*, to the husk, bran, and sprout of a grain. Without the covering of the husk, the grain cannot grow. Likewise, without a sense of 'I' and 'mine', there is no possibility of experience. Though the husk is, thus, necessary upto a certain stage, it is removed from the grain when it is to be eaten. Thus, in God's providence *āṇava* also serves a purpose in one's moral and spiritual evolution. *Āṇava* functions as actuated by the *Tirodhāna-śakti* of the Lord. In the state of release, *Tirodhānaśakti* changes into *Aruḷ* (*anugraha-śakti*). We may infer that in consonance with this change, there is a change in the mode of the functioning of *āṇava*. The false sense of 'I' and 'mine' promoted by *āṇava* changes in such a way as to be charged with sacrificial love.

II

PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS

The eighth *sūtra* of the *Śivajñānabōdham* compares the soul (*paśu*) to a prince kidnapped in his infancy by gipsies and growing up in their ways until the king comes and rescues him, thus helping him to realise his royal identity. The point is this: the soul, in the grip of *āṇava*, goes the way of the sense, not the way of the Spirit. Hence it forges for itself an apparently endless cycle of births and deaths. It takes a long time for the soul to realise that it must detach itself from *āṇava* (false sense of 'I' and 'mine') and attach itself to the Lord. To quote Saint Tāyumānavar:

> When dawns the day when I can be in non-dual union
> with the Pillar of Real Wisdom, in the way I have been all
> along in non-dual union with *āṇava*?[13]

We have noted in the first part (I) that *āṇava* is said to be *sahaja-mala* (co-born or natural impurity). Perhaps we can make the usage of the word 'natural' clearer by recalling the Siddhāntin's view that the soul has a natural tendency to reflect its environment. A crystal may reflect the colour of a red flower. It may reflect sunlight. It is untrue to its own nature in the former and true to its nature in the latter. So is the case with *paśu* in identifying itself with *āṇava* and *Pati* respectively. The underlying purpose of the Lord's five functions is the purification and perfection of souls. This perfection is potential in the soul and it requires to be manifested. In order that this may be done, the soul has to rid itself of the impurity of egoism. We may distinguish between ego and egoism or between *aham* and *ahaṅkāra* with its concomitant *mamakāra*. If the word ego is accepted in the present context as equivalent to the soul (*paśu* and *jīva*), it is eternal. Egoism, or *paśutva*, insofar as the soul has a natural tendency to make itself the chief actor of all action and sole owner of all things, because of its subjection to *āṇava*, is an unfortunate but inevitable taint it has to get rid of in the course of its development.

How can one be a real person or have a proper development of one's personality? It is by cultivating the real ego and not the pseudo-ego which tries to move on its own axis or to grow around its own centre. From a state of non-awareness as a child, of one's identity, one has to grow into a state of awareness. In the early stages, one has to learn to distinguish oneself from others. This is for the purpose of knowing one's duties and discharging them in an unselfish way. But what happens is quite the reverse. One starts claiming rights and precedence over others, leaving them to do the duties one has to do oneself while claiming rewards for oneself. Or, rising a little higher in moral and spiritual evolution, one performs one's duties in order to claim rewards. This again, though better than the former stage, is still in the realm of the false ego. Real development or perception takes place (i) when one performs one's duties and gives away their rewards to others and (ii) when one takes on oneself the punishment for the lapses of others. This may be the spirit behind the Siddhānta insistence that *āṇava* (or *pāśa*) also is real and indestructible. What happens is that a new orientation is given to the sense of 'I' and 'mine'. The perfected soul no longer pushes itself as the agent (sense of 'I') in all cases of right actions done by others or even by itself and the owner or possessor of all rewards (sense of 'mine'). On the other hand, because of re-oriented egoism, the soul rushes forward to do all rescue operations even though they may be detrimental to itself (reformed sense of 'I') and to undertake to pay by personal suffering for the moral and spiritual lapses of others (reformed sense of 'mine'). A simple example may be helpful. When someone is drowning, the expert swimmer does not allow his sense of modesty to make him stand back and let others do the rescueing. He pushes others back and jumps in, at considerable risk to himself. We may recall the gist of a couplet[14] in the *Tiruvaruṭpayan* of Umāpati Śivācārya. He says that the redeemed souls (*jīvanmuktas*) swim about in the ocean of mercy to save souls from the harm caused to them by the pirates (forces dragging souls from the spiritual path). What is the precedent and pattern for the *jīvanmuktas*? Śiva Himself! The *devas* and *asuras* churned the ocean to get nectar. When deadly poison emerged first, they ran helter-skelter and sought refuge at Śiva's feet. Śiva gathered the poison and drank it, retaining it in

His throat. His poison-stained blue throat is a perpetual mark of His compassion and is a call to evolving souls to follow His example of facing danger, in order to let others escape it. It may be objected that selfish persons may not follow this example but use it to exploit the heroism of those who are prepared to sacrifice themselves so as to save others. There is no doubt that most of us lack moral and spiritual sensitivity to emulate the example of sacrificial love. But sooner or later, by God's grace, all souls will succeed in overcoming their selfishness and be prepared to offer themselves as ransom for others.

The Tamil word *āḷ* is significant in this context. Derived from the root *āḷudal* (ruling) and *āḷādal* (becoming a person) it may be generally understood to mean a person as also a servant. Who is a real person? In the unredeemed state, it would mean a person who 'lords it over others'. But in the state of and on the way to, redemption it means one who is prepared to love and serve others. He who wants others to serve him considering himself their master, has not really mastered himself, *i.e.*, overcome his self importance. The real Master is the Lord Who loves all and helps them when they call on Him. We may recall the following lines from Rudyard kipling.

> Father in Heaven who lovest all,
> Oh, help Thy children when they call,
> That they may build from age to age
> An undefiled heritage.[15]

The Tamil expression, *aḍiyārkku aḍiyān, Tillaiccir̤r̤ambalavan* (the Lord of Chidambaram, Who is the servant of His servants) is again a very significant one like Nīlakaṇṭan (the Blue-throated One) in making souls realize that they must grow to their full stature and manifest their potential perfection, only by becoming *āḷ* or persons in this sense — persons whose mission is "to minister and not to be ministered unto."

We may note the significance of *tirobhāva* (obscuration) in this context. It is said to be one of Śiva's five functions (the other four being *sṛṣṭi, sthiti, saṁhāra* and *anugraha*). The periodic destruction *saṁhāra* of the world is to give rest to souls, which are overcome by the fatigue of repeated cycles of births and deaths. Thus, though superficially it appears cruel, it is actually motivated by compassion. Now, obscuration is allowing the souls to be covered up by *āṇava*. How *is* it consistent with His grace? *Āṇava* cannot operate by itself. So it has to be actuated by the *Tirodhāna-śakti* of the Lord. It is really the obverse of *Anugraha-śakti*. Souls are likely to refuse to go through the process of moral and spiritual evolution when they get temporarily disillusioned with life when it brings suffering and pain in its wake. At this juncture, worldly life has to be made attractive to them once again till their temporary disillusionment gives place to total enlightenment through completion of their moral and spiritual education. They acquire a true sense of values and distinguish between instrumental and intrinsic values. Life after this enlightenment, will no longer be lived in an egocentric way. It will become God-centred, so that like Him they will be engaged in the work of saving souls. Hence obscuration serves a purpose in the Lord's scheme of purification and redemption of souls; when obscuration has served its purpose, the Lord's *Tirodhāna-śakti* which actuated *āṇava,* now becomes *Anugraha-śakti*. There should be no difficulty in accepting a re-orientation in the operation of *āṇava* also, in a corresponding manner.

Our *Purāṇas* illustrate philosophical truths around a core of history. History in the *Purāṇas* however is so elaborately dressed up that it is often written off as fiction. This is like throwing away the baby with the bath water. With this caution, we may recall the *Skanda-purāṇa* in this context. Śurapadma and his two brothers are personifications of *āṇava, karma* and *māyā*. It is said that having obtained a boon of immortality, Śurapadma could not be destroyed. In the last stage of the combat with Subrahmaṇya, he assumes the form of cock and peacock. Subrahmaṇya enlists Śurapadma in His service, taking the cock as His banner and the peacock as His mount. We may interpret the symbolism here thus: cock represents *mamakāra,* the sense of 'mine'; peacock represents *ahaṅkāra,* the sense of 'I'. The soul's *mamakāra,* is redeemed from selfishness, when everything is claimed as not one's own, but as the Lord's. *Ahaṅkāra* in the unredeemed state makes the soul go through life like a peacock which spreading its feathers struts about. But when the Lord mounts the peacock, it carries Him on His missions of mercy. Thus, at and after release *āṇava* makes redeemed souls share all the burdens in the Lord's work of redemption of souls.

How even a parable or myth may be valuable is explained by R. W. Hepburn in his book, *Christianity and Paradox* from which

Ian T. Ramsay has given the following extract in his *Words about God*.[16]

"Insofar as a story or parable delineates a way of life that we judge to be valuable, it is not of paramount importance whether or not the story or parable is historically true. It can do its work equally well if fictitious; sometimes better. What job *can* it do? Mainly that of backing up a bare moral rule with an imaginatively vivid instance of its being practised or neglected. In a parable at its best we may have not only an illustration of what the rule enjoins, but also in very little space some useful pointers to difficulties likely to impede our obedience to it, insight into the good effects of obeying, and may be still other sorts of information about it — all in one story. The peculiar beauty or grace or loathsomeness of ways of life can be brought out and kept easily before the mind in such stories, far more effectively than by memorising lists of maxims. They are most memorable and most imaginatively satisfying when bound together as incidents of one life-story, or as the events of one drama, poem, or novel, given their own aesthetic unity. They provide (what again the maxims fail to provide) a resting-place for meditation, and a standing test for the vitality and "Spirit" of one's own moral life, not merely of its conformity to the rules."[17]

Even more explicitly than in the *Skandapurāṇa*, but very crisply, Tirumūlar speaks of the destruction of the three cities (*Tripura Saṁhāra*).

"Fools say that the ancient One of red matted hair, wearing the Ganges destroyed the three cities. The three cities are the effects of the three impurities (*malas*). Who knows when those three cities were destroyed?"[18]

It is usual even to quote this verse emphasising the first three lines and ignoring the last line which poses a question. Presumably Tirumūlar does not want our time and energy to be wasted in answering the historical question, "When were they destroyed?" The lesson for us is that Śiva destroys the evil effects of the impurities affecting souls. In other words, souls get rid of the evil effects of the impurities by His grace. Another point implicit in this account ("providing a resting place for our meditation" to recall Hepburn's words quoted earlier) is that while the cities as effects of the impurites were destroyed, their owners, the three *asuras* were killed and later included in Śiva's legions. In other words, they also get transformed like Śurapadma.

The *Purāṇas* are nuggets of spiritual history. Their value for us consists in the moral and spiritual lessons that they teach us.

The Siddhāntins have given a scheme of spiritual exercises (*Sādhana*) to enable souls to wean themselves from *pāśa* and to live in perpetual awareness of *pati* as the source and sustenance of their very being. *Caryā*, *kriyā*, *yoga* and *jñāna* constitute this sheme. They are said to illustrate *dāsa mārga* (the path of the servant), *satputra mārga* (the path of the good son), *sakhā mārga* (the path of the friend) and *sanmārga* (the good path — typified either by the teacher-pupil relationship or the lover-beloved relationship). Appar (alias Tirunāvukkarasar), Tirujñānasambandar, Sundaramūrti and Māṇikkavācagar are the well-known exemplars of these paths. It may appear as though we proceed from a formal, external and distant relationship to an intimate inward and loving one as we move from *cārya*, on. No doubt, this is so for the *sādhakas* (or aspirants). But for the *siddhas* (the attained souls) each step or stage can be as overflowing with the love of God as the others. It is not *what* they do that matters as *how* they do. The idol (*vigraha*) worshipped in *caryā* and *kriyā* may be as vibrant with the presence of God as the illumined consciousness in *yoga* and *jñāna*. Saint Kaṇṇappar totally unacquainted with spiritually sophisticated modes of worship, has evoked the respectful adoration of Ādi Śaṅkara and Māṇikkavācagar.

Incidentally we invite the attention of readers to the rich scope for a comparative study of the relationships (*dāsa*, *satputra*, etc.) mentioned here with those listed in Sanskrit *bhakti* literature like the *Nāradabhaktisūtra*. It would also be fruitful to study the section entitled *Models and Disclosures*, dealt with by Ian T. Ramsay in *Words about God*. He classifies models into three groups: (1) family model, (2) models in terms of work and crafts and professions, and (3) pictures from a national setting. The study will be rewarding in enabling us to take a fresh look at the abundance and nuances of models used in our *bhakti* literature. Ramsay gives two cautions to be observed: (1) not to remain content with any one model but to use many models — multi-model discourse suitable to their context and (2) to fit our models in their empirical fit, remembering however, "Talk about God will not be related to the world around us as a scientific hypothesis is related to it. But meaning and relevance is no prerogative of scientific assertions."

We may briefly deal with *caryā* etc. *Caryā* consists mainly in external acts which are preparatory to worship. They are: sweeping the temple premises, gathering flowers, feeding the oil lamps, serving the devotees of the Lord, and so on. It will be noticed here that the body (*kāya*) is used for purposes of worship. Appar has a decad of verses known as *Tiru-aṅgamālai* wherein he exhorts each part of the human frame to perform that function for which it has been given.[19] The head is asked to bow before the Lord, the eyes are asked to behold His blue-throated form and so on. If thus the body is used to worship the Lord and serve His devotees, it would loosen the grip of *āṇava* on the soul instead of tightening it as it usually does when it is used in sensual pleasures. The mouth utters the praise of the Lord. The gift of speech (*vāk*) is to be used in adoration of the Lord and talk which will be spiritually uplifting and socially beneficial. It is a gross abuse of this gift to use it in idle and malicious talk, slander, gossip, etc. It may be asked whether even the casual repetition of the Lord's name and singing of His praises without concentration have any value at all. No doubt, concentration enhances the value. But even Sundaramurti who exemplifies the path of *yoga* draws attention to the value of training the mouth to utter the name of the Lord in the following words: "Even were I to forget you, my Lord, my mouth would utter Your name — *Namaḥśivāya*."[20] When the body (*kāya*) and speech (*vāk*) are harnessed in worship, the ground is prepared for the attunement of the mind (*manas*) necessary in progressive degrees in the following stages of *kriyā*, *yoga* and *jñāna*.

The stage of *kriyā* (literally acts) is characterised by performance of various acts, physical and mental. Usually a *vigraha* is used in worship. *Vigrahas* (idols) are worshipped both in homes and temples. The Siddhānta makes it clear that there are three factors in idol-worship, *viz.*, *āsana*, *mūrti*, and *mūrtimān*. Obeisance is offered to the seat (*āsana*) on which the *vigraha* is to be placed. The *vigraha* is the particular form (*mūrti*) chosen for worship. It may be Gaṇeśa or Śivaliṅga and so on. With the mind thus attuned in concentration on the seat to be occupied (*āsana*) and on the Lord in a chosen form (*mūrti*) it is easy to pass on to the Lord Himself, *i.e. mūrtimān*, the Infinite, Who in His boundless mercy and in response to our prayers, is pleased to manifest Himself. Thus the mind is enabled to go on to That which transcends all forms through the devout use of some form. Besides, when we recall that the Infinite Spirit is all-pervasive (*vibhu*), it is not inconsistent to attempt to become aware of His presence in particular objects, especially when they are sanctified in prayer and devotion. Again, there is a transition from the physical and the external to the mental and spiritual. For example, eight kinds of flowers are prescribed for worship. The aspirant is encouraged to progress in addition to the use of actual flowers to the level where the flowers are virtues like *ahiṁsā* etc. Likewise, in the early stage *naivedya* (food offering) is usually of the physical kind — coconuts, fruits, cooked cereals etc. But at a later stage, the devotee offers his soul (*ātma-nivedanam*). At the stage of *yoga*, the mind and spirit are yoked to the Lord in one-pointed concentration and meditation. When the body (including the sense organs) and mind are thus disciplined, the stage is set for *jñāna*. *Jñāna* is not mere cognitive awareness characterised by the triple distinction into knower, known (object) and knowledge. It is a total impartite awareness.

The *Śaiva Āgamas* give details for personal (*svārtha*) and public (*parārtha*) worship. The Śivācāryas to whom Sundaramūrti pays respect in the words, "Obeisance to those who touch the Sacred Form all the three times (morning, noon and night each day, being the times of worship) have to perform *svārtha pūjā* at home before they go to the temple to perform *parārthapūjā*."[21] This shows that they need to have the right mental set up by preparation before they offer worship in the temple. Attention is drawn to the need to avoid prayers for fulfilment of personal desires at the time of worship. In fact all the acts are such as are performed in the case of a royal guest. The aim is to enable the person performing the worship and those witnessing it to develop a sense of the presence of God. It is to help the worshippers to make an imaginative leap from that which has form to that which is beyond form (*rūpa*) and the formless (*arūpa*). At the conclusion of the worship the entire procedure is declared to be an offering at the Feet of the Lord with His consort of Grace for the well-being of all people (*sarve janāḥ sukhino bhavantu*).

The *Āgamas* have systematised worship giving instructions for construction of the temple, making of icons, consecration and installation of icons, articles to be used in worship, etc. The procedure for daily worship and for festivals during particular seasons is laid down.

It will be noted that items from the five elements (earth, water, fire, air and *ākāśa*) are drawn into worship. Flowers and fruits from trees on the *earth*, *water* for the sacred bath of the icons, lighted lamps (*fire*), musical instruments (*air* through *nādasvaram*, etc.) and vocal singing (sound traced to *ākāśa*) are representative of the elements. The entire social community is drawn into worship, each section of it contributing its own skill. In fact temple festivals provide the occasion to show how the community functions like the several parts of an organism. It is an occasion of rejoicing for the entire community which functions as if it is one integrated individual. Temples have been centres of culture and fine arts all through the centuries.

Mūrti (the sacred form of God worshipped), *sthala* (the place where the temple is situated) and *tīrtha* (sacred tank or river) are important factors in pilgrimage and worship. *Mūrti* is the form in which countless worshippers have felt the presence of God. Every *sthala* has its own *purāṇa*, recording the names of saints and celestials who had worshipped there. *Tīrtha* is sacred water suggestive of the cleansing of the mind and spirit along with the cleansing of the body. The important point is that the worshipper is made aware of these three factors with those who have been recipients of God's grace. Saint Appar who worshipped in various *sthalas*, bathing in sacred waters and beholding the Divine in the sanctified idols, calls attention, sometimes gently, sometimes sternly to the need for matching the physical acts with corresponding mental and spiritual attitudes.

We may recall the following from his *Tēvāram*:

> Even if one were to collect the sacred waters of a crore of *tīrthas* and bathe in them, but without love for Hara, that one would be like an obstinate person who puts a lid on a leak pot after filling it with water.[22]

There is no sense in closing the top with a lid if the pot allows water to flow away through its leak. Likewise, if the heart is not filled with love for the Lord — love which cleanses the soul of all its impurities, the washing of the body alone fails in the over-all aim of bath in sacred waters. Appar does not mean to deny the value of *tīrtha* but he makes us feel the need for total purity, not bodily purity alone.

Likewise, in the *Aṅgamālai* to which reference has been made already, he concludes:

> I have sought and found Him — Whom Viṣṇu and Brahmā sought but could not find.

Where has Appar found Him?

> I have sought and found Him in myself (*i.e.*, in my heart).[23]

Elsewhere Appar conjures a picture of high comedy. "The deceptive person that I am, I wasted my time in feigned (pretended) service. Coming to my senses, I sought and found Him. I was overcome by shame that He is in the minds of all, abiding with them and knowing all their thoughts. Then, I had to hold my sides in laughter (at the thought that I was not deceiving Him but deceiving only myself)."[24]

With the mind and senses distracted by worldly pleasures, we pretend to search for God. He Who is everywhere is with us in our search also — the only thing is that we are far too distracted to behold Him. Suddently it dawns on us that He is in the mind itself which is looking for Him; In fact the very urge to look for Him — however feeble or fervent — comes from Him. It is as if we are looking here, there and everywhere for someone, unable to find him. Suddenly we notice that He is, and all through the search has been, by our side. Saint Appar is so tickled by this high comedy that he has to hold his sides, unable to control his laughter.

We may recall Appar's endeavour to worship Śiva at Mount Kailās. When unable to continue walking, he started crawling to reach Kailās, Śiva appeared to him in the guise of an old brahmin and tried to dissuade Appar saying that human beings would not be able to complete that arduous journey. Appar expressed his determination to continue on his pilgrimage even if it meant his perishing on the way. Śiva asked Appar to bathe in a tank nearby. When Appar did so, he found himself mysteriously transported to Tiruvaiyāṟu in the South. There he beheld Śiva and Śakti in pairs of male and female animals and birds. The lesson evidently is that devotees should see Śiva and Śakti in all living beings, not merely in their divine forms in Mount Kailās, not merely see them in all living beings but serve them.

The *Periyapurāṇam* narrates the lives of two saints whose *caryā* and *kriyā* were on the mental level. Pusalār Nāyanār was a poor devotee who had a strong desire to build a temple. The lack of the financial means necessary for such a great enterprise did not daunt him. He resolved to build a temple mentally. This did not mean for him merely image of a temple at one stroke. He set about it as methodically as he would have done were it actual, taking the necessary time for laying the foundation on an auspicious day and hour, gathering the materials and proceeding step by step in the the regular order. At last when it was mentally completed, he chose an auspicious day for the formal installation of the idol. It so happened that a chieftain near Kāñcīpuram had actually built a temple at the same time and fixed the same day for the installation. Śiva appeared to the chieftain in a dream and asked him to postpone it, as He was going to enter the temple built by Pusalār Nāyanār in Tiruninravūr. The chieftain went to Tiruninravur to witness the function. On enquiry he found that there was no new temple. The local residents took him to Pūsalār Nāyanār, who was overcome by joy to hear from the chieftain that the Lord had graciously accepted his mental construction as an actual one. The significant point here is that the devotee had brought his concentration to such a pitch as to make it a sustained effort through the entire period. We have in the *Periyapurāṇam* a brief account of Vāyilār Nāyanār of Mylapore whose worship was completely mental. His temple was unremitting awareness (never a moment of forgetfulness) of God. The lamp he lit was right understanding of the relationship to the Lord. The sacred water for the bath of the Lord was bliss. The food offering was his love for the Lord.

Through spiritual practices ranging from the elementary to the final, souls acquire an attitude of mind which is called *iruvinai oppu* (*karma-sāmya*). Literally it means treating good and evil alike. This does not, however, mean that the distinction between good and evil ceases to be recognised. It is sometimes interpreted as the cancellation of all *karma* because the consequences of good and bad *karma* have become equal to one another. This does not seem to be probable *i.e.*, it is exceedingly unlikely that at some point in time the consequences match each other. Yet another interpretation is that the fruit of an act of great merit ripens simultaneously with the fruit of a most iniquitous act and thus the entire stock of good and bad *karma* is liquidated.

This interpretation is not in keeping with the spirit of morality. The interpretation favoured by standard commentaries is that the soul acquries a frame of mind which enables it to be indifferent to the consequences of good and evil *karma*. In other words it ceases to act from a sense of expectation of rewards and fear of punishment. It is prepared to do the right deed though thereby it has to face suffering. It is strong enough to resist the temptation of rewards if these are offered for bad conduct. Its moral fibre is strong enough to enable it to rise above all calculations of profit and loss, reward and punishment, joy and sorrow. It no longer acts with any sense of tension. Good conduct becomes natural to it, not an ideal towards which it struggles. Bad conduct becomes wholly foreign to it. This stage of moral growth brings about *malaparipāka* — the maturation of *āṇavamala*. As the soul is no longer thinking in terms of 'I' and 'mine' its egoism — self-centredness — is completely undermined. Like a ripe cataract of the eye being ready for removal, egoism is ripe for removal from the soul. The removal of the cataract restores normal vision to the eye. Likewise the removal of *āṇava* restores the natural, cognitive, conative and effective capacities of the soul to function without let or hindrance.

Malaparipāka is followed by *Śaktinipāta*, the descent of grace. The descent is very slow (*mandatara*) slow (*manda*), fast (*tīvra*) and very fast (*tīvratara*) according to the moral and spiritual state of the soul. Wet wood, dry wood, charcoal and camphor differ in the time they take to catch fire. Just as moisture delays ignition, traces of egoism delay the operation of grace according as they are strong or weak. The *guru* appears on the scene now to bestow grace. The Siddhāntin says that the *guru* appears in a human form to souls with three impurities (*āṇava*, *karma* and *māyā*). Like setting a deer, to catch a deer, the Lord, in His grace, appears in a human form to human beings so as not to overwhelm them by His transcendent majesty. The human beings however, are not to make the mistake of reducing the *guru* to their own level. They should worship the *guru* as the Lord Himself, because He is really the Lord. To souls with *āṇava* alone, He does not appear in an external form. He illumines their understanding and inspires them by abiding in them. In other words, souls in an advanced stage of spiritual evolution do not require the *guru* in an external form. They feel His presence in themselves and respond to His grace.

The question of response, whatever be the class of the soul is a difficult one, especially in the context of *freedom* and *karma*. We find in Christianity the debate about *gratia operans* and *gratia co-operans*. In Vaiṣṇavism, we find the debate about *mārjāra kiśora nyāya* and *markaṭa kiśora nyāya*. Though not formulated in such clear terms, in the Siddhānta also we find the mention of *tōṇi nyāya* (boat) and *ēṇi nyāya* (ladder). One has merely to get into a boat to be carried along to one's destination. But in the ladder, one has to exert oneself at each rung to climb to the next higher. In all these cases, the central question is whether human effort is minimal or almost nil or is required in a large measure to co-operate with God's will. We see here that these views try to avoid two extremes: (i) one is to ignore the need for personal effort altogether, not in the sublime sense of self-surrender but in utter moral and spiritual idleness; (ii) the other is to regard God's grace as marginal or just as a token. No doubt it is God's grace that implants the very impulse to worship Him. But this must not make us forget that God wants us to grow to our full moral and spiritual stature. Human freedom and God's grace are not to be set in opposition. By learning to act in conformity with His will, we become free in the real sense of the term. This freedom has a negative and a positive aspect. Negatively freedom is redemption from a false sense of 'I' and 'mine'. Positively it is the exercise of all our capacities to worship Him and serve Him in His creatures.

The Siddhāntin's consider *dīkṣā* as very important in spiritual life. The *guru* performs *dīkṣā* for souls. This has two aspects *viz.*, removal of *mala* and manifesting of the latent *śivatva* in souls. This may be done as *hautrī* (*homa*, etc.), by thought (*mānasa*), by word of mouth (*vāk*), by laying on of hands (*sparśa*,) by look (*cakṣu* or *nayana*). The touch of a *guru* imparts spiritual vibration and illumination. The word of a *guru* makes the supreme truth come alive to the aspirant. The look of a *guru* has a transforming effect. The *guru* can impart *dīkṣā* by thought. It is usual to give the following examples for the several types of *dīkṣā*. *Mānasa dīkṣā* is like the tortoise hatching its young ones from a distance by mere thought (presumably this was a popular belief). *Cakṣu dīkṣā* is like fish hatching its eggs by look (again a popular belief). *Sparśa dīkṣā* is like a hen hatching its eggs by brooding.

Though the Siddhāntin lays stress on *jñāna* as the ndispensable means of release, he insists on the performance of *dīkṣā* because he considers the removal of *mala* by *dīkṣā* as a necessary preliminary before the latent *śivatva* of souls can be manifested by *jñāna.*

We may recall a verse from Appar's *Tēvāram* which illustrates the differences in efforts required for the manifestation of *śivatva* according to the differences in the spiritual condition of souls. The Lord is an effulgence hidden from view by the encrustation of *mala* in the souls. He is like fire in fuel, requiring very strenuous effort for its manifestation by churning. He is like ghee in milk requiring less strenuous effort for emergence. He is like brightness in precious stones requiring the least effort by way of polishing in order to shine forth.[25]

Thus the Siddhāntin describes the steps necessary for the manifestation of *śivatva* hidden in souls by *mala*. He is firm in regard to two points. (1) *Śivatva* is not something newly acquired by souls but their very natural state. (2) Even though it is the natural state, it does not follow that ontologically the soul is one with Śiva. The Lord is *anādi mukta*, ever free, whereas released souls recover their freedom through the Lord's grace. The initial eclipse of their freedom is perhaps necessary for their moral and spiritual growth. We appreciate the freedom of the spirit only after we pass through the misery of subjection to the senses through egoism. When we act in conformity with the Lord's will in the spirit, "Our wills are ours to make them Thine," we realise that we are 'Children of immortality'. Meykaṇḍār insists that we should never forget that we owe our freedom to the Lord after He has enabled us to recover it. If earlier we had forgotten Him, it is understandable as due to obscuration caused by *āṇava*. But to forget Him after removal of *mala* is a lapse for which there can be no expiation. Śivajñānamunivar clinches the point by recapitulating the *Tirukkuṟaḷ* verse which says that there is expiation for all lapses except that of ingratitude.[26]

Social Aspects

Is the concept of social responsibilities compatible with the acceptance of the doctrine of *karma*? If everyone has to work out his *karma* and in the process has to undergo suffering, how can efforts by others to alleviate that suffering be of any avail? In answer, we have to remember some basic points about *karma*. First and foremost, *karma* is acquired by our deeds to do good or evil to others. Our thoughts, words and physical acts are mostly in respect of others and thus have a social reference. We are enjoined to do good to others to strengthen them (*hita*) and to refrain from harming them (*ahita*). Thus we have an inescapable duty to do good and refrain from evil. As for our efforts not being helpful to others who have to work out their suffering most of us do not know whether the suffering of anyone is due to his past *karma* or not. If at the sight of suffering, we do not rush forth to help, we fall short of our moral stature. One ethical text in Tamil says that giving medicine to one whose life is ebbing away is also worth doing because despite appearances to the contrary, some cases where failure seems imminent do turn out otherwise. Besides, whether our effort succeeds, or not, the sufferer has the satisfaction that others are doing their best without abandoning him as a lost case.

The Siddhānta makes it clear that not only doing harm to others is bad *karma* but also the failure to do good when one has an opportunity to do so. To put it in other words, our morality should be positive, always trying to do good to others, not negative, *i.e.*, merely refraining from doing evil. However, in discharging our social responsibilities, there should be no thought of self glory. It is only when we consider ourselves the channels through which God's grace flows to others or tools in His hands, we shall be able to work effectively unaffected by praise or blame. Saint Appar sings:[27]

> It is His duty to sustain (even) me
> It is my duty to abide in service.

We may recall in this connection allusions to the services rendered by ascetics and redeemed souls to relieve the suffering of souls.

Muruga (Subrahmaṇya) in one of His manifestations has six faces and 12 hands. A Saṅgam classic known as the *Tirumurugār̤r̤paḍai* describes the six faces with their respective functions. It says that one of His twelve hands is held up to sustain the ascetics who move about in the sky. The allusion here is to a belief that certain ascetics go round with the sun so as to temper its fierce heat from scorching all living things in the world. This belief about the ascetics is alluded to in another Saṅgam classic called the *Pur̤anānūr̤u*. It speaks of "ascetics with matted locks who, sustaining themselves only by air as their food, rotate about with the sun, bearing its destructive heat so that those living in the world may be spared suffering caused by it."[28] These ascetics use all the spiritual power they get from their penance not for their personal enjoyment but for relieving the suffering of others. The Lord is pleased with their selfless service and holds up one of His hands to sustain them in their noble work.

We may recall the social aspects of spirituality also in a verse in Tirujñānasambandhar's *Tēvāram* which may be rendered as follows:[29] "*Kali Yuga* is destructive by nature. It is difficult to live righteously. Instead it is all too easy to live in reprehensible ways. Moved by compassion for those going down the path of destruction, a certain ascetic (*Roma ṛṣi*) worships Śiva, with his group (the purpose of this worship being to redeem souls from their evil ways). The words of the Tamil Scholar (Tirujñānasambandhar refers to himself thus) sung in worship of Śiva so as to wash the souls of their impurities and destroy their effects (of these impurities) are (really) those of Śiva Himself Who uses Tirujñānasambandhar as His mouth-piece. Hence these are designed to be sung to cleanse the souls of the impurities (cause) and remove all suffering (effect)."

All these are pointers to the truth that the Lord provides the inspiration to redeemed souls to serve Him in His mission of saving souls from bondage and the suffering it brings in its wake.

It is important to remember that bondage (*bandha*) is due to self-centredness. Hence *mukti* or *mokṣa* is first and foremost freedom from self-concern and from desire for enjoyment of bliss, for oneself or for personal salvation. It is said that souls with two impurities advance, not so much by efforts to get rid of one or both these impurities, but by efforts to help those with three impurities to get rid of one or more of their impurities. It must also be remembered that for the Siddhāntin (as indeed for all Hindus) the concept of Society is inclusive of all living beings, human, sub-human and super-human. Hence a spiritual aspirant has duties towards all living beings.

As giving (*datta*) is the message of the thunder to human beings, according to the *Upaniṣad*, so also from the earliest Tamil literarure, giving to others is enjoined and receiving from others is discouraged. Even an ethical primer for Tamil children, inculcates the lesson "Give alms before you eat"[30] and implants the idea that it is demeaning to take (from others). A Tamil classic has the following lines:[31]

> It is demeaning to beg saying "Give." It is more demeaning to say "I won't give." It is ennobling to give saying "Take it." It is more ennobling to say "Please keep it."

In other words one must work hard not only to be self-reliant so as not to ask others for help but also to be in a position to give help to others. The sages and saints directly and indirectly teach us that we should put our trust in God and work for the welfare of others. They renounce the practice of some poets who misuse their talents to sing in exaggerated or even totally undeserved praise of hard-hearted rich persons in expectation of rewards and come away empty handed. "Work with your hands and praise the Lord" says Tirujñānasambandhar.[32] He exhorts us thus: "Plant groves and dig tanks. With a heart (redeemed from the Lordness of egoism) thus made soft (to inspire socially useful, not personally profitable work), worship the flower-like feet of the Lord, with flowers."[33] We may recall that the flowers are not only those from plants and trees but also those of the spirit like *ahiṁsā*, compassion, etc.

Saint Rāmaliṅganār of the last cenury sings "Make me a person devoted to your sacred feet in such a way that it will not be in my nature to stand before others and say 'Give'. When someone approaches me saying 'Give me *this*' — grant me the capacity to give that specific thing without saying 'No'."

Now when someone begs saying 'Give me *this*', what is asked for may be something cheaper or costly on the material plane. But cheap or costly, if it is a genuine need, then one must have resources enough to give it. Or it may be something on the intellectual or spiritual plane. Here again one must be in a position to give. In other words, it must be our ideal to acquire economic, intellectual, moral and spiritual wealth by honest exertion in the respective spheres so that we may share this wealth with others and not hoard it up for ourselves. Classical Tamil literature speaks of three groups of seven persons each, known as *Vaḷḷal* (magnanimous givers). They gave spontaneously even if they fancied there was a need. The *Mahābhārata* speaks of Karṇa giving away all his spiritual merit to Kṛṣṇa who came in disguise. Sri Ramakrishna Paramahamsa gave away all his spiritual wealth to Swami Vivekananda. All these instances reinforce the truth that only in living for others — indeed in being prepared to lay down even our lives for others — we really live.

The *Tolkāppiyam* — the earliest extant Tamil Grammar says that when a man and woman have set up a family and discharged their responsibilities the stage is set for them to the 'pursuit of perfection.' 'Perfection' here stands for the supreme goal of life — *parama puruṣārtha*. This, they are to do, not by themselves but in the company of their relatives and friends. It will be noticed that wedded life beginning mainly on the physical and social plane moves on to find its consummation on the spiritual plane. The husband and wife are spiritual partners now and they set the pace for their relatives and friends.

One often comes across the criticism that contemplatives and mystics have no sense of social responsibilities insofar as they withdraw themselves from the world. It is important to note the difference between those who turn their backs on life in order to escape its responsibilities and those whose withdrawal is a cover for their intense spiritual activity on behalf of the entire world. Even as a top spinning at high speed, appears stationary, these mystics seem to be idle. But their inner state is such as to sweep within its fold all living things so as to lift them from their fallen condition. Their prayers are not for themselves but for souls still in bondage. Their very presence in our midst or elsewhere is a blessing.

Texts, however, are not lacking in Siddhānta works which remind us of our social responsibilities before we move on to the exalted plane of contemplatives and mystics. Tirumūlar sings:

> If something is given to the Lord in the temple, it does not reach the people who are walking temples. If something is given to these walking temples, it reaches the Lord also.[34]

The *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār* says: "Those who have no love for the Lord, have no love for His devotees. Those who have no love for the devotees have no love for themselves. Those who have no love for themselves have no love for any living thing at all. Why talk about them? Though they move about, being devoid of sense, they are verily corpses."[35] Śivajñānamunivar illustrates the point that love for the Lord can be guaged by love for His devotees by the example that a man's love for his wife can be seen in his love for her relatives. It is hypocritical to say that we love the Lord if we do not love His creatures; for, verily, He indwells in each one of them.

Plans are drawn for an egalitarian society, welfare state, etc. Attempts are made to provide opportunities for economic, academic and social advancement for all. The governmental machinery for providing these opportunities may be democratic or totalitarian. The economic policy may be capitalist or socialist or communist in its orientation. If any scheme is to succeed whatever be the governmental machinery or economic policy, the root cause for existing inequalities must be sought and removed. That root cause is ego-centricism — the attitude of "I am the Lord of everything I survey", "I must own the whole world as my footstool." Until this ego-centricism is removed, the best of plans may not succeed. Hence ego-centricism has to give place to God (theo-)centricism.

There is a verse of Tirujñānasambandhar which can be paraphrased thus:

> Those who look up prayerfully to the Lord of *Vṛddhācala*, will not deny help to those who seek it, because the goddess of prosperity (*Lakṣmī*) is standing by them (is at their call).[36]

The prosperity in question may be in any sphere, secular or sacred. Because the devotees look up to the Lord all the time prayerfully, they are filled with an unfailing abundance. Their sufficiency is not of themselves, but of the Lord. Hence it is inexhaustible. The *Periyapurāṇam* helps us to realize the active love and concern of the devotees to relieve the suffering of others. We come across accounts of even restoration of life to the dead, apart from curing diseases, feeding the poor during famine, etc.

"How is the world kept going?" asks an ancient Tamil poet? We may be inclined to answer "By gravitational force." His answer is different.

> The world exists and is kept going because of those who even if they come by nectar will not drink it by themselves (but will give it to or share it with others) ... Their efforts are never for their own advancement but for that of others.[37]

Elsewhere we come across the phrase "Those who do not live for themselves but belong to others." The idea of giving away even nectar to others, to live for others, to be prepared to lay down one's life for others, has for its source and inspiration the blue-throated Śiva. To be a devotee of Śiva in the genuine sense is to live a life which pulsates with sacrificial love.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. C. V. Narayana Ayyar, *Origin and Early History of Śaivism in South India*, p. 4, University of Madras, Madras, 1974.
2. தொல்காப்பியம், பொருளதிகாரம், சூத்திரம் 33, (புறத்திணை இயல்) — நச்சினார்க்கினியருரை.

   கொடி நிலை, கந்தழி, வள்ளி என்ற
   வடு நீங்கு சிறப்பின் முதலன மூன்றும்
   கடவுள் வாழ்த்தொடு கண்ணிய வருமே.

3. மாணிக்கவாசகர், திருவாசகம், 434.

   உற்ற வாக்கையின் உறுபொருள் நறுமலர்
   எழுதரு நாற்றம் போல்
   பற்றலாவதோர் நிலையிலாப் பரம்பொருள்
   அப்பொருள் பாராதே
   பெற்றவா பெற்ற பயனது நுகர்ந்திடும்
   பித்தர் சொற்றெளியாமே
   அத்தனாண்டு தன் அடியரிற் கூட்டிய
   அதிசயங் கண்டாமே.

4. திருக்குறள், 359.

   சார்புணர்ந்து சார்பு கெட ஒழுகின், மற்றழித்துச்
   சார்தரா சார்தரு நோய்.

5. திருமூலர், திருமந்திரம்,
   முதல் தந்திரம், 115

   பதி பசு பாசம் எனப்பகர் மூன்றிற்
   பதியினைப் போற் பசு பாசம் அனாதி
   பதியினைச் சென்றணுகாப் பசு பாசம்
   பதி யணுகிற் பசு பாச நில்லாவே.

6. திருநாவுக்கரசர், தேவாரம், 6, 95, 3.

   ஆட்டுவித்தால் ஆரொருவர் ஆடாதாரே
   அடக்குவித்தால் ஆரொருவர் அடங்காதாரே,
   ஓட்டுவித்தால் ஆரொருவர் ஓடாதாரே
   உருகுவித்தால் ஆரொருவர் உருகாதாரே,

பாட்டுவித்தால் ஆரொருவர் பாடாதாரே
பணிவித்தால் ஆரொருவர் பணியாதாரே,
காட்டுவித்தால் ஆரொருவர் காணுதாரே
காண்பாரார் கண்ணுதலாய்க் காட்டாக்காலே.

7. Refer to Note E, entitled 'God's Creatorship and the Value of Inference' in S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri's *The Śivūdvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha*, p. 101, University of Madras, 1972.

8. திருமூலர், திருமந்திரம், 365.
சமைக்க வல்லானைச் சயம்பு வென்றேத்தி
அமைக்க வல்லாரிவ் வுலகத்துள்ளாரே
திகைத்த தெண்ணீரிற் கடலொலி ஓசை
மிகைக் கொள அங்கி மிகாமை வைத்தானே.

9. திருநாவுக்கரசர், தேவாரம், நான்காம் திருமுறை,
திருவையாறு திருவிருத்தம்,
"புந்தி வட்டத் திடைப் புக்கு
நின்றானைப் பொய்யென்பனே."

10. பதினோராந் திருமுறை, பட்டினத்துப் பிள்ளையார், திருவிடை மருதூர் மும்மணிக் கோவை,
பாடல் 13, வரிகள் 1—13.

11. *Ibid.*, ll. 28—36.

12. திருநாவுக்கரசர், தேவாரம்,
"ஒன்ப தொத்து நின்று என்னுள் ஒடுங்குமே"
ஐந்தாம் திருமுறை, தனித்திருக்குறுந்தொகை, பாடல் 9.

13. தாயுமானவர், எந்நாட் கண்ணி, பாடல் 28.
ஆணவத் தோடத்துவிதமான படி மெய்ஞ்ஞானத்
தாணு வினோடத்து வித ஞ்சாரு நாளெந்நாளோ.

14. உமாபதி சிவாசாரியார், திருவருட் பயன், 100.
கள்ளத் தலைவர் துயர் கருதித் தங்கருணை
வெள்ளத் தலைவர் மிக.

15. Rudyard Kipling, *The Children's Song*, stanza 2 (*vide, Puck of Pook's Hill*, p. 276, New York, 1906).

16. Ian T. Ramsay (ed.), *Words About God*, (London: S. C. M. Press Ltd., 1971). (This book is warmly commended to the readers for a fine representative selection of different points of view in regard to religious language.)

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 191-92.

18. திருமூலர், திருமந்திரம், 343.

அப்பணி செஞ்சடை ஆதிபுராதனன்
முப்புரஞ் செற்றனர் என்பர்கள் மூடர்கள்
முப்புரமாவது மும்மல காரியம்
அப்புரம் எய்தமை யாரறிவாரே.

19. திருநாவுக்கரசர், தேவாரம், 4—ம் திருமுறை.

திரு அங்க மாலை

தலையே நீ வணங்காய் — தலை
மாலை தலைக் கணிந்து தலையாலே
பலி தேருந் தலைவனைத்
தலையே நீ வணங்காய். (1)

கண்காள் காண்மின்களோ
கடல் நஞ்சுண்ட கண்டன்
தன்னை, எண்டோள் வீசி
நின்றாடும் பிரான் றன்னைக்
கண்காள் காண்மின்களோ. (2)

வாயே வாழ்த்து கண்டாய் —
மதயானை யுரி போர்த்துப்
பேய் வாழ் காட்டகத்தாடும்
பிரான் தன்னை வாயே
வாழ்த்து கண்டாய். (5)

ஆக்கையாற் பயனென் — அரன் கோயில்
வலம் வந்து, பூக்கையால்
அட்டிப் போற்றி யென்னாத
இவ் ஆக்கையாற் பயனென். (8)

20. சுந்தர மூர்த்தி நாயனார், தேவாரம், 7-ம் திருமுறை, நமச்சிவாயத் திருப்பதிகம், பாடல்கள் 1—9.

"நற்றவா உன்னை நான் மறக்கினும்
சொல்லு நா நமச்சிவாயவே."

21. சுந்தரர், திருத்தொண்டத் தொகை, 10

முப்போதும் திருமேனி தீண்டு வார்க்கடியேன்.

22. திருநாவுக்கரசர், தேவாரம், 5-ம் திருமுறை, 99. 9.

கோடி தீர்த்தங் கலந்து குளித்தவை
ஆடினாலும் அரனுக்கன்பு இல்லையேல்
ஓடும் நீரினை ஓட்டைக் குடத்தட்டி
மூடி வைத்திட்ட மூர்க்கனோடு ஒக்குமே.

23. திருநாவுக்கரசர், தேவாரம், 4-ம் திருமுறை, 9. 12.

தேடிக் கண்டு கொண்டேன் —
திருமாலொடு நான்முகனும்,

தேடித் தேடொணாத் தேவனை என்னுளே
தேடிக் கண்டு கொண்டேன்.

24. திருநாவுக்கரசர், தேவாரம், 4-ம் திருமுறை, 75, 3.

கள்ளனேன் கள்ளத் தொண்டாய்க் காலத்தைக் கழித்துப் போக்கித்
தெள்ளியே னாகிநின்று தேடினேன் நாடிக் கண்டேன்
உள்குவார் உள்கிற்றெல்லாம் உடனிருந்து அறிதி என்று
வெள்கினேன் வெள்கி நானும் விலாவிறச் சிரித்திட்டேனே.

25. திருநாவுக்கரசர், தேவாரம், 5-ம் திருமுறை, 90. 10.

விறகில் தீயினன் பாலிற் படு நெய் போல்
மறைய நின்றுளன் மாமணிச் சோதியான்
உறவு கோல் நட்டுணர்வு கயிற்றினால்
முறுக வாங்கிக் கடைய முன் நிற்குமே.

26. எந்நன்றி கொன்றார்க்கும் உய்வுண்டாம் உய்வில்லை
செய்நன்றி கொன்ற மகற்கு. திருக்குறள், 110.

27. திருநாவுக்கரசர், தேவாரம், 5-ம் திருமுறை, 19.

நங்க டம்பனைப் பெற்றவள் பங்கினன்
தென் கடம்பைத் திருக்கரக் கோயிலான்
தன் கடன்னடி யேனையுந் தாங்குதல்
என் கடன் பணி செய்து கிடப்பதே.

28. புறநானூறு, 43.

நிலமிசை வாழ்நர் அலமரல் தீர, ...
தெறு கதிர்க்கனலி வெம்மை தாங்கி,
கால் உணவு ஆக, சுடரொடு கொட்கும்
அவிர்சடை முனிவரும் ... ...
... ... — ...

29. திருஞானசம்பந்தர், தேவாரம், 3, 67, 12.

ஒழுகலரி தழிகலியி லுழியுலகு
    பழி பெருகு வழியை நினையா
முழுதுடலி லெழுமயிர்க டமுவுமுனி
    குழுவி னொடு கெழுவு சிவனைத்
தொழுதுலகி லிழுகுமல மழியும் வகை
    கழுவுமுரை கழுமல நகர்ப்
பழுதிலிறை யெழுதுமொழி தமிழ்விரகன்
    வழிமொழிகண் மொழிதகையவே.

30. ஔவையார், ஆத்திச்சூடி, 9. ஐயமிட்டு உண்.

31. புறநானூறு, 204.

'ஈ' என இரத்தல் இழிந்தன்று; அதன் எதிர்,
'ஈயேன்' என்றல் அதனினும் இழிந்தன்று;

'கொள்' எனக் கொடுத்தல் உயர்ந்தன்று; அதன் எதிர்,
'கொள்ளேன்' என்றல் அதனினும் உயர்ந்தன்று;
... ...

32. திருஞானசம்பந்தர், தேவாரம், 1, 116, 1.

அவ்வினைக் கிவ்வினையாம் என்று சொல்லும் அஃதறிவீர்
உய்வினை நாடாதிருப்பதும் உந்தமக் கூனமன்றே
கைவினை செய்து எம்பிரான் கழல்போற்றுது நாமடியோம்
செய்வினை வந்தெமைத் தீண்டப்பெறு திருநீலகண்டம்.

33. *Ibid.*, 1-116-2.

காவினை யிட்டுங் குளம்பல தொட்டுங் கனிமனத்தால்
ஏவினை யாலெயின் மூன்றெரித் தீர் என்று இரு பொழுதும்
பூவினைக் கொய்து மலரடி போற்றுதும் நாமடியோம்
தீவினை வந்துஎமைத் தீண்டப்பெறு திருநீலகண்டம்.

34. திருமூலர், திருமந்திரம், 7, 13, 1.

படமாடக் கோயிற் பகவற் கொன்றீயில்
நடமாடக் கோயில் நம்பர்க் கங்காகா
நடமாடக் கோயில் நம்பர்க் கொன்றீயில்
படமாடக் கோயிற் பகவற்கதாமே.

35. சிவஞானசித்தியார், சுபக்கம், 12-ம் சூத்திரம், பாடல் 2.

ஈசனுக்கு அன்பில்லார் அடியவர்க்கு அன்பில்லார்
எவ்வுயிர்க்கும் அன்பில்லார் தமக்கும் அன்பில்லார்
பேசுவதென் அறிவில்லாப் பிணங்களை ... ...
... ...

36. திருஞானசம்பந்தர், தேவாரம், 1, 93, 6.

மொய்யார் முதுகுன்றில், ஐயாவெனவல்லார்
பொய்யாரிரவோர்க்குச் செய்யாளணியாளே.

37. புறநானூறு, 182.

உண்டாலம்ம இவ்வுலகம் இந்திரர்
அமிழ்தம் இயைவதாயினும் இனிதெனத்
தமியர் உண்டலுமிலரே; முனிவு இலர்
துஞ்சலுமிலர், பிறரஞ்சுவதஞ்சிப்
புகழெனின் உயிருங் கொடுக்குவர்; பழி எனின்
உலகுடன் பெறினும் கொள்ளலர்; அயர்விலர்
அன்ன மாட்சி யனை யராகித்
தமக்கென முயலா நோன்றாள்,
பிறர்க்கென முயலுநர் உண்மையானே.

2

TRUTH IN THE ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA

S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri

The Śaiva Siddhānta system claims that its title bears a yoga-rūḍhi significance,[1] that it not merely happens to be called the final position, but is veritably the final position, all other systems being so many preliminary steps to this goal. The revelations of others such as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, etc., only serve to keep the soul in bondage, for the categories they teach are of limited extent and fall short of the path of release. The knowledge taught in these does not extend upto Śiva-tattva or Laya-Śiva, union with which alone constitutes release. The other Sāstras teach only the twenty-five principles from the gross elements up to puruṣa and no higher status than that of puruṣa can be gained through their knowledge. Hence, it is said, "the Siddhānta alone is the final position, all other Āgamas (revelations) being *prima facie* views; Śiva is the only auspicious being (since He reveals the Siddhānta) all others being inauspicious."[2] The superiority of the Siddhānta is thus established through its consideration of categories not known to other systems. The Sāṅkhya, for instance, recognizes only twenty-four categories (or twenty-five including the puruṣa); the Yoga recognizes practically the same number, though it postulates the Lord in addition to them. The Pāñcarātra and other Āgamas, it is contended,[3] do not recognize any more, while the Siddhānta alone explains all the thirty-six categories, by the full knowledge of which, one may attain union with Śiva, *i.e.*, final release.[4] The test of inclusiveness is thus applied, what is less inclusive being so far dismissed as less valuable and less true. It is not, however, dismissed as untrue. Even the

Cārvāka system has a measure of truth in so far as it recognizes at least the four elements.[5] What has been declared by him who knows more cannot be contradicted by the words of one who knows less. It is possible, thus, to set out a scale of truth beginning with the sciences formulated by human beings and ending with the Śivāgamas. Each higher Śāstra is uncontradicted by the lower, each lower one is superseded by the next higher.

Two minor difficulties have to be faced. It is said that Śiva is the author of all the different Śāstras, eighteen in number (aṣṭādaśānām vidyānām bhinnavartmanām). How then can some be of superior and others of inferior truth-value? The reply is that in the case of all other knowledge except that of the Śivāgamas, Śiva has had the co-operation of other agents such as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, etc. The Hiraṇyagarbha Āgama was thus produced by Śiva, no doubt, but with the co-operation of Brahmā; so too, Viṣṇu co-operated in the revelation known as the Pāñcarātra Āgama. The defects of these branches of knowledge are to be traced to the variable co-operating factor in each case,[6] and not to Śiva, who is the common factor.

Such an easy escape is not possible, however, in the case of the contradiction alleged to exist between the Vedas and the Śivāgamas; for both are revealed by Śiva Himself. But the difficulty is in part imaginary, since the Vedas do not require to be *corrected*, but only *supplemented* in the light of the Śivāgamas. That the Vedic texts require supplementation from among themselves is abundantly clear from the viyadadhikaraṇa[7] of the *Vedānta Sūtras*, where it is shown that the ether is included in creation, though it is not so mentioned in certain texts. Similar supplementation from Śivāgamas is certainly admissible, since, as revealed by Śiva, they possess at least as much authority as the Vedas.

It will have been noticed that the Siddhānta conceives of Truth as a systematic whole, which falls short of perfection in the measure in which it fails to be all-inclusive, but is yet realizable in varying degrees, according to the spiritual grade of the person in whom it is manifested. We are here at some distance from the stage of looking to correspondence with an external reality as the test of truth. Inclusiveness, however, is not the only test or aspect of system; and insofar as the other aspect of harmony is not sufficiently emphasized, one may feel that the Siddhānta has fallen short of the highest conception of truth. This failure is reflected in the harping on the number of categories in the Siddhānta as compared with other systems. It is quite conceivable that another system with far fewer categories may help us to a more harmonious but nonetheless comprehensive understanding of the universe. The number of categories propounded by a system does not of itself guarantee that it is the absolutely necessary minimum or that even therewith a harmonious view of the universe is possible. It is not possible to say that the Siddhāntin has neglected the aspect of harmony, since that necessarily forms part of any intelligible conception of inclusiveness; but he does not appear to have placed that in the foreground of his critical consciousness as much as he ought to have.

Yet another feature of the Siddhāntin's conception of system deserves to be noticed. The lower, he rightly holds, is transcended in the higher; but he actually says, not that it is transcended in, but that it is contradicted by, the higher (adho'dho bādhyam ūrdhvataḥ). Contradiction ordinarily implies that what is contradicted has no element of truth at all. How, then, can it be said that even the Cārvāka system is true to the extent of the four elements that it recognizes? The difficulty is illusory, replies the Siddhāntin. In respect of statements of what is, such as the number of categories, the cause of the universe, etc., the lower is contradicted, insofar as it comes into conflict with the higher, for, option is not possible in the case of the existent. But in the case of what is to be done, where there is a definitive option, such that the adoption of one course bars the other or others, as in the performance of a ritual before or after sunrise, there is no contradiction of the lower by the higher.[8] And it follows without saying that the authority of the lower is never affected in the case of the purely optional acts. It would thus appear that the authority of lower systems is confined to their injunctions and prohibitions and does not extend to their statements of fact — physical or metaphysical. Now, though in the light of higher knowledge these statements may not be true, yet there is no denying the fact that, as applying to what was known at that stage, they were true. The Ptolemaic hypothesis was true, not absolutely, but as applied to the facts then known about the universe. The hypothesis, however modified, failed to square with the facts increasingly known, and hence came to be found untrue; it was transcended by the Copernican hypothesis. In the same manner may the Sāṅkhya, whose theorising is confined to twentyfour categories, be transcended by the Siddhānta whose scope is wider. But the transcendence does not mean the denial of any element of truth to the Sāṅkhya except in respect of the injunctive and prohibitory statements. That a wholesale denial is not meant is apparent from the oft-repeated statement that each system is authoritative to the appropriate subject (adhikārin), a statement which is wholly implausible, if all truth is denied to lower systems in respect of statements of fact (vastvaṁśe). It would appear that the Siddhāntin's talk of contradiction (bādhya) has stood in the way of his realizing the issue clearly; for, while transcendence would not seem to be inconsistent with conservation in a certain measure, contradiction would seem to be so inconsistent. It may be this want of clearness that leads to the distinction between statements as to what *is* and statements as to what *is to be done*. But what is more probable, however, is that the distinction serves to mark off the province where the lower systems are valid for all time, even where they come into conflict with the higher, from that wherein such conflict nessarily leads to the lower being discarded.

Another point worthy of note is that for the Siddhāntin, the Vedas are authoritative because they have been revealed by Śiva, not, as the Mīmāṁsaka contends, because they are eternal and unoriginated. This is in conformity with his more general doctrine that, in respect of its origin, truth is not self-evident but has to be otherwise guaranteed (utpattau paratastvam).

We may now look a little more closely at the Siddantin's criterion of truth. He does not define pramāṇa (means of knowledge) as that which brings about pramā (knowledge), since he holds that to be too wide, including the sense-organs and such accessories as the light of a lamp, etc. According to him, what is an object of knowledge can not itself be an instrument of knowledge (yanmeyam na hi tanmānam)[9] and the sense-organs, etc., are objects of knowledge. Pramāṇa, therefore, is that intelligence-energy which is free from doubt, error or memory (saṁśayādi-vinirmuktā cit-śaktir mānam ucyate).[10] It is directed outwards, not to the knower himself.[11] The nature of doubt, error, etc., will be noticed in another article. It will be sufficient for our purpose here to state briefly that doubt is the apprehension of different conflicting attributes in one subject, and that error is the cognition of a content in relation to that which does not possess that content. Memory, of course, relates to what has been experienced and is not a means of present knowledge.

The expression Cit-śakti usually denotes knowledge rather than the means of knowledge. If Cit-śakti is itself the instrument, what is the name for that which results from the exercise of the instrument? The answer is that Cit-śakti is both instrument and result, that it has two aspects, as inseparably connected with the self and as turned towards external objects. In the former aspect, it is the result and in the latter aspect the instrument. It is not therefore inappropriate to speak of Cit-śakti as the instrument of knowledge.[12]

It may be thought, however, that the appellation pramāṇa can at best apply only to the conative (kriyā) aspect of Cit-śakti, not to its cognitive (jñāna) aspect, since the former alone would appear to function as an instrument. But the jñāna aspect too fulfils a function in the acquisition of knowledge. The conative energy removes the hindrance to the object becoming known, while the cognitive energy endows it with the capacity which is favourable to its manifestation in knowledge (bhāvi vyāpāra anukūla yogyatā). Cit-śakti functioning free from doubt, error or remembrance, in both its cognitive and conative aspects, gives us truth.[13]

So far, however, we have only a negative definition. Umāpati, the commentator on the Pauṣkara Āgama,[14] tries to give us a more positive conception of the nature of truth and to this end examines several current and possible modes of viewing it. That intelligence-energy (Cit-śakti) is a pramāṇa which is associated with intellectual activity (buddhi vṛtti), of the nature of true experience (yathārtha anubhuti). Wherein lies the truth of the intellectual activity? It is manifestly not resemblance that constitutes truth; for, between the intellectual activity and its object that lies outside, there can never be complete resemblance; some degree of it is present even in error, and truth cannot be distinguished from error unless it is possible to define the precise degree of resemblance that constitutes truth.

Nor can truth consist in the attribution of that characteristic which is not the correlate of the non-existence of the substantive (viśeṣya) element in knowledge. For, the pot and the place where it is are in the relation of mutual exclusion (anyonyābhāva) and when we cognise the pot as present at a particular place, the predicate does happen to be the correlate of a particluar variety of the non-existence (*viz.*, anyonyābhāva) of the pot; thus, even a true cognition is excluded by the proposed definition.[15]

If we try to restrict the non-existence (abhāva) spoken of in the above definition to cases of absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva), we are still not free from difficulties. Cherries are red; hence redness is not a correlate of absolute non-existence. The predication of redness would none the less be false in the case of an unripe cherry.[16] This definition therefore, becomes too wide.

Our failure may lead us to exclude the correlate of all kinds of abhāva, except anyonyābhāva, for the non-exclusion of which we saw sufficient reason above. But our difficulties persist. Thus, to return to the cherries, it would be false to predicate the redness even of the ripe ones, since redness is a correlate of prior non-existence (prāg-abhāva). Again, in a case of joint cognition, say of the pot and the cloth, each is the correlate of the absence of the other (ghaṭa is paṭābhāva-pratiyogī and *vice versa*); hence the cognition of the pot and of the cloth should by turns be false, each being in turn the correlate of the non-existence of the other; but as a matter of fact they are both cognised together as true. Further, on such a view, knowledge of conjunction would be impossible; for, whatever is conjoined in the relation of saṁyoga is so through a part of itself; the saṁyoga pertaining to that part would be (as regards the rest of the whole) the correlate of non-existence; hence, we could never truly say that any entity whatever is in the relation of saṁyoga to another.

We may now turn to another possible criterion — the invariable concomitance of the object and the judgement. This may mean that the judgement is not made either where the object is absent or where there is not some relation to the object. Neither possibility is of any help, for, the object can never be *in* the intellect which judges, while if *some* relation to the object be all that is needed, that is present in every case, even in doubt and error. On the former alternative, no truth will be possible; on the latter, every judgement would be true.

May we not say simply that the characterization of an object by the attributes pertaining thereto constitutes truth (viśeṣya-vṛtti-dharma prakārakatvam)? No, for it is not characteristic of truth alone, as distinguished from error. A person sees a heap of red beads along with a fire and takes them both to be fire. In this case, the assertion is of an attribute present in the object; but yet the total cognition is false. Again, there may be cognition of both the beads and the fire, but the fire may be taken for the beads and *vice versa*. In this case too the predication is based on attributes clearly present in the whole taken as the object; yet the detailed cognition is erroneous.

If now, in despair, we turn to a negative definition, we may say that truth consists in not being related to an object that is not the substrate of the characteristic affirmed. But the definition excludes joint cognition (samūhālambhana pratyaya) like that of the pot and the cloth, in which each of the objects is certainly not the substrate of the characteristics affirmed of the other.

Nor may we say that truth lies in the affirmation of a particular characteristic, where there is an object with the corresponding attribute. The object *pot* has the property of *being a pot* (ghaṭatva); on the strength of this we cannot say that *pot* is *potness* or that the *pot* is *in pot-ness*, though neither of these would be excluded by the attempted definition, since the characterization of *potness* or *in pot-ness*, corresponds to the attribute *pot-ness* possessed by the object. Again, we know that *pot-ness* exists in *pots*; but such an assertion would not be true according to the definition, since *pots* are not attributes of *pot-ness*, and the latter cannot be spoken of as possessing pots.

The difficulties thus encountered are avoided by the Siddhāntin who mentions the following conditions as essential to a true predication. (1) It should not be limited by a quality which is its own contrary. This is the most fundamental condition. A monkey may be sitting on a tree; it would be true to say that the tree is qualified by the presence of the monkey. If, however, the assertion were to the effect that the base of the tree is qualified by the presence of the monkey, it would be false, since it is limited by its contrary attribute — presence at the top of the tree and not at the base. The assertion, in other words, must not come into conflict with what is established and thus be contradicted. (2) The predication must be of a subject which is in some definite relation to the attribute predicated. By substituting the words 'be in some definite relation to the attribute' for 'possess the attribute', the Siddhāntin hopes to escape the difficulties he pointed out in the case of *pot-ness* and the *pot*. It was said that, on that definition, *pot-ness* would not be cognised since it does not possess the *pot* as an attribute. On the present view, *pot-ness* and *pot* are no longer considered as viśeṣaṇa and viśeṣya, but as two relata generally. (3) The relation predicated should correspond to that in which subject and attribute are. Thus, a crystal looks red, because redness is inherent not in the crystal, but in what is associated with the crystal. The relation between the two is not samavāyi sambandha, but sva-samavāyi saṁyoga (conjunction with that in which the property is inherent). It is essential that what is predicated should be the specific mode in which the subject and attribute are related, not any other kind of relation, as otherwise, the predication cannot be true. (4) The predication must be made as qualifying the particular subject, which stands in the described relation to the attribute or attributes. This specification prevents the possibility of error already noticed, where several objects are congnised together, *e.g.*, fire and a heap of red beads. Where fieriness is predicated of the fire and not of the beads, there is no error. Hence, the predication must be made of the particular subject which stands in the relation specified to the attributes in question, not of another subject (*e.g.*, the beads), which does not stand in that relation.[17]

If now we look at the net result of the Siddhāntin's labours, we find that we have only one definite test offered us, *i.e.*, absence of contradiction. The other elements mentioned are of interest mainly as showing the Siddhāntin's capacity to get out of difficulties largely of his own creation, as in the difficulties about samūhmālambana pratyaya. The difference between him and the Naiyāyika seems to be more terminological than conceptual, the Siddhāntin aiming at and probably arriving at a more precise definition in terms than the Naiyāyika. But the main difficulty as to correspondence seems still to persist. This is a difficulty which the Naiyāyika does not get over.[18] And the Siddhānta doctrine apparently takes us to the same *cul-de-sac*. A predication is true if it is made of a subject which is in relation to the attributes in question in the manner in which the predication is made. But how are we to know whether the relation between subject and attribute is actual or whether the manner of the predication is also the manner in which the relation obtains? A thorough-going doctrine of Truth as a system can offer nothing but coherence as a test; and if that is the test, the requirements about the manner of relation, etc., are but details in the application of that test. We are not, however, certain that the Siddhānta holds to the coherence-notion in such a thorough-going fashion. What has been said earlier about Truth revealing itself in various degrees in various grades, and the rejection of the correspondence-theory in the sense of resemblance would certainly seem to favour the view that the Siddhāntin holds the coherence-view. But the stress laid on such details as correspondence in the manner of relation, and so on, the use of Nyāya terminology, though with an attempt at greater precision, the absence of explicit reference to coherence as the test, the fact that the Siddhāntin is not an idealist like the Advaitin, all these would indicate that he holds fast to a form of the correspondence-notion though with modification. In his desire to demonstrate that his system is verily the final synthesis, he would appear to have juxtaposed this correspondence-doctrine with the doctrine of Truth as a system, though it is certainly questionable if such juxtaposition can claim to be a synthesis at all.

The truth of a cognition is self-evident, and has not to be made manifest otherwise than by the reflective cognition based on itself (anuvyavasāya jñāna). Here, again, the Siddhāntin parts company with the Naiyāyika, though he agrees with the latter in postulating a reflective cognition consequent on the consciousness of the object, *e.g.*, a judgement, 'I know this to be silver'. This reflective cognition of itself reveals the truth of the cognition of silver; it is not necessary to establish that truth, in any such manner as that indicated by the Naiyāyika, *e.g.*, as the conclusion of an inference based on successful practical activity.

Certain essential features of self-evidence have to be noted. It is revealed by (1) all succeeding instances of (2) normal perception of (3) that of which the true predication is made (the substrate of pramātva), (4) so long as there is no contradicion of the cognition whose truth is in question. Mother-of-pearl may look like silver and be judged to be silver. This cognition is true and its truth is self-evident until the cognition is contradicted by further experience. The cognition of the mother-of-pearl as silver can be apprehended as true only until such contradiction takes place, and not afterwards. To indicate this is the object of qualification (4), which mentions a time-limit. It is also obvious that if reflective cognition is to reveal truth, it must be of that to which the original cognition relates — the substrate of pramātva. A judgement like 'I know this to be a cloth' can be of no help in revealing the truth of the cognition 'This is pot'. Hence qualification (3) is put in.

Even according to the Naiyāyikas, the truth of the original cognition is grasped in *some* instances of subsequent cognition, *i.e.*, those which succeeded the inference based on successful practical activity. To distinguish that position from the Siddhānta, it is made out that self-evidence consists in being the object of *all* subsequent perception.

The qualification 'normal (laukika) perception', again, serves to distinguish this view from that of the Nyāya school. According to the latter, the class pramātva (truth) would be apprehended by alaukika (transcendental) perception. It is not such a cognition of the truth that is understood by the Siddhāntin, as for him the apprehension of the class pramātva is of little help in revealing how a particular cognition is valid.[19]

That the reflective cognition reveals the truth of the original cognition follows from a consideration of the constituents of the former. The extent of the two cognitions is the same. When the reflective cognition arises, it involves the understanding not merely of the subject and the atttibute involved in the original cognition but also of the relation of those two; otherwise, the qualification 'being silver' could not appear as characterising the 'this' before me, in the judgement 'I know this to be silver'; for, the characteristic is verily of the form of the correlate of a relation that is manifested. The manifestation of the relation constitutes self-evidence. To the objection that the relationship is apprehended not of itself but only as the object of another cognition (the anuvyavasāya), the Siddhāntin replies that his position is no worse than that of his adversary according to whom the truth of a present cognition is grasped only through an inference which is other than the cognition. In any case, the truth so apprehended relates to the original, not to the subsequent cognition, and that is all that matters.

A more serious difficulty, however, relates to the possibility of doubt.[20] The moment an object is apprehended, anuvyavasāya steps in and manifests the truth of the apprehension. Where, then, is the possibility of a doubt as to its truth? And yet such doubt is a fact of experience. If it be said that there is no such apprehension of the object, that there is not even vyavasāya jñāna, then too doubt seems to be ruled out; for, when the substrate of the doubt is not given, there can be no doubt. The only way to explain doubt would, therefore, seem to be to accept that with the cognition of the object its truth is not apprehended as well; but this is to give up the doctrine of self-evidence.

To this objection, the Siddhāntin replies that doubt is due to a suspicion of defect in the origination of our knowledge. If this were not the way in which doubt arises, then it would not be possible for us to suspect (as we do) if our cognition is not faulty, even where we do perceive silver to be silver; for, the original cognition of silver would, according to our objector, obstruct doubt. The doubt in either case must be admitted, then, to be based not on the cognition but on the possibility of that cognition having resulted from defective sources. The Naiyāyika may attempt to avoid this conclusion and yet show how a doubt as to non-validity of the cognition is possible. He may say that the original cognition (of silver) passes away before the doubt as to non-validity arises and that, therefore, the former does not preclude the latter. But this does not help since, according to the Naiyāyika, not merely this cognition but everything perishes in its third moment; hence of everything there should be doubt, which is not the case. Further, if the suspicion of defective causation be not the cause of doubt, doubt should be equally possible in the case of what is near as in that of what is far away.

Again, the Siddhāntin does not admit that the cognition of the object is the ground of the doubt. The opponent may, however, urge some argument like the following: where several trees are seen by the way-side to be in the field of vision, some only are questioned about; this is not explicable except on the ground that doubt arises only about the trees which are cognized. But this kind of argument leads nowhere, for the counter-question suggests itself, "When many trees are in the field of attention, how does it happen that only about some of them there is cognition such as leads to further questioning?" If it be said that these trees have some features because of which they alone are known and not others, would it not be simpler to trace the doubt also to those features? True, these features vary in each case, while doubt seems to be common to all of them. Yet, since these features are ascertained to exist and to function, it would be simpler and more justifiable to trace the doubt to them than to cognition of the object whose existence and functioning have to be postulated. Nor can you maintain that one funtion — the occasioning of cognition — having been assigned to the distinctive features, no other function such as the occasioning of doubt may be further assigned to them; for, the cognition so caused may be one infected with doubt; and there is no warrant to maintain that only such cognition as is free from doubt is brought about by the distinctive features of the object; to insist on adding the qualification 'free from doubt' would be to infringe the law of parsimony. The distinctive character of the object may, therefore, be held to be the cause both of the cognition and of the doubt.

It may now be said that once doubt is caused, in whatever way, it is bound to enter into the reflective cognition (anuvyavasāya). The latter will not any longer be in a position to reveal the validity of the original cognition. One may try to wriggle out of this by saying that the doubt is *of the validity* and that in doubting, therefore, validity is already given. Such an answer is obviously inapplicable to the doubt as to the absence of non-validity. The truth is, the Siddhāntin concedes the force of the objection, since his doctrine is not affected thereby. He does not seek to maintain that reflective cognition reveals truth for all time, but only so long as the original cognition is not contradicted. The implication of this clause may be made clear by stating that truth is not manifested subsequent to the apprehension of the absence of relation between the object and the attribute (tadvattvābhāva upasthiti). Doubt has for its object the absence of the relation between the object and the attribute (tadvattvābhāva) and hence arises subsequently to the apprehension of that absence. That, at this stage, truth is not revealed by anuvyavasāya is admitted by the Siddhāntin.[21]

The view of the Naiyāyika that truth is not self-evident in the cognition but has to be made known by other means, does not stand to reason. It is maintained by him that the truth of a cognition, say of water, is inferred from successful practical activity, our ability to use it for drinking, etc. But inference requires a major premise, a statement of concomitance between the major term (i.e., truth, and the middle term (i.e., any instance of successful practical activity); this concomitance must be based on instances of the co-presence and co-absence of the major term with the middle term; in the absence of the concomitance and the illustrative instances, no inference can be made as to the present cognition being true. Now, in the very first instance of cognition, how could there have been any inference, involving the use of the major term 'truth (pramātva)' which is *exhypothesi* not previously known? We are thus forced to the conclusion that knowledge is not possible at all unless we admit that at least in the initial stage truth is self-evident. If this much is admitted, the fact that truth is apprehended by other means also cannot take away from its essentially self-evident character. The opponent may imagine that at least a negative inference about the absence of error (or non-validity) is possible in the first instance of cognition; this might be possible, if non-validity were self-evident; but that is not so, in the view of either the objector or the Siddhāntin, aprāmāṇya being always parato grāhya. Further, the absence of non-validity does not necessarily lead to the inference that the conclusion is true; it only establishes a distinction from what is other than true; if it be taken as an instance of double negation, then the first negation would presuppose a knowledge of what is negated, that is, of truth (and with this we are landed in our original difficulty); if it be taken as a concept applicable to what does not come within knowledge at all, and hence cannot be characterized either as valid or non-valid, then from the denial of non-validity, no conclusion can be drawn as to truth.'[22]

Nor is it possible to say that the relation of the object to the attribute (tadvattva) being known through a different source of knowledge (say, the statement of some one else), this may lead up to the apprehension of truth as the major term in the suggested inference; for this other means of knowledge has no claims superior to those of the original cognition (vyavasāya jñāna) in apprehending tadvatta, and reflective cognition, supervening thereon may well manifest its truth, without the intervention of any inferential process.[23]

Further, the inference guaranteeing truth has to proceed with the help of a middle term. Thus the conclusion 'there is fire in the hearth' is true, because, whatever burns is fire and this thing in the hearth does burn. But how do we know in the first instance that burning is the property of fire? If through observation, what reveals the truth of it? If another inference be needed, we are on our old round. The only way out would seem to be the acceptance of the self-evidence of truth.[24]

With this, however, we are far from admitting that every cognition is true or that there is nothing to differentiate true cognitions from erroneous ones in respect of their origination. The causes of cognition as such do not guarantee its truth, certain further accessories being required in the origination of a true cognition. It would follow from this that the quality of being truly known (pramātva) can be present only in what is effected. There appear, however, to be some exceptions to this principle. Nīlaghaṭatva (the quality of being a blue pot) is knowable, but it does not reside barely in what is effected; substance is knowable, but it is not characteristic only of what is effected. In either case, there is a peculiarity to be noted. The quality of being a pot (ghaṭatva) is certainly characteristic of the effected; it is the addition of the qualification 'blue' that leads us to say that the concept is not characteristic only of what is effected. This need not make any difference to the pramātva of the concept. We may introduce a qualification into our conception of pramātva and say that it is characteristic only of what is effected, except in the case of that which is already determined to be an effect, because of some distinctive features other than the one now specically cognized. The exception is not a true one, since it only proves the rule. Again, in the case of the concept of substance, a host of phenomena may be determined to be effects because of their possession of substantiality, but they cannot all be traced to a common cause. The presence of substantiality is not thus determinative of what is effected. This consideration leads us to qualify still further the conception of pramātva and say that it is characteristic only of what is effected except where a common cause cannot be discovered for a host of effects whose effectedness is determined by the concept whose pramātva is under consideration.[25]

A further and apparently more serious difficulty arises from the consideration that knowledge is eternal and cannot be characteristic only of what is effected (and consequently impermanent). The reply is that we are here concerned not with the eternal wisdom, but with the temporal functioning of the intellect.[26]

It is true that no one characteristic or set of characteristics can be pointed to as distinctive of the origination of true knowledge; but it is possible to point out such distinctive means of origination in the case of each pramāṇa, such as perception, etc. In the case of perception, what guarantees the truth of cognition is the contact of the sense-organs with many parts of the objects cognized.[27] No explanation or justification is offered of this test. But evidently the perception of many parts is taken to warrant freedom at least from that kind of error which jumps to conclusions about the whole from the perception of a very small part, which runs away from the imagined snake when all that meets the eye is but the coiled appearance (of a piece of rope). It is worth noting that the test proposed is not very satisfactory, As pointed out later by the author of the *Advaita-Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*,[28] it fails where a jaundiced person persists in seeing the white shell as yellow in spite of repeated contact of the eye with the several parts of the shell; and it is manifestly inapplicable to the perception of the Self or of colour since neither of these has parts. The first of these objections could, perhaps, be met on the ground that a perfect condition of the sense-organs is an indispensable preliminary of all knowledge, and that what is here attempted is but the setting out of the further conditions operative in true knowledge. The second difficulty, however, is not so easily avoided. It would be interesting to know what the Siddhāntin has to say to it. No objections of any kind are raised or met in the works here under reference.

Reflection on a true ground or middle term is by some held to originate true inferential knowledge. But this view is defective, since it is obviously possible to arrive at an untrue conclusion even with the help of a true middle term, or to reach a true conclusion even though the middle term be not true. An example of the latter would be where the hill (which in fact is fiery) is inferred to be fiery on the ground of a mistaken cognition of mist as smoke. What brings about true inference is the uncontradicted knowledge of the presence of the major term in the minor (abādhita sādhyavatva pramā) or the knowledge that the minor as qualified by the middle also possesses the major.

Now, we infer a conclusion in most cases not when we know already of the presence of the major in the minor; but we have at least a doubt that the major does so exist. In so far as this positive aspect of the doubt is not contradicted, we have what is necessary for the true inference. And even when the presence of the major term does not enter into our knowledge, as in the inference of the existence of clouds from the rolling of thunder, the Lord knows that the major exists in the minor and His knowledge provides the basis. And the formulation 'knowledge—that the minor as qualified by the middle possesses the major', serves to exclude even such error as occurs in joint cognition (samuhālambhana pratyaya). Thus where a faggot and red beads are seen together to possesses redness, the inference that the subject is fiery is valid only in the case of the faggot; for that alone as qualified by the middle term *reaness* also possesses the major term *fieriness*.[29]

The view of true inference thus presented marks an advance on that which takes reflection on a true middle term to guarantee the truth of the inference. It may well be doubted, however, whether the advance is not made at the expense of the novelty of inference. If in inference there is already present (as originating it) the knowledge of the presence of the major in the minor, what is it that the process of inference brings about? In so far as it claims to prove anything, does it not beg the question, since the knowledge of the conclusion is presumed in any true inference? We are up against the Paradox of Inference, and the manner in which the Siddhāntin seeks to get over it is worthy of note. Inference may be applied even to what is already known, as when we demonstrate a truth for the benefit of another. In such a case there is no difficulty about novelty. When we infer for our own benefit, and the presence of the major in the minor is really in doubt, we still know that there is at least the possibllity of that presence; and so long as that knowledge is not contradicted, we have all that is necessary for a true inference. The suggestion is valuable. But when that is accepted, we feel that after all we have nothing more in the origination of true inference than is present in the case of all inference; for, doubt and uncontradicted possibility of the presence of the major in the minor are characteristic of all inference, except that wherein the conclusion is already known. One may, therefore, feel with justification that the paratastva of inference, in respect of origination, has not been established.

As for reliable testimony, the condition which guarantees its truth is the speaker's knowledge of the true sense of what is spoken. It may be thought that yogyatā (compatibility) is the condition. But yogyatā means little more than the absence of ascertained lack of compatibility (ananvaya niścaya viraha); and this may characterize not merely truth, but also doubt. The requirement of knowledge on the part of him who declares, may be thought to be lacking in the case of the Vedas which are authoritative, but are said not to have an author. This does not concern the Siddhāntin, who holds that the Vedas, like the Śivāgamas, have been revealed by Śiva.

Here again, it is questionable whether for correct knowledge through testimony anything more is requisite than tātparya (purport) consisting in the fitness of words to convey a particular meaning. Dharmarājādhvarin, who sets forth this requirement in the *Advaita-Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, conceives of it as a necessary element of all śābda-jñāna. He does not, however, subscribe to the view that he who makes the statement should be aware of the purport. A parrot may make a statement, which, though not intended, is yet perfectly intelligible. A Vedic statement may be intelligible to one who rejects the idea of the Lord having revealed the Vedas. What is essential is tātparya, not vaktṛ-tātparya-jñāna.[30] Such a view lays itself open to the objection that he who made the original statement must in every case have known the purport, *e.g.*, he who taught the words to the parrot. And so long as the Lord knew what He was about, when he revealed the Vedas, that knowledge is bound to function when the learner understands the Vedas, irrespective of his recognition of the Lord's authorship. But the point of the Vedāntin's criticism for our purpose must be sought not in the rejection of vaktṛ-tātparya-jñāna, but in the inclusion of tātparya among the essentials of all śābda-jñāna, so that it is not an additional element distinctive of correct śābda-jñāna alone. We see, then, that the Siddhānta agrees with the Vedānta in accepting the self-evidence of knowledge, but differs in rejecting its self-dependence; but, in proving that true knowledge is dependent on conditions other than those characteristic of knowledge in general, it does not appear to have been very successful.

Note: The works mainly relied on are *Pauṣkara Āgama* (*PA*), *Pauṣkara Bhāṣya* (*PB*), *Śaiva-Siddhānta-Paribhāṣā* (*SSP*), ivāgra-yogin's commentary on the *Śiva-Jñāna-Bodha* (*SJBSgY*), *Advaita-Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* (*AVP*), *Indian Logic and Atomism* (*ILA*), and Śrīkaṇṭha Suri's *Ratna-Traya* (*RTS*). Other abbreviations used are *RSSM* for *Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts* and *DIS* for *Der Śaiva Siddhānta.*

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Cp. *SSP*, p. 6.
2. *PA*, vv. 907, 908; *PB*, p. 557; cp. also *RTS*, vv. 10-12.
3. *PA*, v. 912; *PB*, p. 560.
4. The thirty-six categories of the Siddhānta are: The five Śivatattvas comprising Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara and Śuddhavidyā; the seven Vidyātattvas comprising Kāla, Kalā, Niyati, Rāga, Vidyā, Puruṣa and Prakṛti; and the twenty-four Ātma-tattvas comprising Guṇas, Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra, Manas, the five other organs of cognition, the five organs of action, the five subtle elements and the five gross elements. The Sāṅkhya recognizes in addition to Puruṣa, only the twenty-four Ātma-tattvas, identifying, however, the Guṇa-tattva with Prakṛti.
5. *JB*, p. 563.
6. *SJBSgY*, p. 17; *PB*, p. 561.
7. *VS*, II. 3. 1.
8. *PB*, p. 563; *SJBSgY*, p. 18.
9. *PA*, v. 852; cp. also *SSP*, p. 8.
10. *PA*, v. 845.
11. *PA*, v. 846; *PB*, p. 521.
12. *SSP*, p. 8.
13. *SSP*, p. 8. A further difficulty in recognizing Cit-śakti as pramāṇa is the acceptance of a plurality of pramāṇas even by the Siddhāntin (three according to some, four according to others). The reconciliation of unity with plurality is effected thus. Intelligence-energy which is perfect is beginninglessly veiled by the impurity known as Nīhāra (a synonym of Āṇava). This impurity becomes ripe for removal in different degrees at different times. The manner in which knowledge

results varies with the modes of activity of the internal organ, which vary according to the degree of maturity of mala, and hence we have the different modes in which knowledge comes to us, though all the modes are fundamentally identical with Cit-śakti. In the proportion in which mala is ripe. knowledge is directed away from the world to the path of nivṛtti and becomes increasingly free from doubt, error and remembrance. See *SSP*, p. 17.

14. It is not certain if this commentator is identical with the fourth of the Tamil *santāna ācāryas*. Hultzsch (*RSSM*. II, p.18) considers the identity probable. The editor of the *Pauṣkara Bhāṣya* definitely identifies the two Umāpatis. Schomerus too follows tradition and makes this identification (*DCS*, p. 28). But curiously enough, the commentator quotes from the *Nyāyāmṛta* (see *PB*, p. 519), a Madhva work believed to belong to the 16th century. Further investigation is undoubtedly called for before the identification is accepted.

15. *PB*, p. 511.

16. Cp. the Irish bull 'black-berries are red when they are green'.

17. For the critictim of the other definitions of yathārthatva, see *PB*, p. 511; the Siddhāntin's definition and its justification are found on p. 512 of the same work.

18. See *ILA*, p. 45, fn. 5.

19. *PB*, pp. 512-513; *SJBSgY*, p. 18.

20. See *ILA*, p. 47.

21. On the discussion of doubt, see *PB*, pp. 513-514.

22. *PB*, p. 515.

23. The suggested inference guaranteeing truth involves knowledge of truth, which in turn has to be established, if at all, by another inference, and so on endlessly. To get out of the infinite regress, the opponent seeks to base the apprehension of truth on the apprehension tadvattva, etc., by some means of knowledge other than inference. The objection to this is that any other means of knowledge stands in no better case than the original cognition in respect of apprehending tadvattva. See *PB*, p. 515.

24. *PB*, p. 515. Aprāmāṇya is parato grāhya. The discussion of this along with the nature of error is reserved for a later article.
25. *PB*, p. 515.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *PB*, pp. 5, 516.
28. *AVP*, pp. 264-265 (Calcutta University Edition).
29. *PB*, p. 516.
30. *AVP*, pp. 213-214; also *ILA*, pp. 164-165.

3

THE BEARING OF ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA EPISTEMOLOGY ON ITS METAPHYSICS

P. THIRUGNANASAMBANDHAN

Almost every school of philosophy seeks to establish its basic truths and tenets by applying one or the other means of valid knowledge in conformity with its own metaphysics. It is generally held that Indian philosophy and religion are more or less dogmatic in their approach and do not let reasoning enter their domain. The Nyāya theory of knowledge based on the method of logical analysis is a standing testimony to prove how unfounded is this misconception. In fact, the Nyāya espistemology is applied with some modifications by every school of philosophy. This has given rise to the adage '*Kāṇādaṁ sarvaśāstropakārakam*' which means that the school founded by Kaṇāda is useful to all schools of thought. Every school tries to probe the problem of truth and tries to defend what it conceives as truth by adopting logical methods. This led to a spate of *vādagranthas* or dialectical works dealing with *svapakṣa* and *parapakṣa* in later times.

The Vaiśeṣika, which was founded on the doctrine of difference among particulars (*viśeṣa*) observable in the objects of the world, viewed the world from the ontological standpoint; and the Nyāya, following the methods of argument and analysis, viewed the world from the epistemological standpoint. These two in later times coalesced into one integral system and supplied the methods of argument to the various schools from these two viewpoints. The '*ahaccamayam*' and '*puṟaccamayam*', the orthodox and heterodox schools and others between them, all these with their varying theories and dogmas, beliefs and practices, tried to interpret them with more or less a common yardstick of *pramāṇa*, or *aḷavai* as it is called in Tamil.

The Advaitin lists six *pramāṇas, viz.* perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*), presumption (*arthāpatti*), and non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*). There are other schools which put forward other *pramāṇas* like *aitihya* (history), *pāriśeṣya* (residue), etc., which are sought to be subsumed under one or the other of the above six. Śaiva Siddhānta and Viśiṣṭādvaita accept only three *pramāṇas* — perception, inference and verbal testimony — and bring *arthāpatti* and *upamāna* under inference, and *anupalabdhi* under perception. The *Pauṣkaravṛtti*, however, accepts *arthāpatti* as the fourth *pramāṇa*. The Jainas would uphold *pratyabhijñā* (recogntiion) as a *pramāṇa* and bring *upamāna* under it. The Dvaitins would hold '*aitihya*' as a fourth *pramāṇa*.

The statement in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (IV, 5) "the Self should be realised, heard, discussed and constantly contemplated upon" emphasizes '*manana*' or reasoning involving investigation and discussion. This shows how from the beginning reason played a part in understanding metaphysical doctrines. At the same time, the limitation of reasoning in supramundane matters was recognised. As the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (II,9) says: "Self-realisation cannot be got through ratiocination or *tarka*." As Bhartṛhari, the grammarian-philosopher puts it, "A thing though inferred with great dialectic skill by competent logicians may at the same time be inferred by more competent logicians in a different way."[1] Śrīkaṇṭha in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, "*Janmādyasya yataḥ*" (1. 1. 3), examines the utility of inference in arriving at *Īśvara* being the creator of the universe, and realising its futility abandons it in favour of *śruti*, as inference can be adduced to prove variant conclusions such as the creator of the universe being one as well as many on the analogy of one potter making a pot or many artisans constructing a temple tower. He cites the *śruti* text which says, "One who has not understood the *Vedas* cannot understand Brahman (Śiva)" and maintains that *śruti* alone is the *pramāṇa* to establish *jagatkartṛtvam* in *Īśvara*.[2] This does not, however, prevent the Śaiva Siddhāntin to press into service inference to prove the one agent, Śiva, being the creator of the universe as we shall see later.

Before we proceed to consider how the *pramāṇas* are applied by the Śaiva Siddhānta school in their enquiry regarding the triple verities of God, soul and matter, one would do well to remind oneself how the nature and scope of *pramāṇa vis-a-vis* the *prameya* are conditioned by the metaphysical stand of that school. To the Advaitin, for example, scientific knowledge such as the knowledge about atom can at best be described as knowledge of the phenomenal world at the empirical level. It gives no guarantee for its metaphysical validity. To the Siddhāntin, it is *pāśajñāna* about things which are absolutely real. We find here the difference between the two schools, one idealistic and the other realistic, in regard to the nature of the object of knowledge (*prameya*) as well as the nature of knowledge (*pramā*). Given this difference in regard to *prameya* and *pramā*, it is not improbable that the nature of *pramāṇa* also differs in certain respects between any two schools of thought.

The Siddhāntin, like the Dvaitin or Viśiṣṭādvaitin, would seek to establish the reality of the world by *pratyakṣa*, the senior most among the *pramāṇas*, whereas the Advaitin would press into service *anumāna* to prove the *mithyātva* of the phenomenal world as conceived by him. Madhva expresses his view forcefully thus: "To suppose that even things perceived as real by *pramāṇas* are not so but '*mithyā*' is contrary to the canons of logic and it is a case of daylight robbery." He dismisses the *mithyātvānumāna* of the Advaitin as pseudo-logic.[3] To him *anumāna* is acceptable only so long as it does not contradict other *pramāṇas*. This view is shared by several other schools also. Appayyadīkṣita concurs with this: "Inference is not an independent *pramāṇa* but is helpful only in substantiating a proposition by some means or other by logical method."[4] "Śaiva Siddhānta adheres in its 'transcendental' epistemology to the distinction between consciousness which is meta-judgemental, and is the inalienable essence of self, and knowledge in the sense of judgement or content cognition, which belongs to self, through self's identification with the model operation of intellect."[5]

The author of the *Śivajñāna Siddhi* while dealing with *pramāṇas* does not explain *śivaśakti*, the transcendental conscious power that is meta-judgemental in nature, but proceeds to expatiate on *ātma-citśakti* that comes into play in knowing a thing external or internal in association with the sense organs, objects, etc. In other words, he is not concerned with the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* of *pramāṇa*, but deals with what is of immediate concern, the *viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa* of *pramāṇa*.

However, Gurujñānasambandhar, the founder of the Dharmapuram Ādhīnam in his work, *Jñānāvaraṇaviḷakkam*, deals with the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* of *pramāṇa* and establishes that *śivaśakti* is the *pramāṇa* in the real sense, as the self is incapable of knowing anything without the aid of Śiva's grace. If *ātma-citśakti* is described as *pramāṇa*, it is only by secondary usage (*upacāra*), being in inseparable association with *śivaśakti*. We understand *ātma-citśakti* as *pramāṇa* by what is called *sāmīpya-lakṣaṇā*, or as some others would have it by *upakāraka-lakṣaṇā*, Śiva being the *upakāraka* (helper) and the self being the *upakārya* (helped). Śiva is *pramāṇa* in both the 'bound' and 'liberated' states of the self. In addition, He is the *prameya* for the self in the 'liberated' state.[6]

The Siddhāntin defines *pramāṇa* as *ātma-citśakti*. It is also called *pramā* to mean *pramiti*, taking the suffix of the word *pramāṇa* (*-ana*) in the sense of '*bhāva*' (verbal noun) meaning the known, instead of '*karaṇa*' (instrument) meaning the means of knowledge. It is other than doubt, delusion or remembrance and stands for valid knowledge. This is stated in the *Pauṣkarāgama*.[7] The *ātma-citśakti* is *anugrāhya*, and *śiva-cit-śakti* is *anugrāhaka*. In other words, the *citśakti* of the self functions under the guidance of the *citśakti* of Śiva. Thus *citśakti* is the ground of knowledge as well as the means of knowledge. If, as it is held by the Naiyāyika, *pramāṇa* is *pramākaraṇa* (means of valid knowledge) alone, then even the sense organ like the 'eye' or even 'light' may have to be accepted as *pramāṇa* because they too serve as means of knowledge. The eye or light is not admitted as *pramāṇa* by any one. *Pramāṇa* thus understood is constitutive of knowledge and not mere instrument of knowledge.[8] *Pramāṇa*, therefore, is taken in the wider sense of a *conscious power* that underlies all the sense organs that serve as means of knowledge. It does not stop with the means alone, but extends to the end, the *prameya* itself. This *citśakti*, when it is tainted, so to say, by *vidyā*, *rāga* and other evolutes of *aśuddha-māyā* and operates externally with the objects of the world, is called *pramāṇa*. While not being contaminated by these *tattvas* and being associated with the self as its attribute, that self is called *pramātā*, so declares the *Pauṣkara*.[9]

According to Śaiva Siddhānta, it is not sense-object contact that characterises perception as the early school of Nyāya held, but *sākṣātkāra* or immediacy arising from *citśakti-viṣaya-saṁyoga.* The Advaitins also hold 'immediacy' as a character of perception or *aparokṣa* as they call it, such immediacy being effected with or without sense contact, but *citśakti* does not come into the picture. The postulate of *citśakti* as *pramāṇa* is a unique feature of Śaiva Śiddhānta.

Following the *Pauṣkaravṛtti*, Śivāgrayogin explains the rationale behind the postulate of *ātma-citśakti.* Each of the five sense organs yields only circumscribed knowledge that falls within its sphere. For instance, the eye cannot perceive sound nor the ear perceive colour. Similarily, the *antaḥkaraṇas* like *buddhi*, *citta* and *ahaṅkāra* have their delimited function. *Ātma-citśakti*, on the other hand, not only enables the soul's experience of things external through the senses and other *tattvas*, but also without the aid of any of those *upādhis* like the *jñāna-indriyas* and *antaḥkaraṇas* enables the self to experience things not limited by time or space in what is called yogic perception and what is more, enables the self to experience itself as well as Lord Śiva in the transcendental state. The *Pauṣkara* says: "The *Saṁvit*(*cit*)*śakti* alone is capable of perceiving everything like sound. So it alone deserves to be *pramāṇa*." Unlike the Indian logician who attributes the act of perception to *indriyārtha-sannikarṣa* or sense-object contact, the Siddhāntin holds that it is caused by *citśakti-viṣaya-saṁyoga* or consciousness-object contact. This has to be accepted, says the Siddhāntin, not only because the senses have limited sweep as stated earlier, but also because the sense being inert (*jaḍa*) cannot produce perceptual knowledge by themselves. Hence, the need for the postulate of *ātma-citśakti* which alone with the instruments of senses, is capable of causing the perception of colour, smell, touch, etc., of pleasure and pain, and even of the self. As the *Pauṣkarāgama* puts it, "*Sarvatra-grāhiṇīsaṁvit*" (*Sūtra,* 16). Even *buddhi* or intellect, not to speak of the *indriyas*, is inert or *prākṛta*, (evolute of *prakṛti*), and these are also *prameyas* or objects of knowledge. What is *prameya* cannot be *pramāṇa*. *Citśakti* as *pramāṇa* is *svaprakāśa;* it is both the illuminer of *viṣyas* and illumined by Śiva.

Following the *Pauṣkara*, Śivāgrayogin gives a three-fold classification of *pratyakṣa* that is free from error or doubt and is different from recollection: (1) *indriya-pratyakṣa* (2) *mānasa-pratyakṣa* and (3) *indriyāntaḥkaraṇa-nirapekṣa-pratyakṣa*. The *citśakti* that is ever associated with the self is manifested by *kāla* (the principle that is generative of finite experience), coloured by *rāga* (the principle of attraction), enters into relation with external objects through the *antaḥkaraṇa* (mind) and *jñānendriyas* (external senses) with a view to secure for the self the experience required for spiritual advancement by gradual removal of the veil of ignorance of *āṇava*. This is the first one mentioned above. The second one is a kind of perception wherein the *citśakti* is involved in the experience of objects presented by the senses through the mind. This is of two kinds namely, '*yogipratyakṣa*' or the transcendent perception and '*sukhādi-pratyakṣa*' or experience of pleasure, pain, etc. The third is '*svayaṁ vedanam*', the awareness of the self with which it is ever associated without the intervention of either the mind or the senses.

T.P. Ramachandran, speaking about '*sākṣin*' considered by the Dvaitins as one of the seven *indriyas* — the five organs of knowledge, mind and *sākṣin* — observes, "The *sākṣin* is the witnessing consciousness or the faculty of intuitive or direct perception. It is identical with the quality of sentience possessed by the self. The *sākṣin* is the purest form of *indriya*. It is not subject to defects and so always produces absolutely valid knowledge. The *sākṣin* perceives the objects presented to all the other senses through those senses. Besides, it directly perceives certain objects which cannot be perceived by the other senses. These are the self (*ātman*), the internal organ (*manas*), the attributes of the *manas*, *viz.*, pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*), ignorance (*avidyā*), time (*kāla*), and the unmanifested ether (*avyākṛta ākāśa*). It is a special feature of Dvaita that the Self is known as an object by its own sentience, namely the *sākṣin*."[10]

The above account of *sākṣin* as conceived by the Dvaita school appears to be a closer approximation to the concept of *ātma-citśakti* referred to above as conceived by the Śaiva Siddhāntin. This is, however, to be distinguished from the Advaitin's *sākṣin* which is the psychical element present in all types of experience including deep sleep. It is the subject of knowledge (*jñātā*) distinguished from the subject of action (*kartā*) and of enjoyment (*bhoktā*), the first remaining identified without change unlike the other two.

The Siddhāntin, like the Naiyāyika, accepts the two types of *pratyakṣa*, the *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) and *savikalpaka* (determinate). The first, according to the Naiyāyika, is the perception of the object as an undifferentiated whole of the universal and particulars, whereas the second is one that comprises also the name, species, etc.; of the object in substantive-adjective relation. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins and Dvaitins, however, do not admit the *nirvikalpaka* as conceived by the Nyāya school. According to them, all knowledge including that of the supreme Reality is necessarily of an object as complex (*saguṇa*), i.e., an object and its qualities remain inseparable '*saviśeṣaviṣaya*' in any perception. To the Advaitins, the *nirvikalpaka* is the knowledge of the mere unrelated being (*sattā*) and the *savikalpaka* that is admitted from the *vyāvahārika* or practical standpoint is the knowledge of a thing as qualified by attributes. To the Advaitin, the *nirvikalpaka* follows the *savikalpaka*. These varied interpretations are a natural corollary to their respective metaphysical standpoints.

Error in Indian philosophy is discussed as *khyātivādas*. The Śaiva Siddhāntin is an adherent of the theory of *anyathākhyāti*, like the Naiyāyikas. He contends that the erroneous perception of nacre as silver, the *guṇas* like the peculiar lustre of silver, which are perceived, are as much real as the *guṇin*, the given nacre and the 'perceived' silver. The error consists only in the relation between them. This is in accord with the Nyāya theory of error according to which in a proposition like 'This is silver' there is perception of both 'this' and 'the silverness' in that although according to later logicians in the case of the former the contact is one of sense-object and in the case of the latter it is one of recall of a memory image of the peculiar properties of silver (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*). What are cognised are facts, but they are misapprehended, and hence the error. It is only the wrong judgment of shell as silver which is later on rectified, but not the referent itself. Here the referent is judged as something otherwise (*anyathā*). The *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* says, "*viparyayaḥ anyathājñānaṁ atadrūpa-pratiṣṭhitam*" (*Sūtra*, 6)

The author of the *Pauṣkaravṛtti* cites Rāmānuja's view '*yathārthaṁ sarvavijñānaṁ iti vedavidāṁ matam*' (*Śrībhāṣya* 1.1.1.) which means that all judgments are true. This is the *yathārthakhyāti* of Nāthamuni, renamed as *satkhyāti* by Rāmānuja. The judgment, "This is silver" is valid at the moment of perception. Its validity continues until it is sublated by a subsequent judgment. The *Pauṣkaravṛtti* argues that it cannot be held as valid as it is sublated subsequently by the judgment, "This is shell."

The *Pauṣkaravṛtti* also alludes to *ātmakhyāti* of the Buddhists which is understood generally to mean that error consists in regarding the internal object as external, the mental as the extra-mental. In "This is silver," the 'silverness' is subjective and in no way belongs to the given referent 'this.' This theory of error does not take into account the distinction between empirically true and false judgments. The *Pauṣkaravṛtti* dismisses this theory as it runs counter to the stand taken by it, *viz.*, the consciousness-object (*saṁvid-artha*) contact which is an essential feature of *pratyakṣa*.

The *Pauṣkaravṛtti* also alludes to the *anirvacanīyakhyāti* of the Māyāvadin according to which there is in the illusion of silver a contact of the defective sense organ with the glittering shell and then a mental modification answering to the form of 'this object'. Now through the operation of nescience as aided by the past impressions of silver, revived by this object's similarity, there is the production of some inexplicable silver which lasts so long as the illusion lasts. It is neither real nor unreal, nor both real and unreal, but indefinable and indeterminable. The basis on which this is refuted by the *Pauṣkaravṛtti* is that two diametrically opposite features like 'existent' and 'non-existent' cannot be predicated simultaneously of a single entity. Thus, making a brief reference to some of the *khyātivādas*, the author of the *Vṛtti* opts for the *anyathākhyāti* of the Naiyāyika.

We shall see how the Siddhāntin utilises the *pramāṇas* to prove his metaphysical position and to controvert the theories of other schools, from which he differs. According to the Siddhāntin, there are three eternal verities, *viz.*, God, soul and matter.

Discussing the causality of the world, the Siddhāntin says that Śiva is the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) and *māyā*, the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*). The *Pauṣkara* says, "There is one source for all these and that is the *Śivaśakti* that is ever associated with *Parameśvara*. Iśvara is the efficient cause; '*bindu*' is the material cause; the '*karma*' of the soul is the auxiliary cause. *Īśvara* is declared the cause of the universe, since every effect must necessarily have a cause."[11]

God being the agent of creation is also sought to be proved by what others would call *pāriśeṣya-pramāṇa.* Of the three categories, *Īśvara, jīva* and *māyā*, the last cannot be credited with the work of creation as *māyā* and its evolutes are inert (*jaḍa*). We have seen in the world that no inert object produces another inert object, but it is only a sentient being that can create a thing. The *jīva* also, endowed as it is with limited knowledge and power due to the constraint of bonds, is incapable of creating this vast and manifold universe. By the law of residues (*pāriśeṣya*) it is only *Īśvara* that can be said to be the creator of the universe, because it is He alone that possesses plenitude of knowledge and power to act.

The *Viśvasārottarāgama* corroborates the idea of God being the creator insofar as He alone, the eternal Being, omniscient and omnipotent, is capable of being the agent activising the inert *māyā*.[12] As a chariot, an inert object, is made to move by men, sentient beings, so also *māyā* is activised by the all-knowing and all-powerful God. A similar argument is given in the verse "*Oruvanōṭorutti oṉṟeṉṟu uraittiṭum ulakamellām...*" in the *Śivajñānasiddhiyār*.[13] Commenting on this verse Śivāgrayogin seeks to apply the five-membered syllogism. The subject under consideration of the inferential reasoning (*pratijñā*) is: There shall be an agent for the world (*ulakamellām tarupavan oruvan vēṇḍum*). The *hetu* (reason) is: The world has its origin, sustenance and destruction (*vantu niṇṟu pōvatum ātalāle*). The *dṛṣṭanta* (typical instance) is: In the same way as a potter makes a pot out of clay (*maṇṇininṟu kaṭādiyellām varuvatu kulālanālē*). Then follows *upanaya*, the synthesis of the major and minor premises, and that is: He shall create whatever form he wills (*eṇṇiya karumamellām iyaṟṟuvaṉ*). The conclusion (*nigamana*) follows: He shall create everything from its appropriate cause (*kaṇṇu kāriyaṅgal ellām kāraṇam ataniṟ kāṇbaṉ*).

Anumāna or inference according to the Siddhāntin is the *citśakti* as delimited by intellect leading to mediate knowledge (*parokṣajñāna*) that is obtained in relation to the subject adjunct (*pakṣadharma*) to which the principle of concomitance (*vyāpti*) is applied, such invariable concomitance being in the nature of a universal relation between *liṅga* (middle term) and *sādhya* (major term).[14]

The Siddāntin, like the Naiyāyika, accepts three kinds of inference: (1) *kevalānvayī*, when it is based on a middle term which is always positively related to the major term; (2) *kevalavyatirekī*, when it is based on the middle term being negatively realted to the major term; and (3) *anvaya-vyatirekī*, when the middle term is both positively and negatively related to the major term. It may be noted that the Advaitin does not accept this classification. He admits only one type, namely, "*anvayī*", wherein both the premises as well as the conclusion must be universal affirmative propositions. They do not regard the *vyatirekī* type as inference, but it is brought under *Arthāpatti* or postulation. This again is a case of *pramāṇa* being shaped by the metaphysics of the system that it subserves. To the Advaitin the whole system of finite categories are transcended and negated in Brahman and so one cannot have any term which is never non-existent. When one infers fire from smoke he depends on the knowledge of *vyāpti*, not between the absence of fire and absence of smoke (*vyatireka*) but between the presence of smoke and the presence of fire (*anvaya*).

A *hetu* or the middle term of an inference must satisfy five conditions in a syllogism to yield vaild knowledge. If it does not, then we have fallacious middle. The five conditions of a valid middle are now applied in the inference, "World has God as an agent, because it is an effect; *e.g.*, a pot having a potter as an agent." First, the middle term must be a characteristic of the minor term (*pakṣadharmatā*). Being an effect (*kāryatvam*) is in the minor term (world). Secondly, the middle term must be distributively related to the major term, *i.e.*, the major must be present in all the instances in which the middle is present (*sapakṣasattva*). The *kāryatva* or being an effect is in all instances such as pot, cloth, etc. Thirdly, as a corollary of the second, the middle term must be absent in all cases in which the major is absent (*vipakṣāsattva*). Soul is the counter example (*vipakṣa*) where "being an effect" is absent because soul is eternal. Fourthly, the middle term must not relate to obviously contradictory and absurd objects like the coolness of fire. Such absurdity is absent in the proposition under consideration. Fifthly, it must not itself be validly contradicted by some other ground or middle term (*asatpratipakṣatva*). In the present example, it is sought to be established that God is the agent of creation of the world. No other factor can satisfactorily explain the agency. It cannot be "*māyā*", the material cause, nor "*karma*", the auxiliary cause, nor the soul which has only imperfect knowledge and capacity to act. Thus, the above inference is free from the five fallacies of the middle term, *viz*., *savyabhicāra* (irregular middle), *viruddha* (contradictory middle), *prakaraṇasama* (counteracted middle) or *satpratipakṣa*, *asiddha* (unproved middle), and *bādhita* (contradictory middle).[15]

Upamāna or analogy is held as a separate *pramāṇa* by the Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Advaita schools. This does not carry much conviction. The Siddhāntins and Dvaitins subsume it under *anumāna*. In analogy the unknown is generally explained through the known. The *Māyāvādin* describes the nature of Brahman that is Bliss as comparable to the sugarcane which does not enjoy the sweetness in it but enables others to enjoy the same. Aruḷnandi Śivam criticizes this analogy on the ground that it fails to satisfy the dictum, "*uvamamum poruḷum ottal vēṇḍum.*" (The standard of comparison and the object compared must have between themselves agreement). Here Brahman, the plenitude of Bliss-Consciousness, is sought to be compared to the non-intelligent sugarcane. The contrast between the relata is obvious.

Śabda or verbal testimony is accepted by most of the Indian systems of philosophy as a *pramāṇa*. According to Nyāya, *śabda* is a source of valid knowledge only insofar as the source of the word is a perfectly trustworthy person (*āpta*) and that the validity of the knowledge is also extrinsically caused through the reliability of the speaker and is also extrinsically made out through verification in direct experience.

The Siddhāntin also accepts "*āptavākya*" as *pramāṇa*. According to him "the *citśakti* associated with *āgama-vākya* is *śābdapramāṇa* (*āgamavākyārūḍham ātmacaitanyam śabdapramāṇam*). *Āgamas* are said to be '*pramāṇa*' only by courtesy. Their validity consists solely in their being the utterance of Śiva. The *Pauṣkara* declares: "The *śabda* is intended ultimately to lead on to Śivajñāna."[16] The *Vedas* and the *Āgamas* like *Kāmika*, *Sarvajñānottara*, etc., constitute the proof for the metaphysical concepts of Siddhānta as they are the utterances of Śiva. The *śruti* text "*asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitam etad yad Ṛgvedo Yajurvedas Sāmavedaḥ*" and the Āgamic statement "*pūrvato daśasaṅkhyaṁ śivabhedam tathāparam raudram aṣṭādaśavidhaṁ tebhyo'vadat kṛpānidhiḥ*" bear this out.

Tirumular says, "*Aṇṇal aruḷāl aruḷum Śivāgamam.*"[17]

When it is said that Śiva is the author and expositor of the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas*, it does not mean that he uttered the audible sounds that we hear when the *Vedas*, and the *Āgamas* are recited by preceptors. The sounds that we hear are but the manifesting agencies of the subtle speech (*paśyantī vāk*) or *paranāda* that constitutes the utterance of Śiva with whom the *ātmacitśakti* is attuned. As the *Pauṣkaravṛtti* puts it, "*svacitśakti-pravṛttyanuguṇasya nādasya sūkṣmāyāḥ, paśyantyāḥ vācaḥ niḥsṛtiḥ; na tālvṣoṭha........*"

Sūryabhaṭṭa in his *Śaivasiddhāntaparibhāṣā* explains the nature of *śabdapramāṇa*. The aspirant for *Śivajñāna* shall be one who had been initiated into *nirvāṇadīkṣā* and impelled by a desire to understand the truth about the entire objects of knowledge. He listens to the *āgama-vākya* of the *paranāda* character expounded by a qualified preceptor. As the *vākyas* enter his ears, they arouse in him an awareness of the *varṇas* which are none but the *nāda-bindu*. Then he correlates his words with the Āgamic words repeatedly so that the consciousness of the self is attuned to the ideas conveyed by the *Āgamavākyas*. It is this which is called *śabdapramāṇa*.[18]

The question may be asked as to how it is now said that a certain *ātmacaitanyam* is *pramāṇa*, while it has been said earlier that '*āpta-(śiva)-vākyam*' is *pramāṇa*. Suryabhaṭṭa answers: "*Pramāṇa* is of two kinds, *upakārya* (secondary, literally one who is helped) and *upakāraka* (primary, literally the helper). The *ātmacaitanya* is secondary because the consciousness of the self is to be rid of its impurities (*pāśa*) with the grace of the Lord. *Īśvaracaitanya* is the consciousness of Śiva that is set on the course of removing the impurities of the self. The self is the aspirant of God-consciousness; the *ātmacaitanya* as recipient of the *āgama* teaching is called *sādhakacaitanya* and as such is *pramāṇa*."

That the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas* are *pramāṇa* for the Siddhānta metaphysics can be understood from the following citations. The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* proclaims:

> There are two beings, one the omniscient and the other not; the other *māyā*, also an eternal entity, is associated to provide the soul the needed experience. The Supreme Spirit is eternal,

> all-pervasive and not itself a doer. When a man understands the nature of these three, he has realised the truth.[19]

In Śaiva Siddhānta, divine grace occupies a crucial position in the spiritual progress of soul. The *Kaṭhopaniṣad* says *"yamevaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ......"* (It is he who is the recipient of divine grace that obtains the *śreyas*, the supreme Bliss). The *Pauṣkarāgama* declares: "Never does a man attain *mukti* by his own skill; by no means other than the grace of Śiva, the dispeller of everything that is evil, is such an attainment possible."[20]

On the nature of *Śivaśakti*, the *Niḥśvāsāgama* says: "That supreme and pure potency inhering in Śiva is in reality only one. It is inseparable from *Śambhu* as heat is from fire. It is the connecting link between the soul and *Śiva*.[21] On perceiving Śiva who is endowed with various potencies, with his *caitanya* illumined by Śivaśakti, the soul, with the coils removed, experiences the bliss of Śiva.[22]

To sum up:

(1) The Śaiva Siddhānta school presented by the *Śivajñānasiddhiyār* accepts only three *pramāṇas*, *viz.*, perception, inference and verbal testimony. The *Pauṣkarāgama* accepts four including *Arthāpatti* (presumption); other schools like Advaita accept more than four *pramāṇas* such as *Upamāna*, *Anupalabdhi*, etc., in accordance with their epistemological needs.

(2) Śaiva Siddhānta is unique in holding that *ātmacaitanyam*, the attribute of conscious self, is the one indispensable means of knowledge (*pramākaraṇam*) and substitutes the sense-object contact of the Naiyāyika as a means of perception by the consciousness-object contact, since the senses operate each in a limited field and being inert cannot themselves generate knowledge.

(3) *Ātmacitśakti* is for all practical purposes the *pramāṇa*. But being helped (*upakārya*) by *Śiva-citśakti* (*upakāraka*), the latter is the *pramāṇa* ultimately from the metaphysical standpoint.

(4) The role of this *citśakti* as *pramāṇa* is analogous to the concept of *sākṣin* in Dvaita philosophy.

(5) Accepting the stand of Naiyāyika that *āptavākya* (the statement of a knowledgeable and trustworthy person) is *śabdapramāṇa*, the

Siddhāntin holds that the *Vedas*, the *Āgamas* and other *śāstras* based on them derive their authority from Śiva, the omniscient (*sarvajña*) and the most trustworthy (*āptatama*) Being who is the author of the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas*.

(6) The Siddhānta *śāstras* do not generally discuss the *khyātivādas*. The *Pauṣkarāgama* briefly alludes to it and follows the Nyāya school in accepting *anyathā-khyāti*. Without arguing at length it expresses its disagreement with the Bauddha, Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita views in the matter.

(7) The Siddhāntin holds that *Pratyakṣa*, being the first and foremost among the *pramāṇas*, has to be given due weight and as such the world perceived as real is absolutely real and not apparently so as the Advaitin holds. He uses inference to establish *Īśvara* being the *kevalanimittakāraṇa* of the universe. He cites the scriptural authority to establish the eternality of God, soul and matter. Thus he shows how the Śaiva Siddhānta system is based not only on authority but also on reason.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Yatnenānumito'pyarthaḥ kuśalairanumātṛbhiḥ |
   Abhiyuktatarairanyaiḥ anyathaiva upapādyate ||
   —Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*
2. "Nāvedavin manute taṁ bṛhantam" ityādiṣu vedāntaśāstram-antareṇa brahmaṇaḥ bodhasambhavāśravaṇāt |
   — Śrīkaṇṭha's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* under *B.S.* 1.1.3, p. 147
3. Yacca pramāṇadṛṣṭānām api padārthānām mithyātvakalpanam, tacca pramāṇaviruddhatvādeva prakāśataskaratvam —Śrī Madhva's *Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya*, p. 136
4. Yathākathañcit yuktyupanyāsātmakam upapattirūpam na tu svatantrapramāṇam
   —Appayya Dīkṣita's *Śivārkamaṇidīpikā* on *B.S.* 1.1.3
5. Dr K. Sivaraman, *Śaivism in Philosophical Perspective*, p. 336
6. *Jñānāvaraṇaviḷakkamum Māpāḍiyamum*, p. 447, Published by Dharmapuram Ādhīnam

7. Saṁśayādi-vinirmuktā cit-śaktirmānamucyate
—*Pauṣkarāgama*, VII. 4.

8. Nanu na syāt kuto mānaṁ yattat pramitisādhanam |
Sattvadīpadṛgādīnāṁ pramāṇatvaprasaṅgataḥ ||
—*Pauṣkarāgama* VII. 11-12

9. Cit-śaktiśca parāpekṣo bodha eva na cāparaḥ;
Na tasyābhimukhaṁ jñānaṁ mātā mānamparonmukham ||
— *Pauṣkarāgama* VII. 8

10. T. P. Ramachandran, *Dvaita Vedānta and Its Contribution to Indian Philosophy*, p. 9

11. Teṣām ekā parā yonir yat tejaḥ pārameśvaram |
Nimittam īśvaras teṣām upādānam sa bindurāṭ ||
Svakarmasahakārī syāt tasmāt kāryam sahetukam ||
— *Pauṣkarāgama*

12. Acetanasya māyādeḥ pravartakatayā patiḥ |
Siddhaḥ sarvārthavit kartā vyāpakaḥ satatoditaḥ ||
— *Śataratnasaṅgraha* of Umāpatiśivācārya, translated into English by P. Thirugnanasambandhan, Madras University Philosophical Series, No. 20, p. 9

13. Oruvaṉōṭorutti oṉṟeṉṟuraittiṭum ulakamellām
Varumuṟai Vanduniṉṟu pōvatum ātalālē
tarupavaṉ oruvaṉ vēṇḍum tāṉ mudal īṟumāki
maruviḍum anādi-mutta citturu manni niṉṟē
— *Śivajñānasiddhiyār Supakkam* with the commentary of Śivāgrayogi in Tamil. Śaiva Siddhānta Mahāsamājam, v. 21, p. 110

14. Vyāpti-viśiṣṭa-pakṣa-dharmatā-jñāna-janya-parokṣārtha-viṣayaka-buddhivṛttyavacchinna-cit-śaktereva anumānatvam
— *Śaivaparibhāṣā* by Śivāgrayogī, University of Mysore, p. 9

15. *Śivajñānasiddhiyār*, commentary by Śivāgrayogī on the first *sūtra*, Śaiva Siddhānta Mahāsamājam, p. 111

16. Śabdastu pāramparyeṇa Śivajñānānumāpakaḥ, *Pauṣkarāgama*

17. *Tirumandiram* of Tirumūlar, 58

18. *Śaivasiddhāntaparibhāṣā* of Suryabhaṭṭa, Published at Devakkottai, p. 16

19. Jñājñau dvāvajāvīśanīśau ajā hyekā bhoktṛbhogyārthayuktā,
Anantaścātmā viśvarūpo hyakartā, trayaṁ yadā vindate brahmam etat.
— *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, 1.9

20. *Collected Lectures on Śaiva Siddhānta 1963-1973*, Annamalai University, p. 387

21. Ekaiva vastutaḥ śaivī yā śaktirnirmalā parā |
Avinābhāvinī śambhoḥ śuceruṣṇamiva prabhoḥ ||
Niḥśvāsāgama;
see *Śataratnasaṅgraha* of Umāpatiśivācārya, *op.cit.*, p. 87

22. śivārkaśakti-dīdhityā samarthīkṛta cid-dṛśā |
śivaṁ śaktyādibhiḥ sārdhaṁ paśyatyātmā¯gatāvṛtiḥ ||
— *Niḥśvāsākārikā* cited by Veḷḷiyambalavāṇasvāmī in his *bhāṣya* on *Jñānāvaraṇaviḷakkam*, published by Dharmapuram Ādhīnam.

4

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA

K. Vajravelu Mudaliar

In India, philosophy invariably leans on religious faiths, and ever since men of different faiths strove to establish their faith as true, the enquiry into the valid means of knowledge came into existence. The materialists restricted themselves to accepting sense perception alone as the only valid means of knowledge and the Buddhists to inference in addition. Sense perception includes perception by mind also. Mind or *manam* in Tamil, is considered to be a sense-organ functioning within the human organism. Among those who believed in verbal testimony there is a difference of opinion as to what constitutes scripture or the valid testimony.

In Tamil literature, the earliest record of epistemological thinking occurs in the *Maṇimekalai*. The heroine, Maṇimekalai, listens to the exposition of the respective faiths of various scholastics in the town of Vanchi; one of the expounders called Aḷavai vādi, takes the stand on the *pramāṇas*, as the means of valid knowledge. He might have been a Naiyāyika.

During the Saṅgam age, religion was a way of life which was chalked out by the elders who were influenced either by tradition or by supersensuous direct experience. So they did not feel the necessity for establishing their faiths by epistemological reasoning. But later on when Buddhist monks and Jaina ascetics came to South India, they tried to undo the native faiths and replant their own faiths, through a class of trained men called *Samayak-kaṇakkar* or scholastics. These men followed a formal method in establishing the truth of their sayings. Their methodology consisted in citing four evidences with regard to their faiths, *viz.*, the scripture, the tradition, the verities held, and the nature of the state of release.[1]

Saint Tirujñānasambandhar of the first half of the 7th century seems to be familiar with syllogistic arguments for the existence of God. He says, "It is not necessary to investigate too much with reasons and analogies, for, our Lord, the all-pervasive splendour makes Himself comprehensible even as a flame, to those who approach Him with devotion and love. So, ye who wish to be rid of the painful experiences of the world, approach Him with sincere devotion and lead a blissful life."[2] With respect to Śaiva Siddhānta literature in Sanskrit, learned scholars say that the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* belongs to the pre-systematic age. The *Śaiva Āgamas* such as *Kāmika* and others may be taken to be somewhat systematic. Discussion on the *pramāṇas* occur in the *Mṛgendra*, an *upāgama*. In the *Pauṣkara* there is a chapter on *pramāṇas*; but, to my knowledge, this chapter mostly depends on the views of the *Nyāya* works. The six kinds of relation between objects and sense organs stated there are rejected by Śivajñāna Yogin, the commentator on the *Śivajñānabodham*. He says that the topic has been dealt with, as it is held by the *Nyāya* school, and so it is not acceptable to the Siddhānta school.[3]

So it is to be taken that Saint Meykaṇḍār was the first to systematise the religious philosophy of Śaiva Siddhānta and place it on a sound epistemological basis. His disciple, Aruḷnandi Śivanār, has added a chapter on epistemology in the second part of his *magnum opus*, the *Śivajñānasiddhiyār*.

I shall mention here two important points which require special attention when we consider the epistemology of Śaiva Siddhānta. The first point is that the term "*pramāṇa*" (*Aḷavai* in Tamil) is used in two senses in Śaiva Siddhānta: (i) the primary sense, and (ii) the secondary sense. This is clear from the *Śivajñānasiddhiyār* where the expression, "the cognitive potency of the individual self that runs towards the external objects" (உயிரின் ஓடு உணர்வு) is used in defining the various means of valid knowledge, perception, inference and verbal testimony.

The epistemological significance of the wording of Meykaṇḍār in the formulation of the inherent nature of the self may also be noted with profit. The last line of the seventh *sūtra* of the *Śivajñānabodham* reads, *"Iru tiṟan aṟivuḷatu iraṇḍalānmā."* This may be translated freely thus: The individual self which is neither *sat* nor *asat*, has cognition of both, and with both of them as aids, it has its being in them. Here the two kinds (*iru tiṟan*) means *sat* and *asat*. *Sat* is the immutable supreme Being, which is of the form of consciousness-bliss (*bodha-ānandam*), and *asat* is the changing material world in the form of body, organs, locus and objects of experience (*tanu, karaṇa, bhuvana* and *bhogam*).

Śivajñāna Yogin in his commentary (*Māpāḍiyam*) brings out the epistemological significance of this line thus:

> The expression that 'the self has cognition of both' signifies that all which can be classified under the terms *sat* and *asat* are *prameya* (objects of cognition and experience); the self which apprehends them is *pramātā* (subject of cognition and experience); the cognitive potency of the self is *pramāṇa* (the special instrument of the act of cognition), and the occurrence of such cognition and experience is *pramiti*; the expression that "the self has cognition with both as manifesting aids" signifies (1) that when the self's cognition is aided with *asat*, the *pāśa-jñānam* in the form of perception, inference and scripture, which is separate from it is the manifester and (2) when it is illumined by *sat*, Śivajñānam (the light of grace of the Lord), the self's inseparable support, is the manifester. By courtesy (in a secondary sense), the manifesters may be denoted by the term *pramāṇa*. But to identify the manifesters themselves as *pramāṇa* (in the real or primary sense) as the *Naiyāyikas* and others do, is absurd.

Two other authoritative *dicta* may also be considered in this connection. The first is a description of *pramāṇa* by Śivāgra Yogin in his *Sivaneṟi-prakāśam*, (Śtanza 20):

> The seers hold that the cognitive potency of the individual self is free from doubt, error, and remembrance; and is illumined by the consciousness-force of the Supreme, as *pramāṇa*; its field

> of objectivity is not confined to the external things alone as in the case of sensation; while not pervading non-existents, it extends its pervasiveness to the three manifesting aids, perception, inference and scripture, and all their sub-classes. It pervades and transcends even the faculty of intellect (*buddhi*).

The second is an excerpt from Śivajñāna Yogin's refutation of the commentary of Jñānaprakāśa Munivar on the *Śivajñānasiddhiyār*, (stanza 14, Aḷavai Iyal):

> It is said in the *Pauṣkara* that the cognitive potency of the self which requires to be aided, is *pramāṇa*, not the consciousness force of the Supreme which does not require any aid for its functioning. To define and eliminate the wrong idea (that the formulation of the definition of *pramāṇa*, *viz*.: "Saṁśayādi vinirmuktā cicchaktirmānam ucyate" may give rise to), it is also said that what is *pramāṇa* cannot be *prameya* and vice versa. This test is applied and, since the sense-organs, the probans (*liṅga*), and scripture are *prameya* (objects of vaild knowledge as well) as any other object, it is concluded against the followers of Nyāya Śāstra, that these cannot be called *pramāṇas* (in the real sense). So we have to understand that in Śaiva Siddhānta the term *pramāṇa* is used in two senses: (1) the cognitive potency of individual self free from doubt, etc., as the aided means (*upakārya pramāṇa*), and (2) the ordinary sense, *pratyakṣa*, inference and scripture as aiding means (*upakāraka pramāṇa*).

My second point is that it is desirable and necessary in the interest of truth that some notions which are held by the commentator, Śivajñāna Yogin, are to be modified in the light of modern science. The famous commentator of the *Śivajñānabodham* explains, according to the light available in his time, that of the five sense-organs four alone are stationary and contact the object that come to them, but the eye, the fifth organ reaches its objects in a subtle from of light and contacts them while perceiving. However ingenious this explanation may be, it is only a prototype and is anticipatory of what actually takes place. The external world impresses itself on the individual in the from of energy, heat, light, sound, etc., and our sense organs, including the eye, catch these impressions and draw our attention. This is sensation; and it is called *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* or *indriya-pratyakṣa*. Then, our internal organs intervene and according to the characteristics of the impressions, they objectify the source of the impressions, as such-and-such. This is perception proper, and is called *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* or *mānada-pratyakṣa*. In order to understand how our eyes are impressed by light rays and objectify the sources, one should read that part of physics which deals with light and its laws of reflection.

Again, with respect to the theory of error which is known as *khyāti-vāda*, I do not think that any Tamil work deals with it. They simply mention error as *viparīta* or *tiribu*, and explain it along with the other defects of knowledge such as doubt. It is a favourite topic with the monists; others also discuss it without much success, for want of scientific knowledge of light. Of those that have dealt with this problem, Madhva of the Dvaita school who speaks of *abhinava-anyathā-khyāti* is nearest the truth. He speaks of *sādṛśyam* in dealing with error. Śaiva Siddhāntins who are supposed to favour *anyathā-khyāti* should be understood as advocating *sādṛśya-khyāti*. That this is the view of the Śaiva-Siddhāntins, can be easily seen from the argument that they use in refuting the view that the material world is only an appearance of *parabrahman*. Śivajñāna Yogin, while refuting the *māyā-vāda*, distinguishes valid perception from the erroneous one in the following way:

> In erroneous perception a rope may be seen as a snake by some for sometime, as a garland by some for sometime, and so on; whereas in a perception free from error and doubt, a pot is seen as a pot at all times by all persons... The rope and the snake are alike as they are long and bent, and so one may be mistaken for the other. But there is no likeness (*sādṛśya*) between Brahman and the world which consists of things like pot, etc. Brahman is sentient whereas pot, etc., are insentient.[4]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. மெய்த்திறம் வழக்கு நன்பொருள் வீடெனும்
இத்திறம் தத்தம் இயல்பினிற் காட்டும்
சமயக் கணக்கரும் (*Maṇimekalai*, kātai 1, ll. 11-13)

2. ஏதுக்களாலும் எடுத்த மொழியாலுமிக்குச்
சோதிக்க வேண்டா சுடர் விட்டுளன் எங்கள் சோதி
மாதுக்கம் நீங்கல் உறுவீர் மனம் பற்றி வாழ்மின்
சாதுக்கள் மிக்கீர்! இறையே வந்து சார்மின்களே
(*Tēvāram* 3. 54. 5)

3. *Cf. Śivajñāna Pāḍiyam,* VI Sūtra — Śivasamavāda school and its refutation.

4. *Ibid.*, Sutra II, adhikaraṇa 2.

5

AN ATTEMPT AT UNDERSTANDING THE ŚAIVA THEORY OF PERCEPTION

V. Ramakrishnan

What is intended in this paper is an attempt at understanding the Śaiva theory of perception in the overall setting of the doctrinal scheme. As a preliminary step, the conventional discussion of the specific problem of perception in the post-Humean era (at some academic centres in the West) will be touched upon. Such a negative approach may help to give some positive insights into the nature of the problem that the Philosophy of Religion could be called upon to discuss. Thereafter a short elucidation of the contrast between the standpoints of religious experience as stated by the theologian-philosopher on the one hand, and the desacralisation that pervades the entire experience of the non-religious man on the other, could be attempted. (Such an opportunity is provided by the early portions of the *Śivajñānasiddhiyār*—both *Parapakkam* and *Supakkam.*) A discussion of this nature could throw light on the difference in meaning and significance of the term 'perception'.

The current discussion of the problem of perception reveals three significant features that should interest us:

1. It is exclusively concerned with our perception of the external world.

2. What motivates the probe is the interest taken to understand the nature and faculties of human beings.
3. The human being is viewed as a body-mind complex and by perception is meant seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling and touching.

It is generally claimed to be an intelligent examination of the theoretical difficulties involved in the notions of common-sense with a view to their defence or amendment, so that philosophy may "not be dismissed as unscientific, out of date, and blind to the results of observation and experiment."[1] The aim and scope of doing philosophy, therefore, is to be encompassed within the norms set by the world of science.

Fanciful theories emerged (ever since philosophy divorced itself from religion) concerning the facts of perception and their interpretation. The twentieth century saw developments in philosophy that made metaphysics suspect. It was viewed as a source of pseudo-problems engendered by misconceptions about the logic of our language. Current trends in the study of the psychology and physiology of perception and the examination of the specific characteristics of illusions and hallucinations, however, seem to point to the need for a revision of the plain man's assumptions. The plain man's assumptions refer to (1) the relation between a person and other entities that inhabit a common spatio-temporal world and by which he discovers their nature and characteristics. As a corollary to this we find that objects of perception are 'public' or 'inter-personal'. Objects of perception are distinct from, independent of, and external to, the percipient. It is the 'public' assumption that distinguishes them from dream and mental images. (2) Perceiving seems to be direct awareness. (3) By perception we can ascertain the nature and characteristics of these other entities.

One significant trend that developed had been doubt concerning the trustworthiness of the senses as a source of objective knowledge. Very often this led to idealist conclusions. The source of the challenge appears to be the problem of 'absolute certainty' with regard to perceptual judgements that science seems to insist on. Those in defence of common-sense assumptions seek their qualification with tests and checks. As a consequence, 'absolute certainty' gives way to 'high degree of probability'. Developments in either direction seems to point at some form of representative theory with one doubting their objectivity, while the other seeks refinement and partial surrender of the ideal of 'absolute certainty' to retain the objective nature of knowledge derived from perception. The former stand seems less fashionable now, while the latter sees in physics and physiology the necessary and sufficient condition of all perceptual knowledge. The parallel efforts of psychologists and philosophers have made some see the need to avoid the haughty isolation in which they have worked thus for, though collaboration, it is admitted, would not guarantee a definitive solution of the problem.

An examination of some of the key concepts used in the background of aims and scope will help reveal one significant fact. Philosophical activity in the broader Indian context (of which Śaiva Siddhānta is an instance) had been of a totally different order with different rules governing the interpretation of doctrines. The 'haughty isolation' among the different fields of inquiry that is complained of is avoided. It is not merely because the quest is for a more integrated theory capable of accommodating all their findings. The more rewarding exercise seems to be the urge for freedom and the search for a higher mode of existence. Unlike in the current trend philosophy had not divested itself from the basic concerns of religion. The central insights of religion in fact constitute the datum on which all philosophical activity takes place. The comparison would also point to the futility of causal adoption of modern labels to identify varying standpoints within the Indian system.

The concept of the 'external world' presupposes a body-mind complex as the percipient. (This is essentially a Christian approach to the problem of human personality however much philosophy would claim to extricate itself of religion.) The physiological process involved, which constitutes the later stages of an act of perception, therefore becomes part of the percipient. A curious feature of such an account is that it could be an object of perception for someone else. From a subjectivist angle, it becomes a sufficient condition of perception, though it does not exhaust all the necessary conditions of perception.

The process of perceiving is aimed at arriving at the nature and characteristics of objects and entities external to the body-mind complex. This is precisely the aim of all the sciences — a disciplined form of thinking that is resorted to with the view to conquer nature. Towards this end the 'nature and faculties of human beings' is probed into to investigate the scope and limits of man's ability to conquer nature. To that extent the quest is ego-centered though the obsession for 'absolute certainty' is toned down to one of 'high probability'. This, then, is the most a theory could aspire for. Knowledge loses its cocksureness and gives way to the tentative. All this results in the effort to refine the plain man's assumptions. Philosophy thus becomes a useful adjunct to scientific inquiry.

The assumption in the Indian context demands the repudiation of the ego-centered approach, for it is the sick nature of the 'plain man' that constitutes one of the central insights of the seers. The examination of the problem of perception, therefore, is spurred by different aims.

The external world, here, refers to the physical structure of the human person as well. In the background of Indian physiology, mind ceases to be a totally different phenomenon. It is treated as an evolute of the same material stuff the external world is constituted of. In the circumstances the traditional body-mind problem becomes a pseudo-problem. The percipient (*jñātṛ*) therefore has as his object a wider range — both in terms of quantity and quality. It is the body-mind complex in its interaction with the environment — *tanu*, *karaṇa*, and *bhuvana* — that constitutes the objects, and their impact on the self constitutes experience (*bhoga*).

Perceiving is possible because of the capacity or power, possessed (அறிவாற்றல்) by the percipient for knowledge (*ātmacitśakti*).[2] It is the want of fulfilment of this potentiality that is the source of tension and conflict among the more sensitive beings. The religious man has glimpses of the divine reality (*sat*) and deeply desires to be, to participate in reality and be saturated with it. It is the felt alienation from what is seen as his original state of bliss (அனாதி சிவரூபமாகிய ஆன்மா) that enables him to be aware of his fallen state (பெத்தநிலை). Two features emerge that are of interest to this discussion: (1) Indian thought as a whole never doubts the existence of the external world and the problem of establishing an external referent to all perceptions does not arise. (2) One singular factor is identified as primarily responsible for obstructing knowledge of things as they are. This veiling principle is known as *āṇava* which in Śaiva metaphysics becomes a permanent category. The psychology of perception, therefore, as Sivaraman correctly observes[3] gains preliminary status over the objective content in Indian epistemology.

The knowing subject in a pluralistic conception is seen as a free agent. His knowing carries with it the connotation of transformation (உணருதல்), where the knowing subject identifies itself with the object known (பற்றிநிற்றல்). Since the knowing subject has no independent mode of existence, it tends to reflect the object it opts for (சார்ந்ததன் வண்ணமாதல்). This is the Śaiva interpretation of the notion of *advaita*. A curious feature limiting the knowing capacity of the subject is that it is aided in its capacity to know (உணர்த்த உணரும்). The apparent illogicality of this state of affairs can be bypassed on the authority of the sensitive perceiver. In a state of conditioned existence (*paratantra*) under the impact of *āṇava* it sees the unreal as the real. Sivaraman quite aptly states, "The knower or knowledge becomes dependent on the known, and surrenders its being to that of the known object."[4] Reference to the "known object" could also refer to god as one of the possible alternatives. Since this is the limit, the chances are more weighted towards the unreal. Those with glimpses of the divine splendour had mourned over the fallen or embodied state. (இளைத்தேன் தளர்ந்தேன், ஆற்றேன், etc., give vent to this feeling of alienation.) Hence the gradation in the quality of knowledge. And from the point of view of the psychology of perception, gradation in the quality of the experience involved, the ecstatic responses of the truly liberated (அர்த்தம் எனக்கு அருளியவாறு ஆர் பெறுவார் அச்சோவே) stands testimony to this gradation.

Two other significant features in the Śaiva conception needs to be noted. (1) The knowing subject is aided by physical factors both as instrument of knowledge and source of illumination. This involves the Śaiva version of the physiology and physics of perception (உயிரினோடு உணர்வு வாயில் ஒளியுறு ஆதிபற்றி செயிர் உறு விகற்பம் இன்றித் தெரிவது இந்திரியக் காட்சி — *Siddhiyār*, Aḷavai 6).

The current interest in the problem of perception confines its range to this area alone, and sees in it the necessary and sufficient conditions of all perception. The cognitive activity posterior to the bare datum (மானதக் காட்சி) and the psychological states of pleasure and pain (தன் வேதனைக்காட்சி) are the extended zones that Śaiva mystic physiology allows for. The adept in *yoga* could transcend space, time and nature to see things in their integrated whole (யோகக் காட்சி).

Perception also implies possibilities of graduating into higher states of development. While the sense-organs are constitutive of the same stuff as the objects in the environment and thus enable the percipient to engage them to reach out to their due objects (*e.g.*, the eye that could see to reach out to the objects that can be seen; similarly the other organs could chalk out their own zones of activity), the material aids to perception also help to dispel darkness (or illuminate the objects seen). In the *kevala* state the knowing subject is said to be completely enveloped by *āṇava*. As a corollary to this advantage, life on earth is also seen as an opportunity to develop the perceptual powers of the knowing self.

(2) The sensitive perceiver is also aware of a permanent condition of illumination, *viz.*, *Śivaśakti*. It is seen as illuminating from within (அவனருளே கண்ணாகச் காணினல்லால்; ஊனினை உருக்கி உள்ளொளி பெருக்கி) and from without (தேச விளக்கெல்லாம் ஆனாய் நீயே) the objects of perception. It is the source of all being. However, it remains a potentiality until such time as it is yearned for. In its final stages it gives to knowledge the 'absolute certainty' that requires no proof. We have it on the authority of the saint. His personality is so forceful that it makes his word authoritative.

A cursory look at the Śaiva scheme enables one to see the limits of the physicalist account of perception which the current discussion takes for granted. It sees in it a necessary but not sufficient account of the perceptual process. Perception in the final analysis is dependent on an act of will. It also shows the futility of demarcating areas of discourse, for all fields of inquiry become subsumable within the over-all quest for freedom. (The attempt to demarcate areas of discourse arises out of a need to accommodate the reality of religious experience with the practical success of science).

The failure of natural theology (which attempted to borrow the methodology of mathematics and the physical sciences) in proving the existence of religious entities has led to revolts against rational and speculative study of religion. New trends arising from the study of religious phenomena by way of the history of religions and comparative religions could be viewed as significant developments. Rudolf Otto (*Das Heilige*) and Mircea Eliade (*The Sacred and the Profane*) can be treated as pace-setters of this new and significant trend which has proved useful in the philosophy of religion. Otto's reference to the 'irrational aspect' of religion in contrast to the rational (perhaps to draw the distinction between it and the concerns of rational theology) and Eliade's distinction between 'the sacred and the profane' seem to concede the possibilities of areas of discourse with their own rules for what constitutes a meaningful statement. "The sacred", states Eliade, "is equivalent to a *power*, and in last analysis, to *reality*. The sacred is saturated with being. Sacred power means reality and at the same time enduringness and efficacity. The polarity sacred-profane is often expressed as an opposition beween real and unreal or pseudo-real."[5] This appears to be comparable to the polarity *sat-asat* in Śaiva Siddhānta. There does not appear to be a parallel to '*sadasat*' as having access to both spheres, and the man with religious experience for whom "all nature is capable of revealing itself as cosmic sacrality",[6] seems to find an appropriate parallel in Aruḷnandi's polemics with the Lokāyata. The latter fits in well with Eliade's conception of "the man without religious feeling, of the man who lives, or wishes to live, in a desacralised world." The Lokāyata provides the instance of the man who finds it difficult to rediscover the existential dimensions of the religious man.

The polemics conducted against the Lokāyata by Aruḷnandi is also an instance of an attempt at educating the 'irreligious man' — operating within different dimensions. Whether ideals are derived from the proclaimed epistemological standpoint or the other way around, the Lokāyata is committed to perception and peception alone as the measure of all things (ஈண்டு அளவை காட்சி, Parapakkam I.2), (மனமுதல் ஆறினுக்கும் நேயத்ததாக வேண்டும் P.I.11). The objects of perception are the material elements (பூண்ட பொருள் பூதம்). Aruḷnandi points to the inadequacy of this source alone for all perceptual phenomena and the account of all the Śaiva categories.

The Lokāyata finds the ideal and the real in 'nature' (இயல்பு) itself. Being engrossed in such an experience (போகம்) (the knowing subject and the object to perception are constituted of the same material stuff), it also gains the status of an ideal worth striving for (சுடரெனத்தோன்றுதல்). What appears to be the natural outcome of surrender of the inclinations (வேட்கை) also becomes the very definition of the ideal. This then becomes his way of life (மார்க்கம், நெறி).

The Śaiva's conception of 'nature' is that which does not change on its own (இயல்பினுக்குச் செயலது இன்று S.I.3). Yet the elemets that constitute nature are seen to assume several forms that come into being and pass away (உருக்களாய் ஆதலோடு அழிவாகும் P. I.(2)5). To the Śaiva, forms do not remain static and this experience of change comes as a primitive datum (இப் பூதாதியெல்லாம் விதிப்படி தோற்றி மாயக்காணலாம் S I.2). According to the law of *sahasahetu* (*e.g.*, மா மரத்தைக் காட்டல்) the fact that matter allows itself to be acted upon (செயற்படும் அசேதனத்தால்) points to an efficient cause (செயல் செய்வான் ஒருவன் வேண்டும் S. I. 3).

An understanding of the Śaiva theory of perception necessarily demands reference to inference. This may bring to light the role of perception in the overall problem of knowledge. But inference in the sphere of religious truths has to adhere to its own norms analogous to what obtains in aesthetics. To transport into the arena what obtains in the fields of mathematics and the physical sciences is unwarranted. Aristotle rightly observes that it is the mark of the educated man to expect that degree of exactness which the subject-matter allows. To insist on the exactness of mathematics that operates on the basis of axioms specific to that subject will drag us once again into natural theology.

Inference in the sphere of religious studies draws its significance from its suggestive value. The Lokāyata appears blind to the possibilities that the perceptual data would suggest. It requires the requisite religious imagination born out of commitment and training to see in what is given the handiwork of God. It is an act of creation the rich and variegated nature of which points to the real and powerful being.

Another instance of inference useful to an understanding of perception is in the sphere of man's love for his female partner. Sex for the religious is no organic function as such. It is (as with food) viewed as a sacrament, where the urge is communion with the sacred. The experience of such love is a form of primitive perceptual datum. Applying perhaps the inference of *kāriyahētu*, Aruḷnandi arrives at the divine archetype the primitive bisexuality as the cause. This avoids the charge of trying to apply what is true of the parts as capable of explaining the origin of the whole. Such an approach at understanding religious causation is likely to salvage the cosmological argument from its harsh critics (ஆதியே உலகத்தில் ஆணொடு பெண்ணுமாய் அணை காரியம், நாதன் நாயகியோடு கூடி நயந்த காரணம் என்பரே, P. I. (2) 15).

The type of physical aids to perception are said to be due to the *karma* performed in previous births. But *karma* in Śaiva Siddhānta is not understood as a moral law operating on its own momentum. It is viewed as the meting out of justice by a loving and powerful will. The Tamil term "vidhi" (விதி) though used as synonymous with law as used in the sciences carries with it the connotation of a decree (ஆணை) which is the outcome of an act of will. Thus confronted with 'vidhi', the attitude is one of acceptance if not with resignation. This is viewed as the given. It could have been worse. Hence the suggestion that it is the work of a just and loving God. The perception of pleasure and pain is what sparks of such an inference (தன் வேதனைக் காட்சி).

The data of perception thus presented, all point to a divine being real, powerful, enduring and efficacious. "நாதன், முதல்வன்" are terms that point to the ground of all being, which is a truly free being (அனாதி முத்த சித்துரு; தோற்றம் நாசம் தனக்கிலா நாதன் Supakkam I. 1 and I. 4). In the presence of this 'living God' of the believer the feeling is one of absolute surrender in faith (பராவு தேவர் பராவு தூய பராபரன் அடி பற்று நீ P. I. (2) 29) where one attains to a perfect state of happiness (சேமமாகிய இன்பம் P. I. (2) 30). Thus, as in any doctrinal scheme, one should attempt at understanding any specific dogma in its relation to the rest of the scheme. What is here attempted is the contrast with the irreligious to show that a certain degree of reverence is essential for the word of the seer. The same object presented to the religious and the irreligious evoke two different perceptual judgements. In this instance Aruḷnandi, who is groomed in a totally different tradition invites the Lokāyata to come and see for himself the untainted, bright and permanent happiness that could save him (மாசதற்றொளிர் நித்த சுத்த வளந் தருஞ் சுகவாரிகாண் P. I. (2) 28).

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. A. J. Hirst, *The Problem of Perception* (London, 1966), p. 25.
2. *Ātmacitśakti* is translated quite appropriately by Sivaraman as 'self's knowledge function' in *Śaivism in Philosophical Perspective*, Motilal Banarsidas, 1973, p. 293.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 291.
4. *Idid.*, p. 293.
5. M. Eliade, *The Sacred and Profane*, pp. 12-13.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

6

DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE SANSKRIT WORKS ON ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA

G. SUNDARAMOORTHY

This paper aims at pointing out some most significant developments in the epistemological thinking of the Śaiva Siddhāntins.[1] These developments are mainly traced from the Sanskrit sources of Śaiva Siddhānta, but attempt is made here to compare them with the Tamil sources wherever necessary.

Although we generally accept that the Śaiva Siddhānta philosophy is very old, it may not be wrong to hold that the Śaiva Siddhānta philosophy took a somewhat definite shape only during the age of the *Śaiva Āgamas*.[2] The philosophical ideas of Śaiva Siddhānta are contained in the *Jñānapāda* portions of the *Śaiva Āgamas*.[3] Although it is generally believed that all the *Śaiva Āgamas* have *Jñānapāda* portions of their own, the *Jñānapādā* portions of all the *Śaiva Āgamas* do not seem to have been preserved for us.[4]

A study of the *Jñānapāda* portions of the *Saiva Āgamas* makes it clear that all of them do not agree in all their philosophical views. The commentators of these *Śaiva Āgamas*[5] try to impress upon us that the difference in the views of these *Śaiva Āgamas* is only apparant. But to a critical student of the *Śaiva Āgamas* it appears that the difference of views indicates development in the thinking of each of the *Āgamas*. It is natural that each thinker wishes to develop his own peculiar view mainly to improve upon the earlier views; consequently difference as a result of development and development as a result of difference are inevitable in every school of thought.

As it is common to all the philosophical schools, the Śaiva Siddhānta philosophy also must have originated as an unsystematic school of thought. Unfortunately, we do not have satisfactory literature to reflect fully the unsystematic stage of Śaiva Siddhānta except what we get from some of the *Śaiva Upaniṣads.*[6] The *Śaiva Āgamas* represent the second stage of Śaiva Siddhānta in which attempt is made to present the Śaiva Siddhānta thought in a somewhat systematic manner. Some *Āgamas* like *Mṛgendra*[7] represent the early stage of the systematization of the Siddhānta thought. Some advancement is noticed in the systematization of the Siddhānta thought in the *Pauṣkara Āgama*, also called *Pauṣkara Smṛti.*[8] The *Pauṣkara Āgama* occupies a very important place in the history of Śaiva Siddhānta. This *Āgama* seems to represent the final stage of the Āgamic development of the Siddhānta views.[9]

The *Pauṣkara Āgama* is immediately connected with this paper for the fact that it seems to be the only *Āgama* having a separate chapter (*paṭala*) on the *pramāṇas.*[10] In some other *Śaiva Āgamas*[11] we get stray references to epistemology, but the *Pauṣkara Āgama* attempts to hold all of them in a somewhat systematic manner in its chapter on the *pramāṇas*. It tries to explain the Śaiva Siddhānta concept of epistemology in nearly 89 *sūtras*. The chapter on the *pramāṇas* begins with the request of the sages to Śiva to explain the *pramāṇas*. In the second *sūtra* the sages say that they wish to listen to the exposition of the *pramāṇas* as the *prameyas* become meaningless without the knowledge of the *pramāṇas*.

> "adhunā śrotumicchāmaḥ pramāṇāni kṛpānidhe |
> yatsvarūpamavijñāya prameyo vyarthamiṣyate || "

The *sūtra* makes it clear that the Śaiva Siddhāṇtins of that age understood the importance of the knowledge of the *prameyas*. In fact the knowledge of the *pramāṇas* is very necessary for the understanding of the other views of the school. Therefore the sages are correct in wanting to know the *pramāṇas* in order to understand the *prameyas*. But there seems to be a discrepancy in the context in which the sages want to know of the *pramāṇas* since the *Pauṣkara Āgama* has dealt with *Pati*, *Bindu*, *Māyā*, *Paśu*, *Pāśa* and *Puṁstattvam*[12] in its earlier chapters. After having known these subjects in detail, the sages now want to know of the *pramāṇas*. If the *Pramāṇa Paṭala* had been placed at the beginning of the *Pauṣkara Āgama*, the question of the sages would have become more pertinent.

We now come to a more systematic age of the Śaiva Siddhānta thought which produced a number of works like the *Tattva-prakāśikā* and others which are called 'Aṣṭa Prakaraṇas'.[13] It is surprising to note that epistemology does not attract the attention of the writers of these systematic works like the *Tattva-prakāśikā*. Almost all these works devoted more space and time in order to explain the various *Tattvas* and other problems connected with them. This seems to be the result of the general nature of the *Saiva Āgamas* which showed more inserest in the *Tattvas* of the Siddhānta than in epistemology. In this context the inclusion of a chapter on epistemology in the *Pauṣkara Āgama* seems to be a significant development. The *Pauṣkara Āgama* might have felt that the Śaiva Siddhānta of that age neglected a systematic account of epistemology and it was therefore necessary on its part to give a proper place to the *pramāṇas*. We can be sure that the inclusion of epistemology in a prominent way in the school of Siddhānta created a new dimension for epistemology.

Some more interest was created by another Śaiva Siddhānta text for the cause of epistemology. This text is a commentary on the *Tattva-prakāśikā*, and the work is ascribed to one Śrī Kumāra. In fact the *Tattva-prakāśikā* has two commentaries, one by Aghora Śivācārya[14] and the other by Śrī Kumāra.[15] According to scholars, Aghora Śivācārya belongs to 12th century A.D.[16] The age of Śrī Kumāra has not been fixed properly, but it may not be wrong to assign Śrī Kumāra to the 12th century or even to the later half of the 11th century.[17]

The *Tattva-prakāśikā* has no reference to epistemology, but the commentator Śrī Kumāra creates an opportunity to discuss the details of epistemology in the fourth chapter.[18] Śrī Kumāra, while commenting on the *Buddhi-tattva*, deviates a little to discuss the details of the Siddhānta epistemology. The discussion on epistemology at this place seems to be a bit unconnected with the context, and one is tempted to feel that Śrī Kumāra could have done this at any other place in his commentary. Śrī Kumāra's introduction of the discussion on the *pramāṇas* in the fourth chapter of the *Tattva-prakāśikā* suggests that Śrī Kumāra did not feel the importance of the *pramāṇas* to introduce them in the beginning of his commentary. Like the *Pauṣkara Āgama*, Śrī Kumāra felt the necessity of introducing the epistemological views in a cogent manner in one place, but was not inclined to give more importance than this.

We now pass on to notice some more developments with regard to the Siddhānta epistemology. In this context we may mention two important prose texts on Śaiva Siddhānta. One text is the *Śaivaparibhāṣā* of Śivāgra Yogin[19] and the other text is the *Śaivasiddhāntaparibhāṣā* of Surya Bhaṭṭa.[20] Śivāgra Yogin's contribution to Śaiva Siddhānta is unique for various reasons. He wrote many Sanskrit and Tamil works to enrich the field of Śaiva Siddhānta.[21]

The *Śaivaparibhāṣā* is a prose work in five chapters. There is a chapter on the *pramāṇas*[22] in this work. Here Śivāgra Yogin quotes profusely from the *Pauṣkara Āgama* and explains the problems of the Siddhānta epistemology mainly on the basis of the *Pauṣkara Āgama*. It appears as though Śivāgra Yogin is writing a commentary on the *Pramāṇa Paṭala* of the *Pauṣkara Āgama*. Śivāgra Yogin feels that the knowledge of the *pramāṇa* is a fundamental requirement to the understanding of the other views of the school. But it is interesting to note that Śivāgra Yogin does not express this view in this chapter on the *pramāṇas* in the *Śaivaparibhāṣā*, though he has expressed it else where.

இராகமறியார் இசைப்பயன் தானறியார்
தராதரமறியார் சற்காரியமறியார்
ஓராரளவை ஒருபயனும் தானறியார்
ஆராய்ந்தளவை அறிந்து கொளீரே.[23]

Śivāgra Yogin not only speaks of the importance of epistemology but also affirms that epistemology should be discussed in the introductory portion of any work before it begins to deal with the other ideas of the Siddhānta school. It is for this reason that he devotes the very first chapter of the *Śaivaparibhāṣā* to epistemology. The importance attached to epistemology by Śivāgra Yogin seems to be an outcome of the influence of Aruḷnandi Śivācārya. It may be remembered that Aruḷnandi Śivācārya devotes the first chapter of his *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār* to explain the Siddhānta epistemology.[24] Śivāgra Yogin[25] might have been influenced by the treatment by Arulnandi Śivācārya. Thus it is clear that Śivāgra Yogin added a new weight to epistemology by treating it in the beginning of his work. Śivāgra Yogin has rendered a great service to the Siddhānta epistemology by the special treatment accorded to it. Some later writers on Śaiva Śiddhānta began to give the same importance to epistemology following the example of Śivāgra Yogin. Surya Bhaṭṭa who has written the *Śaiva Siddhānta Paribhāṣā* is a good example to be quoted in this connection. Surya Bhaṭṭa surely seems to have followed the ideal of Śivāgra Yogin and he too treats epistemology at the beginning of his work.[26] One need not think that Surya Bhaṭṭa has minimised the importance of epistemology by placing it in the second chapter of his book. The first chapter being the introduction to the book, epistemology gets its due respect in his work.

We will now consider some more texts of the later period. The *Jñānāvaraṇa-viḷakkamum Māpāḍiyamum* published by the Dharmapura Ādhīnam[27] (which is in Tamil and Sanskrit) quotes many Sanskrit works on Śaiva Siddhānta. This work has a chapter on Aḷavai (*pramāṇa*). Many useful explanations are given to the Siddhānta epistemology in this work. This work very often quotes from the *Jñānānta Paribhāṣā*[28] to illustrate the Siddhānta epistemology. The *Jñānānta Paribhāṣā* seems to suggest some more developments in the field of the Siddhānta epistemology. In the earlier works on Śaiva Siddhānta very often we come across a common definition of *pramāṇa*. Thus the *Pauṣkara* defines *pramāṇa*:

> dvayālambā saṁśayo buddhiḥ samānākāra darśanāt |
> viparyayo'nyathājñānam-atadrupapratiṣṭhitam ||
> anubhutārthaviṣayā matiḥ smṛtirihocyate |
> ebhirvihīnā cicchaktiḥ pramāṇatvena sammatā ||[29]

The meaning of this verse is: *Citśakti* which is bereft of *viparyaya*, *saṁśaya*, and *smṛti* is valid knowledge. According to Śrī Kumāra, the general definition of *pramāṇa* is this: *samyaganubhavaḥ pramāṇam.*[30] It means that right experience which is devoid of *vikalpa*, *viparyaya* and *smṛti* is *pramāṇa*. Śivāgra Yogin also defines it following the *Pauṣkara*.[31] According to Surya Bhaṭṭa, "*Pramāṇamātrasamavetaṁ prameyārthāva-*

bhāsakaṁ pramāṇam."[32] It means: *Pramāṇa* is that which reveals the object and which stands in *samavāya* relationship with the knower.

The *Jñānāntaparibhāṣā* too defines *pramāṇa* in the same way as it is done by the *Pauṣkara Āgama.*[33] In all these definitions there is not much difference. However, the *Jñānāntaparibhāṣā's* contribution to the development of the Siddhānta epistemology lies in this that while the other texts try to define *pramāṇa* in the way it is acceptable to the Siddhānta, the *Jñānāntaparibhāṣā* defines it after refuting the definitions of *pramāṇa* as given by the other schools of Indian Philosophy. This helps us to know how and where the other definitions of *pramāṇa* are wrong. In this connection it may be pointed out that the *Ṣivajñāna Siddhiyār* which tries to explain the *pramāṇas* in a detailed manner does not give any general definition of *pramāṇa.*[34] It is, therefore, significant that the Sanskrit works on the Siddhānta fill up the gap found in the Tamil Siddhānta works.

From the foregoing account it may be understood that the Sanskrit texts on the Siddhānta contain some significant developments in the treatment of epistemology. The development shown so far may be summarized as follows:

1. In the pre-systematic age of the Śaiva Siddhānta system, epistemology does not seem to occupy any importance.

2. In the early *Śaiva Āgamas*, epistemology was given only a passing importance as there are only stray references to it in these texts.

3. In the later *Śaiva Āgamas*, epistemology was given some importance as it was treated separately. especially, in the *Pauṣkara Āgama*.

4. Again, in the systematic works of the Siddhānta school like the *Tāttvaprakāśikā* epistemology was pushed to its original position as these texts gave importance only to the *Tattvas* and details about them.

5. In the commentaries on the systematic works, epistemology attracted the attention of some writers as found in the commentary of Śrī Kumāra.

6. In the independent works of the later age like the *Śaivaparibhāṣā*, epistemology which was given prominence was considered to be the basis for understanding the problems of philosophy.

7. In the works of the still later age like the *Jñānāntaparibhāṣā* the Siddhānta epistemology was developed further by contrasting it with the views of the other schools of Indian philosophy.

The above observation is mainly with reference to the *pramāṇas* which are dealt with in the Sanskrit works either in a separate chapter or in a stray manner. It may be noted, however, that the epistemological problems are not confined to *pramāṇas*.[35] Many epistemological problems which are very closely related to *pramāṇas* have been discussed by these works in relation to other problems of Śaiva Siddhānta.[36] A careful study of these problems will also show that there has been development in the analysis and elucidation of them.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. For an analysis of the epistemological problems as expounded in the *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār* and its six commentaries, see V.A. Devasenapathi, *Śaiva Siddhānta*, University of Madras, pp. 16-68; V. Ponnaiah in his *Theory of Knowledge of Śaiva Siddhānta* deals with the epistemology of the Śaiva Siddhānta system. But this author has consulted only the Tamil sources and has not taken pains to refer to the Sanskrit sources. He does not mention even in reference most of the important Sanskrit texts on Siddhānta.
2. The age of the *Śaiva Āgamas* is a matter of speculation. The Āgamic ideas might have originated long ago, but slowly they come to be written and attained the present form mostly during the period between 4th and 10 centuries A.D.
3. According to tradition, each Āgama is divided into four parts — Caryāpāda, Kriyāpāda, Yogapāda and Jñānapāda.
4. In spite of the fact that the *Śaiva Āgamas* are of very great importance to the students of Indian culture, it is unfortunate that they are not available for reference to most of the interested scholars mainly due to the fact that they have not been printed. Of course, some are now available in print.
5. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakanṭha, Umāpati Śivācārya and others are some of the most important scholars to be remembered in this connection.

6. The *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* is an important one to be noticed in this connection.
7. Two important editions of this text are available at present. One was printed in Kashmir and the other was printed in Tamil Nadu.
8. This *Āgama* was printed in Grantha character in Tamil Nadu.
9. The age of the *Pauṣkara Āgama* is not known definitely. But as it is quoted by some commentators of the 11th-12th centuries, it seems to be as old as that. But whether all the *Paṭalas* as available presently belonged to it originally is a question to be decided by scholars.
10. S. N. Dasgupta in his *History of Indian Philosophy*, Volume V, gives an account of this work, see pp. 29-37.
11. For example see, *Mṛgendra Āgama* (Devakkottai ed.) p. 10.
12. All these topics are discussed in the *Pauṣkara Āgama* in separate chapters. The *Pauṣkara* contains eight *Paṭalas* or chapters and the *Pramāṇa Paṭala* is the penultimate one.
13. *Aṣṭa-prakaraṇa* includes the following works: *Tattva-prakāśikā Tattva-saṅgraha*, *Tattvatraya-nirṇaya*, *Ratnatraya*, *Bhoga-kārikā*, *Nāda-kārikā*, *Mokṣa-kārikā* and *Para-mokṣa-kārikā*.
14. The commentary of Aghora Śivācārya has been published in Tamil Nadu.
15. The commentary of Śrī Kumāra was published from Kerala.
16. K.A. Nilakantha Sastry, *The Cholas*, p. 688.
17. Aghora Śivācārya in his introductory remarks to his commentary on *Tattva-prakāśikā* says that some scholars before him have tried to comment on the work without the proper knowledge of Śaiva Siddhānta. We do not exactly know whether he means the commentary of Śrī Kumāra as it is the only commentary known to have been written on the work.
18. Śrī Kumāra divides *Tattva-prakāśikā* into six chapters, but Aghora Śivācārya does not have such divisions.
19. This has been published in Mysore.
20. This has been published in Tamil Nadu.

21. For an account of the contribution of Śivāgra Yogin, see V. A. Devasenapaṭhi, *Śaiva Siddhānta*, pp. 9-11. See also the introduction of Publication No. 200 of Tiruvāvaḍuturai Ādhīnam.

22. *Śaiva Paribhāṣā*, pp. 1-27.

23. Maraijñāna Sambandhar who has written a Tamil commentary on the *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār* quotes a verse with the same meaning. See Publication No. 106 of Tiruvāvaḍuturai Ādhīnam, p. 29.

24. Aḷavai Ilakkaṇam of the *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār*, verses 7-20.

25. Śivāgra Yogin has written an elaborate Tamil commentary (with the mixture of Sanskrit) on the *Sivajñāna Siddhiyār*.

26. pp. 6-18.

27. Publication No. 367 of Dharmapura Ādhīnam, p. 408.

28. The work is known only through such quotations. It is not known whether the work is available in print.

29. *Sūtra* 6 of the *Pramāṇa Paṭala*.

30. p. 28.

31. p. 2.

32. p. 7.

33. Publication of Dharmapura Ādhīnam.

34. This fact is noteworthy. Why and how this has been omitted is to be thought over by scholars.

35. For example, the theory of error is an important epistemological problem but normally it is discussed apart from the *pramāṇas*, although it is connected with them intimately.

36. For example, the *Māpāḍiyam* of Śivajñāna Svāmigal.

7

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ŚAIVISM

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI

The Saiva philosophy is, in a sense, typical of the entire range of Hindu thought. While, in all its forms, it subscribes to the belief in three *padārthas* (categories: God, soul and the bonds) and thirty-six *tattvas* (principles), in the reality ascribed to the *tattvas* and in the independence assigned to souls and matter, it varies from idealistic monism at one end of the scale to pluralistic realism at the other end. But all through there will be found the typically Hindu insistence on knowledge as essential to salvation, and as the prime cause thereof, though in some forms of Śaivism, this requisite is diluted with (or as they would say, reinforced by) deeds. All such variations may be found even in the recognised orthodox forms of Śaivism leaving out of account types like the Pāśupata (which does not recognize that God is the material cause or that He has any regard for the *karma* of souls in creation), the Mahāvratas, the Kāpālas, etc., who combine the belief of the Pāśupatas with obscure rituals of their own, and a host of other unorthodox types like Bhairava, Vāma and so on. These latter are near the gate of truth, but yet outside it; while even among those that have entered the gate there are numerous gradations. Which is placed higher will depend on the outlook of the system that makes the estimate. Thus, monistic Śaivism (aikyavādaśaiva) is given a relatively low place in the estimate of the Siddhāntin, who is a realist. The basic teachings of Śaivism would thus seem to have undergone pretty nearly the same vicissitudes as the Upanishads, being interpreted variously according to the metaphysical bent of the followers. We shall take up the fundamental conceptions and briefly note, where necessary, the varying interpretations thereof.

The Śaiva system recognizes thirty-six principles as against the twenty-five of the Sāṁkhya and Yoga. No other system recognizes as many principles; even the Pāñcarātra, says the Śaivite, admits only twenty-four.[1] The reckoning of more principles is treated as a discovery of principles which other systems failed to note, and is thus considered a feature of merit in itself. To reckon more is to know more and to know more is to know better.[2] The extra principles are not uncritically accepted, however, and we shall have something to say about the arguments for them in the proper place.

To start with the last in the scheme of evolution, we have the five gross elements (*mahābhūtas*), ether, air, fire, water and earth; the last possesses the five qualities of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour; water lacks odour; fire lacks taste and odour; air lacks colour, taste and odour; ether has sound alone. These qualities are called *taṇmātras*. They are subtle as contrasted with the elements which are said to possess them; and they cause the gross elements. The uncritical mind may not understand how a quality like sound can be the cause of a substance like ether; but this is due to mere prejudice; for there is no such thing as substance other than its qualities viewed collectively, just as there is no forest other than the trees collectively.[3] Sound produces ether, while sound and touch produce air, and so on. Thus we have ten principles, viz., the gross elements and the *tanmātras* that cause them. The *tanmātras* are themselves evolutes of that variety of individuation (*ahaṅkāra*) wherein the quality of darkness and inertia (*tamas*) is predominant. This variety of *ahaṅkāra* is also called *bhūtādi*, since it is (indirectly) the cause of the elements. There are two other varieties of *ahaṅkāra*, distinguished by the predominance of *sattva* or *rajas* (the quality of illumination, buoyancy and goodness or the quality of activity and passion); they are called *taijasa* and *vaikṛta* respectively, making a departure from the Sāṁkhya doctrine where the *sāttvika* is called *vaikṛta* and the *rājasa* is called *taijasa*. Still another point of departure is that the Sāṁkhya derives all the organs of sense and action including the *manas* (the mind in its deliberative aspect) from the *sāttvika ahaṅkāra*, making the *rajas* merely an auxiliary to both the *sāttvika* and the *tāmasa* varieties, while Śaiva philosophy derives the organs of sense and *manas* from *sāttvika ahaṅkāra* and the organs of action from *rājasa ahaṅkāra*. In any case, the organs are derived not from the elements as in the Vedānta, but from varieties of ahaṅkāra. The enumeration of the organs of sense and action corresponds to that in any other system; *manas* is, as in the Sāṁkhya, recognized to be an organ of both sense and action; about its function we shall have to say more presently in treating of the internal organs as such. *Ahaṅkāra* is itself derived from *buddhi* (the intellect). From the standpoint of the individual, *buddhi* is known as the determinative faculty. It is itself derivative, but about that which gives rise to it there is considerable difference of opinion in different Śaiva works. Some recognize a principle called *citta*, which is equivalent to the three *guṇas* (primal constituents of the universe), manifested but in equipoise; above these they admit a principle called *prakṛti* as the cause of the *guṇas*, for on the general principle that all that is manifold and non-intelligent is caused, the *guṇas* must have a cause and this is *prakṛti*; it is other than the mere equipoise of the *guṇas*. Others, while recognizing *prakṛti*, see no need for a separate principle called *guṇa* and hence identify *citta* with *prakṛti*. Yet others would say that *citta* is but a variety of the functioning of *manas*, that it is what may be called the faculty of attention and does not rank as a distinct principle at all. As the balance of opinion is in favour of reckoning only twenty-four principles from *prakṛti* downwards, there is no room for *citta* as a separate principle. The matter is mentioned only to indicate the existence of diverse opinions even in the enumeration of the principles.

Buddhi, *ahāṅkārā*, *manas* and *citta* (where it is recognized) constitute the internal organs. When the senses come into contact with objects, they give rise to indeterminate cognition. *Citta* (or *manas* in the first phase of its functioning) fastens itself on this or that element in this stream of indeterminate presentation. Then it analyses the datum into substrate and quality (*viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*), says that such and such qualities would belong to one substrate, while such other qualities would belong to another substrate, and doubts which of these substrates the object in front actually is. *Ahaṅkāra* resolves to decide the issue; and *buddhi* supervenes and resolves that it is one or the other of the doubted substrates.

As in the Sāṁkhya, eight dispositions of *buddhi* are recognized, viz. *dharma* (virtue), *jñāna* (knowledge), *vairāgya* (dispassion), *aiśvarya* (lordship) and the opposite of these, *adharma, ajñāna, avairāgya* and *anaiśvarya*. The subdivisions of these conform for the most part to Sāṁkhya teaching, though they vary in some details; the totol number of these products of the intellect (*pratyayas*) is 612.[1]

Mūla-prākṛti, sometimes called *prakṛti-māyā*, is itself a product of impure (*aśuddha*) *māyā* through the evolute called *kalā* (lit. particle). *Aśuddhamāyā* evolves primarily into three principles—*kāla* (time), *niyati* (destiny or necessity), and *kalā*. Time should be admitted as an independent principle, since we find in experience that even when all necessary causes are present, the effect is not produced except with the passage of time. We find that different crops grow in different seasons; we find that time matures and time heals. If time is taken to be one, its distinction and consequently its causal efficacy would have to be explained by the adjuncts which differentiate it; and the empty husk of bare time would not be worth recognition. Time, therefore, is manifold; it is also non-intelligent; hence it is a product and, being a product, is non-eternal.

Destiny is that principle which sees that every soul has its due in the matter of the enjoyment of its appropriate fruit, that there is no improper filching of another's fruit or avoidance of one's own. Being non-intelligent, it has no doubt to be actuated by Intelligence as the energy of the Lord (*Śiva-śakti*), but *Śiva-śakti*, actuator in every case, should therefore be endowed with different instruments for different purposes. Destiny is the instrument intended for the purpose of controlling the enjoyment of *karma*.

Kalā is the instrument whereby the darkness that envelops souls is removed in part. On one side it evolves into *mūla-prakṛti* and on another into *vidyā* (knowledge) and *rāga* (attachment). *Vidyā* and *rāga* have a tendency to be confused with *jñāna* and *avairāgya*, which are dispositions of the intellect. The latter are purely material; in order that they may attach to the soul, they should be actuated by *Śiva-śakti*, which is pure intelligence. For their actuation intermediaries are needed which are neither wholly pure nor wholly impure; hence the recognition of *vidyā* and *rāga*. *Jñāna* as a disposition of the intellect would account for individual cognitions; but these would not be possible unless the cognition faculty of man has been made manifest and this is done through *vidyā*. If the cognitive energy of the Lord were directly active, bliss alone should be cognized, as pure bliss is of the nature of that energy; in order to account for our experiences of pleasure and pain, *vidyā* has to be admitted as an intermediary. Similarly attachment appears in the intellect, only as controlled by the emotive faculty, which needs to be manifested by *Śiva-śakti* through an appropriate instrument. This instrument is *rāga*.

These five—*kāla*, *niyati*, *kalā*, *vidyā* and *rāga*—are called the five sheaths (*pañca-kāñcuka*). It is as enveloped in these and endowed with five *kleśas* (hindrances), viz. *avidyā* (ignorance), *asmịta* (egoity), *rāga*, (desire), *dveṣa* (aversion) and *abhiniveśa* (identification) that the soul is ready to have experience of *mūla-prakṛti*. The five *kleśas* are together called *puṁstva-mala* (human impurities); and the soul in the condition is admitted as a separate principle called *Puruṣa-tattva*.[5]

From *aśuddha-māyā* up to and inclusive of *Puruṣa*, there are seven principles. While the twenty-four principles from *prakṛti* are wholly impure, these others are mixed; hence they are said to belong to the *miśra adhvan* (the mixed way) as distinguished from the *aśuddha adhvan* and the *śuddha adhvan* (to which belong the *Śiva-tattvas* to be mentioned presently). The seven principles from *aśuddhamāyā* are also called *bhojayitṛ-kāṇḍa*, the part that brings about enjoyment, as distinguished from the directive part (*preraka-kāṇḍa*) and the part consisting of objects of enjoyment (*bhogya-kāṇḍa*). The functioning of the five principles—time, destiny, etc., in constituting finitude is well illustrated in the *Paramārthasāra* with reference to the judgement, "Now this is something I know fully." The infinitude of knowledge is contracted into finite knowledge (*vidyā*); it is limited to a part (*kalā*); the word "now" indicates a present or future knowing of something unknown or a present or future doing what is not yet done; this distinction constitutes time. The word "something" indicates restriction (*kalā*) of the soul's powers; the word "this" indicates a definite and necessary relation between the subject and object; necessity (*niyati*) restricts the object known. The word "fully" indicates a sense of incompleteness, a desire for possession of everything and for continued existence; this is *rāga*. The words "I know" expresses finite knowledge (*vidyā*); these five united with *māyā* constitute what are known as the six cloaks (*shaṭ-kañcuka*) in that system.[6]

The pure principles are five. *Śiva-tattva* is the first of these and the cause of the rest—*śakti, sadāśiva, īśvara* and *śuddha-vidyā.Śiva-tattva* is one, pervasive and eternal; it is of the nature of both knowledge and action; it is the cause of the other pure principles. It helps to manifest the cognitive and conative energies of souls. It is not, however, to be identified with Śiva, for *in itself* it is not of the nature of knowledge or action which is non-intelligent. Neither Śiva himself nor His inherent *śakti* (power) can be directly the cause of any principles as they would then be liable to transformation and affected by inertness. *Śiva-tattva* is an evolution through *mahāmāyā* or pure *māyā*, as distinguished from *aśuddha māyā* mentioned earlier. But *māyā* in either form cannot be an inherent power of the Lord; it is assumptive, taken on (*parigraha-śakti*).[7]

The first evolute of this is *śakti-tattva*. From *śakti* proceeds *sadāśiva-tattva*, wherein the cognitive and conative energies are held in equipoise; thence proceeds *īśvara-tattva*, in which the cognitive energy is subordinated to the conative; from that again comes *śuddhavidyā-tattva*, wherein conative energy is subordinated to the cognitive. Since time belongs to the class of inferior impure evolutes, it should follow that the pure principles are timeless and that there is no question of priority - posteriority among them. Such a conclusion is, however, not acceptable to all Śaiva Siddhāntins;[8] by these others, therefore, a pure time is recognized, pertaining to the pure principles. It is difficult to make intelligible this concept of a pure time. If it is free from the defects discovered by idealistic dialectic in the category of time, it is really timelessness; and if there is really a sequence among the pure principles, these cannot be as pure as they are claimed to be. The recognition of "pure time" is significant of the Siddhāntin's constant desire to effect a compromise. It is questionable, however, whether this compromise is anything but a half-way house.

So far we have dealt with one aspect of the evolution of *Śuddhamāyā* or *mahāmāyā*, the evolution into the world of things (*artha-prapañca*) as contrasted with the world of sounds (*śabda-prapañca*). Over and above the articulate sound cognized by all physically, the Siddhāntin recognizes three other forms—*parā*, which is absolutely supreme and subtle, *paśyanti*, which is relatively gross but is still undifferentiated as the colours of the peacock are undifferentiated in the peahen's egg, and *madhyamā*, which is grosser still and differentiated, though not articulate, being of the nature of words which we utter to ourselves without the use of the vocal organs. Articulate sound is called *vaikharī*. Of this there are two forms, subtle and gross; the latter abides in the *śuddhavidyā-tattva*, and the former in *īśvara-tattva*; *madhyamā abides in sadāśiva-tattva*; *paśyanti* in *śakti-tattva*, also called *bindu-tattva*, and *parā* in *śiva-tattva* also called *nāda-tattva*. Just as *śakti* has to be distinguished from *śakti-tattva*, *bindu* has to be distinguished from *bindu-tattva*; the latter is an evolute of *śuddhamāyā*, while the former is *śuddha-māyā*.

Meaning is made known not by letters nor by words, but by a capacity which is manifested through letters and words. This capacity (*śakti*) is what is called *sphoṭa* by the grammarians. It resides in the *nāda-tattva*, the first evolute of *śuddhamāyā*. The arguments whereby *sphoṭa* is established are well known. The individual letters cannot make known the meaning, for if each letter did so, the other letters would be unnecessary; and as the letter-cognitions are momentary, any aggregation of them is impossible. The contention that the residual impresions of letter-cognitions persist and that they may have this function is of no avail, since residual impressions are known to have the function of recalling their own causes (here the letter-cognition). and there is no justification for imposing another function on them: Though *sphoṭa* or *śākti* or *nāda* is manifested by each letter, meaning as a whole is not fully manifest therewith; for it is manifested bit by bit by each succeeding letter as occurring in a particular sequence; the manifestation by the preceding letter or set of letters is a preparation for the manifestation by the succeeding letter, till the word is completed. Similar is the case in the expression of meaning by the words of a sentence. The Siddhāntin thus favours not a mere diversity, but a unity progressively manifested in the diversity.[9]

Souls are naturally infinite, pervasive, omniscient, etc. Yet they experience themselves as limited, finite, little-knowing. This is due to their bonds, of which there are three—*āṇava*, *karma*, and *māyā*. *Āṇava* is a connate impurity; it is what may be called original sin, if by "sin" we mean nothing more than imperfection. It is present without any beginning in souls, like the husk and bran in paddy or verdigris in copper. It is because of this impurity that the pervasive (*vibhu*) soul cognizes itself as finite, as if it were atomic (*aṇu*). Because of this limitation of cognitive and conative powers, souls act in certain ways which they take to be good or evil; and these acts bear consequences which have to be worked out by being experienced. The consequences constitute the next bond called *karma*. But in order to experience the consequences and gain knowledge thereby, there should be worlds, objects of enjoyment. These are provided by *māyā* (the impure variety). The functions of *āṇava* and *māyā* are thus opposed; while *āṇava* obscures, *māyā* illumines; while *āṇava* binds, *māyā* liberates; but the illumination and liberation due to *māyā* are very limited; such knowledge as results therefrom is delusive.[10] All the same there is sufficient contrast between *āṇava* and *māyā* to warrant the non-identification of the two. Those who would avoid the recognition of *āṇava* have yet to admit ignorance as a positive entity obscuring the natural powers of knowledge and action. This ignorance itself is called *āṇava* by the Siddhāntins.[11]

Souls which have all three kinds of bonds are called *sakalas*. Those for whom *māyā* alone has been resolved, by the involution of the worlds, etc., in the periodical deluges, are called *pralayākalas*. *Karma* remains for these in addition to *āṇava* and has to be worked out in fresh worlds, etc., in a fresh creation. Those for whom *karma* too is resolved, *āṇava* alone being left, are called *vijñānākalas*. These reside in the worlds constituted by *śuddha-māyā*.

God is pure, omnipotent, omniscient, gracicus, eternally free from bonds.[12] He carries on the fivefold function of creation, preservation, destruction, concealment and the bestowal of grace. The last is the culmination of all His other functions. Souls, in their essential nature, are the same as God; but their potencies are concealed by beginningless *āṇava*. To remove the obscuration and to reveal innate capacities is the purpose of God's functioning. The ignorance of souls can be removed partially through the bodies, instruments, etc., provided by *aśuddhamāyā*, i.e., by the physical world around us. The creation and sustentation of this world are therefore undertaken by God for this purpose. Aided by these bodies and instruments, the soul transmigrates, acquiring and spending *karma*, gathering experiences and gradually wearing away the power of *āṇava* to obscure. The progress is not uniform nor invariable. Different souls require different leagths of time; sometimes there is backsliding, because the identification with the material world and its enjoyments is too strong. The process of transmigration is in any case wearisome. It is necessary to give rest periodically to the evolving souls; the flagging energies of *aśuddhamāyā* have also to be given time occasionally to get freshened up; hence the function of destruction is thus an act of grace, not of cruelty. Souls left to themselves may not engage in activity leading to further experiences. And *āṇava* being non-intelligent is not active of itself. Since for their own good souls should be made to act seeking the pleasures of this world as if they were ultimate happiness, and parviscience as if it were omniscience, God functions through His own energy of concealment (*tirodhāna-śakti*) and makes *mala* (original impurity) active; hence this *śakti* too is figuratively spoken of as a *mala*; and the function of concealment is the fourth function of God in the interest of the souls.

When by long experience of transmigration the soul has learnt to equate empirical good and evil, realized that the one is as fleeting and intrinsically worthless as the other, and become indifferent to the acquisition of good *karmas*, as well as bad, the stage is set for release. The *mala* that has obscured and hindered is now ripe and fit for the divine surgeon's knife. The soul no longer cognizes with the evolutes of *aśuddhamāyā* nor with its own feeble flickering intelligence, but seeks the omniscience that is at once its own nature and birthright. There is the onset of divine grace, quick or slow, relatively to the capacities of the soul and the activities of physical or mental worship or meditation that the soul betakes itself to. When grace has fully set in, the Lord reveals Himself and instructs the soul. To the *vijñānākala*, He reveals Himself as their own inner light, to the *pralayākalas* in a divine supernatural form, to the *sakalas* as a preceptor apparently like one of themselves. By seeing, touching or instructing, He performs the purification (*dīkṣā*). If the ignorance of souls were due to mere absence of knowledge, it could be removed by knowledge; but *mala* is an entity; it is of a positive nature and can be removed only by another positive entity; hence the need for *dīkṣā*. The need for the help of the preceptor does not cease immediately with *dīkṣā*. He has to continue to help for a while, just as the surgeon is required not merely to operate the cataract but also to bandage the eye for some days before proper vision is restored. With this restoration, the soul no longer looks on itself as of the nature of *pāśa* or *paśu*, matter or the finite little-knowing spiritual atom. It has been weaned away from association with them and educated to a realization of its own full stature. It realizes its own *śivatva* and whatever is cognized is cognized as *Śiva.* There is no more misery or imperfection, since there is no cause thereof; when the cognizer and the cognized are both *Śiva,* who can cause misery to whom? This is the final stage of release. It is not dependent on or concomitant with release from the body; for the change is not physical, but spiritual. Through mere momentum or through the residue of *prārabdha-karma* (past work already bearing fruit), the physical body may persist for a while after spiritual illumination; but it does not fetter the enlightened soul, since it is not cognized as such.

The attainment of *śivatva* may be understood as complete mergence of being in Śiva or the realization of an identity of essence in spite of difference in existence. This is the difference between the idealist and realist schools of Śaivism, between what is ordinarily known as Kashmir Śaivism and the Śaiva Siddhānta of South India.[13] The latter contends that identity is not significant in the absence of difference and that when the scriptures teach non-duality (*advaita*), they mean to deny not the existence of two, but the duality of two; they say, "They are not two," not "There are not two." While both schools claim to maintain *advaita,* they differ thus in the interpretation of the term. Consistently with the starting point, the realist Śaiva cannot conceive of release as a mergence. The released souls continue to exist as souls; if as such they ceased to be, who is there to enjoy release? Not God, for He is eternally released. The soul claims God's nature as its own too; but it has not the effrontery to claim that it is itself God. On the contrary it always professes to be a devoted servant of God. But it claims greater dignity for itself than in the Vaṣṇava *viśiṣṭādvaita*; if the analogies of being secondary to God, being the body of God and so on were pressed, it would follow that in release God experiences through the soul, as formerly the soul used to experience through its possessions, the body and the senses; this is the proper consequence of the adjectival position of the soul. But the Śaiva Siddhātin will have none of this; he makes the soul the essential figure in the picture. In bondage the soul experienced through *pāśa;* now it experiences through *pati* (the Lord); its knowledge is no longer *pāśa-jñāna* or *paśu-jñāna,* but *pati-jñāna; pati-jñāna* means not the Lord's knowledge, but the soul's knowledge through the Lord. To the idealist critic, this will appear to be one more half-way house, a concession to the popular demand for individuality combined with an inability to avoid the fundamental position of non-duality. The other well-defined indications of idealism may be briefly resumed here; the recognition of *pramāṇa* (evidence of knowledge) as essentially one—*cit-śakti*, the varieties of perception, inference, etc., being but instruments which define that one; the recognition of *māyā* as not the inherent but an assumptive (*parigraha*) *śakti* of the Lord: the admission of *sphoṭa*; the acknowledgement of the essentially unstable and indeterminable nature of the *jīva* (soul) as such, since he is said to be *sad-asat* (real-unreal), i.e., both intelligent and non-intelligent, taking on the colour of his surroundings (this is not far removed from the Advaitin's doctrine of *jīvatva* as indeterminable); the notion that there is no substance as a substance in which qualities inhere; and so on. But more than all these, the insistence on knowledge as a means of release is what places the system in the direct line of succession of Indian thought. The original defect is obscuration or ignorance of a positive character with the resultant non-intuition[14] of the jīva's essential oneness with Śiva. The removal of this ignorance has to be worked up through discipline —*caryā* (observance), *kriyā* (rites) and *yoga*—and helped by the onset of grace; but discipline and grace function only as culminating in *jñāna*; it is knowledge that removes the sorrows of the soul. Throughout the course of transmigration, the soul has suffered in ignorance of its birthright, like the princeling brought up by the woodmen as one of themselves; when the Divine Preceptor removes the veil and reveals the true identity of the princely soul, there are no more false identifications, no more miseries. Discriminative wisdom is the supreme means of release; all others are means only as subsidiary thereto. And this knowledge is not of the same texture as empirical knowledge. The external objects of cognition through *pāśā-jñāna* are *asat*.[15] Illustrations of things which are *asat* are the writing on the water, the dream and the mirage. For the Siddhāntin who believes in *sat-kārya-vāda* (the view that effects are pre-existent in the cause), the *asat* cannot be the absolutely non-existent; what he means thereby is the mutable. It requires very little imagination to see the close resemblance of this conception of the world to the Advaitin's conception of it as *anirvacanīya* (indeterminable). It will not be forgotten in this connection that the Advaitin too is a *sat-kārya-vādin*. A further point of resemblance is the function assigned to scripture. Scripture too is a *pramāṇa* and its content can be but *asat*. To this objection the Siddhāntin says that scripture (like other *pramāṇas*) has a place in the knowledge of the pure *sat*, in that, though it does not have Siva for its content, it helps to bring about the inward realization of the *sat.*[16] It is a case of the *pramāṇas* not revealing but fulfilling themselves in the *sat.*

Consistently with such a doctrine of release, one would pect not only the subordination of all forms of worship and meditation to knowledge, but also their elimination when knowledge is attained. The *jīvanmukta* (free while living) should have no duties to perform. If he does any virtuous acts, it may be optional or purely by force of habit. Those who want to find him will see him in the company of the saintly or in places of worship; he will be found in the garbs of the saintly. But there can be no injunction of place or time or activity for such souls. The mention of what they do is to be treated as a description, not a prescription. In so far as any prescription is intended, that should be taken to apply to him who is yet in quest of wisdom, not to the enlightened man. Such a position is taken up not merely by the monistic Saivism of Kashmir, but also by the Siddhānta. The twelfth *sūtra* of the *siva-jñāna-bodha* prescribes the consorting with godly men and the frequenting of temples *for the sake of* release, and not for the released.

The more extreme among the realists say that, even though knowledge is attained, there is no unshakable realization. *Prārabdha karma* not yet having been exhausted, it will tend to uproot this new acquisition; and the performance of virtuous acts is enjoined for the sake of reinforcing the knowledge gained.[17] Such a position is not unintelligible in itself; but it is hardly consistent with the Siddhāntin's conception of the nature and supremacy of knowledge in the scheme of release.

Doctrinal variations like these do but lend point to our main contention that a whole gamut of variations has been played on a single fundamental theme, with a common stock of fundamental concepts based perhaps on common scriptural texts.[18] The Śivāgamas, no less than the Upanishads, have provided the basis for every shade of philosophic thought from monism to pluralism, idealism to realism, but throughout there is the insistence on knowledge as the saviour, the insistence characteristic of the best Hindu thought.[19]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See *Pauṣkara Āgama*, pp. 559-562. The Advaita Vedānta reckons thirty-six principles, but the new principles in the scheme are not independent principles, being for the most part, modification of one principle, *vāyu* (cosmic force).

2. The estimation of the worth of knowledge by its extent seems to have been common to the earlier Upanishads, as, for instance, when different seers are criticized for knowing one part or another of the cosmic Purusha, but not all the parts. See W. Ruben: "Uber die Debatten in den alten Upanishads" (*Z.D.M.G.*, 1920; pp. 238ff.). It is, however, possible that in the passages cited by Dr. Ruben, some emphasis at least is intended on the idea of a *whole* as contrasted with the idea of a *more*.

3. See *Pauṣkara Āgama*, pp. 456-460; also Śivajñānamāpāḍiyam, pp. 184-86. This is very much of an idealistic view of substance, with some affinities to Russell's Theory in his Lowell Lectures; and it marks one of the affinities of the system to Idealism.

4. They are 10 of *dharma* (5 *yama* and 5 *niyama*), 80 of *jñāna*, 100 of *vairāgya*, 64 of *aiśvarya*, 10 of *adharma*, 64 of *ajñāna*, 100 of *avairāgya*, 8 of *anaiśvarya* and 176 of *aśakti* (impotence). See Māpāḍiyam, p. 170.

5. See "*Tattva-traya-nirṇaya*," v. 22, commentary, and Māpāḍiyam, p. 158.

6. Allied to the conception of the cloaks is that of the eightfold city (*puryaṣṭaka*), which is another name for the subtle body with which each soul is endowed. There are divergent accounts as to the eight constituents of this body. According to some accounts (e.g. the *Kālottara*) they are the five subtle elements together with *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahaṅkāra*; according to others they are *kāla*, *kalā*, *niyati*, *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahaṅkāra*; according to yet another account (Bhoja's *Tattvaprakāśikā*, v. 12), this body is made of thirty *tattvas* under eight heads: (1) *the elements*, (2) *the organs*, (3) *manas*, (4) *buddhi*, (5) *ahaṅkāra*, (6) *guṇa*, (7) *prakṛti* and (8) the five beginning with *kāla*.

7. See Aghora Śiva's commentary on the *Tattvaprakāsikā*, v. 25. Even the realistic school has to admit Māyā to be a *parigraha-śakti*. While, however, the idealistic school draws what seems to be the natural inference and compares the product to the reflection in a mirror (see *Paramārthasāra*, verses 12 and 13: "As in the orb of a mirror pictures such as those of a town or village shine, which are inseparable from it, and yet are distinct from one another and from it, so from the perfectly pure vision of the supreme Bhairava this universe, though void of distinction, appears distinct part from part and distinct from that vision;" cp. also the opening verse of *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra* ascribed to Śaṅkara), the realist school refuses to take the evolutes to be illusory, "as such a manifestation would be false, though what is declared to be so is established as true by all the means of knowlege." (For the *Paramārthasāra*, Dr. Barnett's text and translation published in the *J.R.A.S.*, 1910, have been used.)

8. Verse 32 of the *Tattvaprakāśikā* denies priority and posteriority among the pure principles. But the commentator, Aghora Śiva, condemns it as an interpolation; according to him there is an order of evolution and involution even among the pure principles.

9. The grammarians who defend *sphoṭa* are Advaitins, though not of the orthodox variety. They are *śabda-brahmavādins*. Śaṅkara rejects the *sphoṭa* doctrine despite its monistic metaphysical implication. Vācaspati follows him in this, though the arguments of neither can be said to be very conclusive; see an article by the present writer on "Vācaspati's criticism of the *sphoṭa-vāda*"—*Journal* of *Oriental Research*, Madras, December, 1932. The Siddhāntin's recognition of *sphoṭa* is one more link with monistic idealism.

10. See Aghora Śiva on v. 25 of the *Tattvaprakāśikā*: "Though *aśuddhamāyā* too brings about knowledge and action through *kalā*, etc., it yet serves only to delude, since that knowledge is of the particular and leads to the superimposition of the self on the not-self, whereas the knowledge brought about by the

mahāmāyā is extensive knowledge of all things together; further, the latter is of pure entities like Śiva and comes through knowledge imparted by doctrinal works; hence *śuddhamāyā* produces real wisdom."

11. The arguments for the existence of *āṇava* constitute a striking parallel to the Advaitin's arguments for recognising nescience of a positive nature (*bhāva-rūpa-ajñāna*). Yet another link with monistic idealism.

12. He is both the material and the efficient cause of the world; through His *śakti* He is the material cause and in His own nature the efficient cause. The distinction is relative and not indicative of a real difference, for there is identity between *śakti* and *śaktimān*, as between attribute and substance. While the monstic variety of Śaivism insists on both kinds of causality, the dualistic variety as presented in the *Māpāḍiyam* considers the attribution of material causality to be figurative.

13. The contrast in localities is unsound; for many of the early writers of the realist school, e.g. Sadyojyotis, Rāmakaṇṭha, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, etc., seem to have belonged to Kashmir. Tradition has it that Tirumular, perhaps the earliest Tamil Śaiva, brought Śaivism to the South from the North, possibly Kashmir. The edition of the Kashmir Śaivism series recognize that dualist Śaivism too has a home in Kashmir and one of the works published by them, the *Nareśvara-parīkṣā*, belongs to this school.

14. *Akhyāti*, as it is called in the Pratyabhijñā school.

15. See the *Māpāḍiyam, sūtra* VI, topic 8.

16. *Māpāḍiyam, loc. cit.* Yet strangely enough, the Siddhāntin is not tired of criticizing the Advaitin for his doctrine of a non-dual Brahman, revealed by scripture, which is not real as Brahman is.

17. See *Māpāḍiyam, sūtra* XIII. Compare this with Śivāgrayogin's *bhāṣya* on the Sanskrit version of the same *sūtra*.

18. It is by no means certain that the remote basic texts of the idealistic school are different from those of the realist. Even

the *Śiva-jñāna-bodha*, a cardinal text of the realist school, is susceptible of idealist explanation. *Vidyāraṇya* is credited with an idealist commentary on these twelve *sūtras*; in our own days, a very creditable attempt in this direction has been made by Kuppuswami Raja of Tanjore, the scholarly Tamil translator of many Sanskrit philosophical works.

19. It is because of this cardinal feature that it was possible for Appaya Dīkshita to construct (or, as some would have it, reconstruct) a bridge between Śaivism and Advaita Vedānta, through the system known as *Śivādvaita*; see further the *Śivādvaita-niraṇya* and the *Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha* (both published by the University of Madras).

8

HUMAN FELLOWSHIP AND ŚAIVA PHILOSOPHY

S. GOPALAN

It is probably a truism to state that among the theistic systems of Indian thought Śaivism offers an ideal and wholesome philosophy of human fellowship. For theists by temperament the idea of human fellowship ingrained in Śaivism needs no logical or philosophical analysis, since it is self-evident. The theist may argue that the human-fellowship-feeling follows as a natural sequence the idea of the Creator who has implanted certain characteristics in his 'Creatures'. Furthermore, he may maintain the feeling itself gets 'diffused' when a person consciously tries to cultivate it as a sequel to its being a subject of logical analysis. Notwithstanding the important aspects of truth contained in the views of ardent theists indicated above, it is hard to accept that the philosophic basis of the Śaiva ideal of human fellowship needs no analysis whatever. Hence we propose to analyse the philosophical foundations of the Śaiva idea of human fellowship in this paper. We may preface our paper by pointing to the fact that Śaivism is *not* to be considered as *merely* a popular religion which appeals to emotion but as one whose appeal to the intellect is equally strong. We are more concerned to point to the intellectual basis since it will also make apparent the baselessness of the view that Śaivism is religion and not *also* philosophy.

Before we argue our case that the philosophic basis of Śaivism offers us an insight into the strong foundations of the religious aspect we shall indicate in outline what we understand by the human fellowship-feeling. That would not only help us in avoiding ambiguity in our treatment of the subject but will also aid a specific discussion of aspects of Śaivism which offer us an insight into the human side of the question.

Our argument in outline is that even though we do use the expression *fellow-feeling*, it is not *just* a feeling, — obviously 'experienced' by some people sometimes or by *all* people sometime or the other in their lives. Though psychologically and logically it is not meant to deny the subjective aspect of the human fellowship idea — for unless we grant the subjective aspect, speaking or transforming one's life or bringing about attitudinal changes in the 'others' towards *all* becomes mere verbeage, — what we *do* maintain is that because of the built-in logic, the fellowship-feeling holds within it norms that help transformation of personality. It is only because of such a blending of the subjective and objective (or extra-subjective) aspects in the fellowship idea, that a meaningful ethical (social) and religious philosophy can be built and sustained. As will become apparent from the sequel, Śaiva philosophy of human fellowship concretely illustrates our analysis just indicated. We may thus consider certain elements of analysis to comprehend clearly the Śaiva position.

Though in this section we are concerned to lay bare a methodology to appreciate the philosophic aspects of the leading idea of Śaivism — we consider the fellowship feeling as *the* leading idea — wherever necessary we may make brief references to the Śaiva point of view, and such an approach is likely to help us overcome a mechanical dissection both of a philosophy of fellowship in general and of the Śaiva position in particular.

The logic of individuality that we find in Śaivism offers us a convenient starting point. That every individual is unique is probably an acceptable presupposition for building up a philosophy of fellowship, though here again the blending of the unique and the universal needs to be urged.

Logically the idea of the unique does not preclude the universal, particularly when the universe of discourse is *mankind*. Making meaningful statements for a philosophy of man becomes possible only when the "linking human-kind" in (and between) the unique individuals, is conceded. The uniqueness of the individual(s) is a potential which can become manifest through a process of growth, consciously to be aimed at and achieved. The analogy of intellectual growth that Max Scheler gives is interesting and useful. Intellectual growth as such may connote that the individual has developed a unique point of view or conception regarding a particular matter, but he commences with the common meaning. But the common humanity is the base on which the 'unique individuality' is built.[1] There is thus no room for the 'situation of inconsistency' to arise. The one is the soil on which the other grows, offering conditions conducive to the potentiality actualizing itself. Conversely, the actualization indicates the dormant potential which has always been there in every unique particular. So from the point of view of the one who is manifesting an actualization of the potentiality, in-built in his personality, we may still think of aspects of personality which needs to be 'awakened' from the 'dormant stage', and from the point of view of the others who are yet to attain the stage even of partial actualization, we may appreciate that the dormant potentiality for achieving uniqueness is still with them. The implications of both are significant in as much as they point to the 'heights that can yet be attained' and to the necessity of helping the other "pilgrims' progress". The elements of *sublimation*, the necessity to keep one's ego down by not becoming complascent about what has been achieved but to reflect about what is yet to be achieved, and *expansiveness*, the concern for 'taking the others along the path' are seen to be ingrained in such a philosophy of the unique individual.

The psychological aspects of fellow-feeling can thus be directly derived from the logic of the unique individual. The common humanity which is the basis of the development of the unique does not get obliterated in the process of development, it always remains within the individual, hence also it is always open to him to be reflected about and deepened in his own person. What is perhaps equally important, it affords direct access to others. As Norto argues: "...the common humanity remains within us ... and when the other manifests a feeling which we ourselves have not had, he activates (through fellow-feeling) within us what has until now been a dormant potential."[2] Reciprocal involvement between individuals results and also a strong basis for a mutual respecting of each other's personality is found. What is oftentimes referred to as the feeling of empathy becomes much more meaningful since the individual, by becoming conscious of the significance of the others is also able to feel one with them.

With all the identity-feeling that the individual does develop or is exhorted to develop, the cause should not be overstated to maintain that an actual entering into the structure of the other person takes place. True fellow feeling is thus functional and not structural. This is obvious from the fact that even when the individual has the feeling empathy he is conscious of the fact that he is rejoicing (or sorrowing) *with* the other person, that he is different from the other person whose feelings he is able to fully appreciate. It is interesting in this context to recount how Max Scheler argues postively that entering into the structure of the other person, far from being helpful, is positively harmful. He distinguishes between authentic fellow feeling and the appearance of fellow feeling. In the former case individuality is kept distinct and in the latter some type of identification with the other person is achieved. In the second case (about which he is critical) life acquires a tendency to dissipate itself in a vicarious re-enactment of the 'others' and is also characterized by reflecting the changing moods and interests of the other persons. He writes:

> (In such a case) our own life consists in a series of reactions to such material content as becomes available, at *second hand,* through the other person's experience. Here we react to what actually touches him, as though touched by it ourselves; not because of any illusion or hallucination concerning the priority of the individual feelings but because we are leading *his* life and not our own, while remaining quite unaware of the vicarious relationship by which this process is effected.[3]

From our point of view an important point emerges out of Scheler's analysis, namely the ethical aspect of the fellow feeling idea. In a sense, no doubt, it seems to be that when the individual does not have the identity experience, he seems also to be not so capable either of appreciating the other feeling or reacting to them fully. Identity experience seems to be a pre-requisite for an authentic feeling of moral obligation that needs to be developed towards others. But a consideration of inter-personal relation would indicate that the individuality of the persons who become involved in reciprocal relations should not be obliterated if they are to effectively function *as* individuals. For one thing, an inter-personal relation itself entails the individuality and the separateness of the persons in such a relationship and for another the fellow feeling idea implies that individuals — as individuals — co-exist with the recognition of the importance and significance of the 'others'.

We made only a passing reference to the ethical aspect of the question, since we wanted to point to the fact that even considering the question (of the necessity to develop fellow feeling between individuals) purely from a social point of view impresses upon us the necessity to give a proper emphasis on the *feeling* of identity without unduly pressing it to its literal extent.

When considered from an ethical view-point, it becomes even more clear that individuality *has to be* preserved and respected. For, an ethical act emerges out of a conscious feeling that the individual *himself* is acting, and is doing so not because of an external compulsion to act in a particular way but because of his own conscious choice exercised through free-will. This means the individuals have to be distinct from each other and must be capable of consciously wanting to enter into empathetic relation with others for their acts to deserve an ethical description. In the absence of this the individual may exhibit all the characteristics of an ethical act such as sacrifice, but he would not have "authentically" lived out a life of sacrifice (in our example). The normative character of ethical life requires that the norm be subjectively appropriated by *each* individual and lived out.

The religious and the metaphysical aspects of such a life thus come to the surface inasmuch as the ultimate seriousness and the system of meaning ingrained in ethical life deserve closer scrutiny. We are not contending the idea that in the non-theistic (monistic) systems the religious and metaphysical are significant (though in different ways) but are only concerned here to point to the rootage of the "ethics of the unique individual" in the religious and the metaphysical realms. Since we are preparing the backdrop against which alone the true significance of the Śaiva philosophy of human fellowship can be comprehended, we need to pinpoint the religious-metaphysical roots of ethics itself. It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into a lengthy analysis of the religious-metaphysical bases of ethics itself. Suffice it to point to only one aspect of the question since ultimately the human fellowship idea is ethico-social with a system of meaning according it deeper and enduring significance.

Whatever may be the popular meaning of religion, the analysis given by both philosophers and sociologists bring to the surface what we consider to be the metaphysical rootings of ethics through an analysis of religion. William James writes:

> Religion has meant many things in human history; but when from now onward I use the word I mean to use it in the supernaturalistic sense, as declaring that the so-called order of nature, which constitutes this world's experience, is only one portion of the total universe, and that there stretches beyond this visible world an unseen world of which we now know nothing positive, but in its relation to which the true significance of our present mundane life consists. A man's religious faith ... means for me essentially his faith in the existence of an unseen order of some kind in which the riddles of the natural order may be found explained. In the more developed religions the natural world has always been regarded as the mere scaffolding or vestibule of a truer, more eternal world, and affirmed to be a sphere of education, trial and redemption.[4]

In his recent publication, *Sociological Approach to Religion,* Louis Schneider introduces the concept of religion thus:

> It repeatedly has been observed that men are constrained to ask questions that involve the ultimate meaning of life and living. What is human life, in particular all about? Does it have any reference to any other realm than the realm of nature? ... There is a powerful and very ancient impulse to find answers to these questions (which many men persistently refuse to regard as meaningless) and to work out transcendental "compensations" for the circumstances pointed to. The term "Religion" is one about which there is dispute,

> but the "concerns" we point to are nevertheless clearly concerns that fall within the sphere of religion if the term is to be assigned anything but arbitrary meaning.[5]

The point we are making in illustration of which we have referred to one philosopher and one sociologist is that the metaphysical realm (call it the 'beyond', the realm of the supernatural or the realm beyond nature) has been instrumental in enabling men to make sense of values and norms given to them through the traditions they inherit. The term *sacred* is made use of to indicate the realm beyond the 'profane'. In this sense religion itself is nothing but a *system of meaning* and a *belief-system* and the participation in it involves a *feeling of fellowship* which is logically and imaginatively extended on to other 'groups' participating in similar concerns elsewhere. No wonder therefore we find Emile Durkheim referring to religion as "a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things ... beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a church all those who adhere to them."[6] Integration of society, we may suggest, — (adopting the Durkheimian phraseology and indicating the metaphysical roots of ethics pointed to above) — gives the ultimate meaning of religion, and the idea of fellowship concretely illustrates the idea at the 'profane level'.

The aspects of analysis for a philosophy of fellowship considered above are significantly apparent in Śaivism. From the point of view of the theme of our paper it is fruitful to consider the psychological and the logical aspects of individuality that are characteristic of Śaivism and then pass on to consider the ethical, metaphysical and religious aspects together since our thesis is to lay bare the integrated nature of the philosophy of fellowship that we find in Śaivism. We could equally well have used the expression "the ethics of the fellowship idea" instead since the metaphysical and the religious aspects of Śaiva philosophy give us the spirit and substance of the ethics of fellowship.

Our commencing the analysis of a philosophy of fellowship with the Śaiva idea of individuality was with a view to emphasizing the significance of the individual as against the universal (that we find in Śaivism) for building up a philosophy of fellowship. This is not to preclude at all the idea of the universal but it is rather to point to the universalistic significance both of the individual who has only the potentiality for developing the fellow-feeling attitude and of the one who has either partially or fully actualized the capacity for "development". For re-emphasizing our point we would again commence with the philosophical aspects of the psychology and logic of individualism found in Śaivism.

Quite frequently for the sake of clarifying the distinction between philosophic and religious approaches to God it is maintained that the 'Absolute' in philosophy is identical with 'God' in religion. Varied have been the uses to which this seemingly "simple equation" has been put. From the point of view of religious philosophy or philosophy of religion (for both expressions point to the Śaiva approach to man, God and the fellowship-feeling that gives a meaningful connecting link between them), it occurs to us that another important distinction is also involved — that between the Infinite and the finite (and also the type or types of relation that can hold between them). The more significant aspect of this dichotomy is that the Infinite or God is considered *in relation to the individual*. Our interest here is to highlight the Śaiva view that the individual is distinct from God on the one hand and, on the other, from other individuals and to show that the idea of fellowship follows logically and psychologically from it.

In terms current in contemporary sociological, religious and psychological discussions we may ask what the Śaiva has to say in regard to the problem of identity-crisis. Is the crisis of the individual's personality inevitable? If not, how could personality-disintegration be averted? Or, basically still, wherefrom does the whole 'problem' (of identity-crisis) stem? It seems to us that the unique individual idea (in terms used in the earlier sections of this paper) and the idea of the distinct finite (in terms we have just now introduced) provide us answers to questions on the problem of identity and point to the necessity for developing fellow-feeling.

In the Śaiva classics we find the idea of the Infinite occurring again and again while describing God and distinguishing Him from man. God is neither a mere logical concept nor is He a form of the Supreme or the Infinite. The devotional works and a work like the *Periya Purāṇam* maintain that God is the Supreme, the Infinite, the Highest truth which enters into relationship with the finite individuals.

Logically, the idea of the Infinite involves also the idea that it is beyond the senses (*indriya*) and the mind (*manas*) and Śaivism does not at all repudiate the idea. Yet the Śaiva does maintain that out of compassion the Infinite reveals itself to the finite. As the *Tiruvācagam* has it:

> Thou Ancient One transcending speech not grasped by apprehension of the soul! Thou didst arrange in order, manifest the ether and all elements. Like fragrance of the flower uprising everywhere. Thy greatness without cease all things pervades. This day to me in condescending grace Thou cam'st.[7]

It is also significant that the Infinite does not lose its value or greatness just because it reveals itself to the finite. We find this idea equally clearly in *Tiruvācagam*:

> See even I have seen Him with my eyes! See, the Ambrosial Fount, yielding abounding grace! Lo, I have seen His mercy's might! See, His roseate Foot this earth hath trod! See Him even I have made certain as Siva! See in Grace He made me His.[8]

Our interpretation of the verse stems from the fact that even while seeing God, the ardent devotee (whose ardous efforts have at last borne fruit by his having a vision of the Lord) is able to appreciate the contrast between his smallness and Śiva's "Grace-full" Greatness in 'revealing' Himself. Furthermore, the *Tiruvācagam* is unambiguous on this point:

> The one most precious Infinite to earth came down
> Nor did I greatness of the sage Supreme condemn
> Who came in grace.[9]

In terms of our thesis, recognition of individuality and distinctness does not, in the process, de-value the Infinitude of God who is the Supreme principle accepted in Śaivism. The Śaiva interpretation of the Vedic declaration "Reality is one" is that the Supreme reality is one. In the *Śivajñānabodham* we find this interpretation. Meykaṇḍār says: "When the *Ṛg-veda* says 'One', it means that reality is one, that the Lord is one. Thou who sayest 'One' understand that thou art soul bound by the fetter. The *Veda* means that just as there can be no letters if the vowel 'a' is not, so there is nothing, 'if Brahman is not.'"[10] Devasenapathi's interpretation of the above is illuminating:

> ... The scriptural declaration regarding oneness seems to have a *valuational* and *not an ontological* significance. He also points out that the literary usage reinforces the above distinction: 'We say of someone who is not important in a given setting that he (or she) is a non-entity.' Surely, it does not mean that he does not exist! It only means that he does not count for a given purpose.[11]

Another significant point (for our thesis on the fellowship idea) that emerges out of Devasenapathi's reference to the discussion of the concept of the Infinite in the Śaiva Siddhānta context is that concord rather than discord can result from accepting 'limitation' and 'otherness'. Though the *Śivasamavāda* is *not* acceptable to the Siddhāntin to the extent that it points out that (1) spiritual entities do not limit one another in the way material entities do, and (2) there will be no conflict at all between the will of the Lord and the will of the released soul (because these are identical in intending the welfare of all living beings), it brings out the necessity to develop the benevolent and compassionate attitude towards the 'others', — an important element, in our opinion, in promoting a proper understanding of the individualist view.[12]

Acceptance of limitation and otherness, we mentioned, is not in regard to one's own self (and logically also in regard to the other fellow beings) and in regard to the contrast between the individual soul and the Supreme soul and it brings out clearly the Śaiva's philosophy of fellowship as a corollary of the necessity of regarding identity. We are aware that when identity is referred to here it is likely to give rise to some difficulties in our context of maintaining distinctness as the key-word in our discussion of fellow-feeling. Yet the usage of the term 'identity' is paradoxically helpful in explaining the significance of distinction. The first difficulty may be that we are probably reading the problem of achieving identity too much into Śaivism. We are not having in mind at all the varied significance the term 'identity' has assumed in contemporary discussions. All the same, it should be pointed out that the problem of regaining identity (in the sense of realising personality-integration) is not peculiarly modern. The reasons for the individuals experiencing a loss of identity in the contemporary context are different, especially when we talk in terms of the alienated individual, the group-identity concept and personality-disintegration in the purely psychological sense. But when we examine the basis for these and listen to the ancient Śaiva philosophers, we find an area of agreement in regard to the diagnosis of the problem itself. In the Śaiva terminology the problem of man is alienation — alienation from God and because of that alienation from all other beings (human beings necessarily not excluded) as well. In purely Śaivite terms, the problem is one of bondage which can be solved only by realizing the means to liberation. Liberation here needs to be thought of more in positive terms — as connoting the recognition of the individual's own significance *vis-a-vis* that of the other entity, God — than negatively as connoting an *escape from* the cycle of birth and death (*saṁsāra*). To the extent that man does not recognize his own nature, to that extent does the problem of personal identity persist, just as in the contemporary the alienated individual has to realize his own powers from which he gets (perhaps by sheer force of circumstances) 'alienated'.

The second difficulty arises especially because identity is used in the Advaita school to connote the realization of the soul as Brahman itself. In the Śaiva context the term identity is used in a different sense as is evident from the *Śivajñānabodham*: Meykaṇḍa declares that the Lord is one with souls and other than souls, for the word *advaita* means 'not two'; if it be taken to mean 'one', there is that which thinks it is one. He explains it with illustrations: 'Because, like tune and sound, like fruit and its essential sweetness, the foot of the omnipresent Lord is in *advaita* relation (with souls), the precious scriptures do not say "one" but "not two". Like the stone which unites with the wax when it is melted, He being closely joined to the world of souls is in inseparable union with it. Because he enters my solitary soul, I can now say "I am the world."'[13]

It is obvious that non-duality in Śaivism does not connote complete identity of the individual with the Supreme soul. *Pati* and *paśu* are both intelligent principles, but they are not identical. The *Śivajñānasiddhiyār* clearly points to the differences between *Pati* and *paśu*: "The Lord is the intelligence that is grace; the soul is the intelligence which attains that grace. The Lord is the intelligence which gives the knowledge that prevents births and release; the soul is the intelligence which receives it. The Lord is the informing intelligence, and the soul is the informed intelligence. Thus, though both are intelligences, even when they unite, they do not become identical but are non-different."[14]

Śivajñānayogin points to the different senses in which the term *advaita* is used, negation (*inmai*), contrariety (*marudalai*) and otherness (*anmai*). The Śaiva understands *advaita* in the third sense of otherness. By *advaita* is meant non-difference, the presence of a principle which is other than the Supreme, which though different from It as an entity, is in so far as it is itself an intelligence, of like nature with the Supreme — even as *abrāhmaṇa* (non-brahmin) does not mean the non-existence of any other than a *brāhmaṇa* (brahmin) or one directly opposed to him in qualities, etc., but refers to an individual different from him as an entity while sharing his humanity with him. There is thus, according to the Siddhāntin, an inseparable union between the Lord and the soul. This does not mean that they become one entitatively. This intimate relationship is described as 'the non-duality of the dual, (*irumaiyin orumai*).[15]

The two difficulties in regard to the usage of the term *identity* in our context are thus seen to reinforce the distinctness of the Infinite and the finite principles (*Pati* and *paśu*). In our context a detailed reference to *pāśa*, the third 'entity', is not necessary, since our main concern here is to delineate the individuality principle. We may mention, however, that the existence of *pāśa* as a separate entity again does not delimit the infinitude of God just as the distinct existence of *paśu* does not in the least diminish the importance of the infinite God.

The idea of fellow-feeling is now easy to comprehend. The Śaiva idea of the distinct individual we have been taking pains to bring out implies that the presence of the 'other distinct particulars' be recognized and accepted. But since their significance itself depends on the understanding of the type of relationship that holds good between the infinite God and them, the fellowship feeling that ought to govern the relationship of the 'particulars' themselves cannot be understood outside the context of the God-man relationship. Reference to the elements of identity between God and man has clearly revealed that the spark of the divine is to be seen also in the 'human'. Reference to the element of difference between them has brought out the dependent nature of the distinct particulars.

At this stage in our argument it is necessary to refer to an important corollary of considering the category of *paśu* as unique. K. Sivaraman, in explaining the 'unique particular' of *paśu* makes a significant reference to the way the uniqueness itself could be understood. The unique particular is described by him as follows:

> A self whose being is to be understood phenomenologically speaking neither as different from that of phenomena nor as identical with that of the trans-phenomenal God...is characteristically named *paśu*.

Paśu is discovered by "reflective introspection on the knowing process itself. The self-relatedness of knowledge in demonstrating the apriority of self-hood or rather self-relatedness ... is for inwardizing or reflective introspection of knowledge by which one comes by an understanding of oneself."[17]

In the context of our discussion, the inwardization-aspect of the 'knowing self' is important since, in the absence of a proper understanding of one's own self, even the potentiality one possesses (for achieving spiritual perfection and for developing fellow-feeling) cannot be realized, and obviously in the absence of the knowledge, the 'intention to seek' cannot even be thought of. It is in this sense that the knowledge-function (*ātma-cit-śakti*) of *paśu* can be considered to be related to objectivity because of its inherent intentionality. The *paśu*'s "*relation* to object as intentionality is an essential quality of self and is its eternal and inalienable function. The self's apprehension (*grāhakatva*) which is of the nature of self-and-other illumination is not its separable accidens. It is its very essence."[18] *Ātma-citśakti* pervades all things, not ontologically, but cognitively through identification. As Sivaraman maintains: "Knowledge cannot know anything by keeping aloof; to know is to become identified with the being of the object for the time being and to a limited degree."[19] The importance of the intentionality-characteristic of *paśu* is thus significantly important and is noted by Sivaraman: "The knowing self is both knowledge and will ... The two point to an initial aspect of knowledge, ... the 'intention' (*icchā*) which may become concrete as an intellectual determination or as a decision."[20]

The intentionality-characteristic possessed by all individual souls is thus an aid to actualizing their potentiality for perfection. Likewise the realization of the fact that there are the other souls equally capable of actualizing their potentiality and also the need to aid the process (of actualization) signify a community of souls mutually respecting the individuality of each other and aiding each other in achieving progress.

In terms of realizing identity — finding one's true self — by getting over the state of alienation, each *paśu* (individual soul) is considered to be bounded with all the others because of the similarity of their situation and more importantly because of the spark of the divine found in each one of them. In terms of fellowship feeling, the metaphysical seems instrumental in creating it, since the idea of a transcendental goal haunts each one of them and the way of realizing the transcendent seems similar and hence requires mutual understanding and aid.

The transcendent goal envisaged in Śaivism can be explicated clearly from the three entities recognized in the system. In our context the concept of *pāśa* needs to be referred to. *Pāśa* is a general name for the three bonds, *āṇava*, *māyā* and *karma*. Of these, *āṇava* is the root impurity, *māyā* is a source of partial illumination and serves as a lamp to souls lost in the darkness of *āṇava*,[21] and *karma* is the 'instrument of bondage'.

Āṇava as root-impurity is responsible for limiting the soul's capacities, — making it of limited intelligence, limited power and limited independence.[22] The Śaiva concept of *mokṣa* would thus mean freeing the soul from *āṇava*. The transcendent goal that the soul aims to achieve is 'freedom' in the sense just indicated, and it is important that we reiterate here the significance of intentionality as a pre-requisite in this regard.

Āṇava which covers all souls is quite often compared to darkness which hides all physical objects.[23] The important difference between them is that 'physical darkness' of *āṇava* is imperceptible even as it prevents perception of truth. The *Tiruvaruṭpayan* expresses this with the aid of a beautiful simile:

> My Lady Darkness has an infinity of lovers but hides
> herself from even her spouse with strictest chastity.[24]

The way *āṇava* affects all the individual souls and the way it hides itself cleverly from each one of them are clearly stated in the above lines.

In ethical terms *āṇava* is the principle of delusion because of which good thoughts become significantly absent in the individuals and bad thoughts become positively present. Similarly *āṇava* prevents the utterance of good words and doing of good deeds. Utterance of bad words and indulgence in bad deeds which strengthen the bond also result from *āṇava*. *Āṇava* thus affects the thought, word and deed of the individual by thoroughly obscuring its understanding and disrupting its will. The individual's intentionality coupled with the grace of the Lord helps in the attainment of liberation or *mokṣa*.

Māyā, when compared to *āṇava*, is not so obstructive; it even partially (at least) aids self-realization. For our purposes here an elaboration of the scheme of the cosmos and the evolution of the *tattvas* are not necessary. Suffice it to note here that *māyā* is considered by the Śaiva Siddhāntin as the primal material cause from which the universe evolves, and into which it is resolved periodically. The universe and all its constituents are thus evolutes of *māyā* and, to the extent they are used for selfish and sensuous purposes by the soul, they bind. If the products of *māyā* are used for working out the salvation of the individual soul, they do not have the binding effect. Śaivism, like the rest of Indian thought, considers embodiment and the consequent worldly experience to be necessary to get liberation.[25] To get rid of the evil effects of *āṇava* and the binding effects of *karma*, embodiment and empirical experience are necessary. It is thus clear how *māyā* is not considered wholly evil in Śaiva Siddhānta.

Karma, as one of the binding factors, signifies that the individual acts with a sense of agency. Accordingly what is recommended is doing actions without the sense of agency. It is important here to notice that not merely the actual deeds, but also thoughts and words bind and hence it is necessary to entertain good thoughts and speak good words in addition to doing good acts. Even omission to do good deeds constitutes bad *karma*.

It is obvious that *karma* connotes deeds done both in relation to the other individuals and in relation to God. In either case *karma* binds only if it is done with 'attachment'— expecting the fruits of actions. Even good deeds bind and hence they also must be done not because they will lead to enjoyment or desirable experiences, but *because they are good* just as one must desist from indulging in bad acts, not to escape their evil consequenees but *because they are bad.*

The 'problem' thus is for the individual soul (*paśu*) to get rid of *pāśa*; and the latter is possible when the soul's proper relationship with the Lord (*Pati*) is understood. The egoistic approach to life is sought to be got over by realizing the dependent nature of the soul. Weaning the soul away from *pāśa* is accomplished by what may be referred to as 'contemplative identification' with the Lord. The example given to illustrate this is the case of *garuḍabhāvanā*. To cure snake-bite, the person who knows the *garuḍamantra* identifies himself with *garuḍa* and is able to draw off the poison. Soon after the poison is drawn out, the individual gets back to his original state. In a like manner, contemplative identification with the Lord helps the soul in getting rid of the impurities. As soon as this is achieved, the dependent state is regained.

Though the identification aspect does remind us of the Advaita concept of Brahman-Ātman identity, from what has been said above the position accorded to identity by the Śaiva Siddhānta is obvious. Śaivism considers 'complete identification' as erroneous as 'complete independence'. The initial error is to identify the soul with the body. Correction of this error requires that different type of identity be 'practised.' The effect of it is that a proper understanding of the situation is reached. The *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār* clearly explains (and illustrates) this point.

We might reiterate here that Śaiva Siddhānta does not accept complete identity (in the sense in which the Advaita school considers it) and replaces the idea by the necessity (on the part of the individual soul) to realize a kind of identity with the Lord which neither obliterates the individuality of the soul nor denies the supremacy of the Lord. The firm position that the Śaiva takes is that the Lord's intelligence and activity pervades that of the individual soul and the latter does not become devoid of intelligence and action.[26] Thus the most important aspects of ethical and moral life, viz., reflective consciousness and activity, are asserted by the Śaiva. We maintain that this is a direct corollary of the doctrine of the unique particular which we were outlining in the earlier sections of the paper.

It remains to be shown how the fellowship idea also follows, as a natural consequence, the unique individual idea. In the earlier sections, no doubt, we did argue this out, but were mainly concerned with the ethical significance of it. We made the statement that the metaphysical roots of ethics lend support and confer meaningfulness to the entire structure that is built on that. We suggest that religion is that structure and that ethics and metaphysics transform the common man's religion into a '*system of meaning*' which the individual has to appropriate to himself and realize. The metaphysical categories of Śaivism thus lend strong rootage for the ethical and religious view of life, so characteristic of Śaivism. It is because of this that the fellowship idea finds a strong ground in the Śaiva system.

In the section on *pāśa* we indicated, in outline, the metaphysical orientations of Śaiva philosophy and it is time we draw the ethical and religious significance of the metaphysical ideas and emphasize that the fellowship idea is not just a stray suggestion but is very much ingrained in the system. The metaphysics of 'plurality' (otherness) and 'limited autonomy' (dependence) unambiguously suggests that the very fact of bondage which starts the 'quest' also has, however indirectly, the suggestibility of (i) a 'moral universe' in which fellow-feeling is the currency establishing 'communication' and 'reciprocation' and (ii) the necessity to establish through fellowship-feeling action which will not be centred round the ego of the person acting, but round God — the necessity to shift the centre of action from the narrow self. It also helps us comprehend how religion as a system of meaning has given us the fellowship idea.

The metaphysical categories we have in Śaivism suggest clearly the end of religion and the way life is to be led and also furnish the strong foundations for the ethics of fellowship. Of the three categories *Pati* is '*sat*', *paśu* (soul) is *sadasat* and *pāśa* (bond) is *asat*.[27] The Śaiva emphasizes that he uses the term *asat* in a valuational and not in an ontological sense, and because of this the principle of each 'working out' his salvation and helping others 'work out' their salvation gets a strong emphasis in the system. The rejection of the metaphysical 'one' (or the non-dual principle which gives no room for a 'second') also prepares the ground for the cultivation of love, for love presupposes entitative difference. Here we should remember that the soul has a tendency to be influenced by its environment because of which it even identifies with the environment. Saint Tāyumānavar hence offers the prayer:

> Oh for the day when I shall be in inseparable union
> with the wise, everstable One
> Even as now I am in inseparable union with the
> primal Impurity.

May be, it is because of this tendency of the soul that it is suggested that it keeps company with the 'good' so that it will always be filled with good thoughts and develop a tendency to do good. We find an interesting analogy which illustrates the idea. The soul is compared to a prince kidnapped in his infancy by gipsies and brought up by them without knowing that he is a prince. The prince naturally grows up and behaves like a gipsy. But when the king comes and reveals his identity, the prince gives up his gipsy ways and starts behaving as a prince. In a like manner, the Lord comes as the guide and reclaims the soul, points out the *Śivajñānabodham*: "When because of the soul's meritorious practices the Primal One enlightens the soul as a *guru*, saying: 'Brought up among hunters, the five senses, thou hast last consciousness (of thy true estate),' the soul leaves them and being no other than the Lord, reaches His feet."[28]

God reveals himself as *guru* only when the impurity (*mala*) is ripe for removal and when the soul has achieved an attitude of indifference to the consequences of deeds — both good and bad as we explained above.[29] The strong sense of egoism, prompted and sustained by *āṇava*, has to be cast aside, since otherwise the sense of agency will continue and the soul will get entangled in the cycle of birth and death. In religious terms, the soul must realise that it is nothing in itself, that it is only a servant of God whose duty is to carry out the Lord's behest. Thus by conforming to the purpose of the Lord the soul is able to cast off its bonds. As the *Śivajñānabodham* has it: "When the soul having become one (with the Lord) even as the Lord is one with the soul, abides in the Lord's services, powerful *karma* and the impurity (*āṇava*) and *māyā* pass away."[30]

The doctrines of plurality of souls and the unique individual are clearly seen to be asserted even when God is described to be one with the soul. The distinctness between the individual soul and God is again seen to be maintained. In the *Śivajñānabodham* we read: "Because they dsssolve in the One who is not one (of them), just as they are evolved and maintained by the one who is not one (of them) (the Agent of) dissolutlon, who is not one of them, is the Primal (God). Souls, though like Him imperishable, are in many ways His servants even there (viz., in the state of release)."[31]

The oneness idea is equally well emphasized, signifying the attitude one should take towards the 'others' and God. We maintain that the fellowship idea is clearly implied by this assertion: "For the enlightened, He is not both other than and one with the world. But because the relation is non-duality which includes all these three, all things are His form. Nevertheless, thou who knowest the truth of non-duality, worship in love."[32] If the whole world is to be seen as the Lord, it is obvious, the attitude the individual should develop towards his fellowmen should equally well be determined by the attitude. Furthermore, the attitude of indebtedness which the individual is exhorted to develop towards God and the dependence-feeling he is asked to continue to entertain (towards God) are aimed at making humility his great virtue: "To forget Him who helped him to know Himself and made him like Himself is not a sin which can be removed. Though he makes him like Himself, the soul which was a servant, remains a servant. Therefore the worship of God is strength to the soul."[33]

The injunction to worship God which is central to the religious aspect of Śaivism thus becomes significant. Duality which continues to be experienced is obvious from the worshipper-worshipped relation, but this does not necessarily preclude the individual realizing a sense of oneness with Him. Obviously 'oneness' has not been understood in its literal sense in Śaivism. If individuals *are* distinct from each other and from God, and if oneness is exhorted to be an ideal worthy of realization, nay as the normative goal of *any* individual who reflects about life and its significance, it is apparent how the attitudinal change in the individual gives us the idea of human fellowship. The 'moral universe we referred to earlier is thus concretized in terms of human beings with fellowship-feeling establishing communication-channels between them and the attitude of reciprocation strengthening it. Naturally, shifting of the centre of action also results. Religion itself thus becomes a system of meaning to which the metaphysical categories lend the strong roots required.

It should not, however, be thought that the 'area' of the 'moral universe' and that of God-centred activity are unrelated or juxtaposed alongside each other. No doubt, they may be so when the individual is not evolved morally or religiously, but as the individual 'evolves' they become more and more integrated until they coincide completely. In this sense religion as a system of meaning is nothing but the condition which promotes God-centred activity born out of the fellow-feeling. When the individual is evolved fully, it is immaterial whether we consider the God-centred activity to be born out of fellow-feeling or consider fellow-feeling as being born out of the recognition of God everywhere, in every activity. Śaivism as a system of religion and philosophy concretely illustrates this principle of fellow-feeling and God-centred activity reciprocally involving each other.

The lives of the saints in the Śaiva tradition clearly illustrate our point. The *Periya Purāṇam* incorporates in it details about the dovotees of Śiva — referred to as the 'sixty-three devotees' (*nāyanmārs*). One of the striking things about the saints that we learn from the *Periya Purāṇam* is that they live on the lofty plane of communion with God, but are moved by compassion for those individuals who are still suffering. The saint's attitude towards suffering humanity is characterized by love which equally well characterizes their relationship to the Lord. The devotees of Śiva who know nothing but love for Him bring to bear on their attitude towards the others the same feeling of love with the same intensity and magnitude since they see God everywhere. God is to them no metaphysical Absolute nor *just* a concept, but is a living entity whose presence is felt in *every being*. It is this aspect of the *Periya Purāṇam* which makes its appeal universal. It will not be an exaggeration at all to suggest that the universality of its appeal is itself born out of the fact that the religious interest is basically *human*. In its truest sense the more religious is also the more universally appealing. Hence the followship-feeling is seen to naturally flow in the person (i.e., when the 'raw.' individual experiences and achieves full growth of personality) and to permeate the whole of his being, spreading the fragrance of love to the whole of the human community.

The lives of the saints and their devotional outpourings amply illustrate the necessity for attaining an ego-free state. Going through the devotional literature of the saints might give the impression that in them we find only an intensive quest of God by man. The emphasis on *bhakti* (devotional love of God), it might be argued, signifies at best the mystic experience man wants to have by surrendering himself to God and that it is a typical instance of the individual soul seeking the Lord's grace for attaining spiritual perfection. The purport of this line of analysis may undermine the fellowship idea altogether and hence needs to be contended here.

We are not, however, denying the value of this type of interpretation of the lives of the saints and the devotional literature for which they are well-known. Our submission is that the saints and their saying have deeper implications and that they can be comprehended only in the light of the spirit of Śaiva philosophy itself. *When so comprehended, bhakti* will be seen to mean not a mere intellectual, not even *emotional* love of God, but as standing for a deep-rooted feeling for *Being* as such, the feeling which can be truly referred to as comprehending as an integral part of it, the fellowship-feeling.

We have already laid sufficient emphasis on the necessity for *expansiveness* — for getting over the ego-centric predicament in which man finds himself in the course of his day-to-day, unreflective 'living' (it is more 'existence' than living, the Śaivite would maintain). We have also pointed to the Śaivite view that shifting the centre of action from man to God is the sure way of achieving selflessness. In the light of all these, the *bhakti literature* of Śaivism in general and of the saints in particular would be seen to suggest the way in which the shifting can be effected.

In the ethico-religious context *bhakti* may be said to be the sure way of overcoming the evil effects of *karma* — by surrendering oneself to God wholeheartedly and implicitly, but our argument is that the result of it is a natural feeling of fellowship that ensues.

A final counter-argument to our position may be that the conflict between the principle of moral justice and the supremacy of God would make our argument regarding fellowship-feeling extremely weak, if not obliterate it completely. In more specific Śaiva Siddhānta terms, if God's grace effectuates freedom from the effects of *karma*, the individual's own initiative comes to nought. The moral agent is no longer 'responsible' and the very foundations of ethical, moral and religious life are shaken and hence scope for fellowship-feeling gets reduced and at best can be mere *theory*.

Our defence is that God does not become supernumerary by the saints exhorting man to act disinterestedly to escape from the kārmic effect nor does the exaltation of God's supremacy belittle the value of the individual's effort. This is the idea we get from the saints: utterances and lives. The *nāyanmārs* have made it unambiguously clear that as a man sows so does he reap, that as long as the sense of agency (indicated by the ego-feeling: 'I act') continues he is under the moral law. The corrollary of this — which is also explicitly stated by the *nāyanmārs* — is that the moment the individual surrenders himself wholly to the Almighty, he also becomes 'free' from the operation of the moral law, since he comes under the sovereignty of the Lord who is nothing but Love. As long as man has only an 'intellectual love of God' and as long as his devotion to the Lord is merely emotional, he continues to be under the moral law. This is the reason why the saints insist on whole-hearted sureender and 'non-dual love'.

Since *karma* arises from egoism, with the rooting out of egoism *karma* also is overcome. The logical and psychological consequence of overcoming egoism is the development of altruistic feeling, attitude and outlook. Feeling kinship with the whole of humanity, then, is no longer 'exposition', but *actual experience*. The alienated being that man was before his spiritual evolution, he becomes an integrated being subsequently. The situation of identity-crisis is replaced by the situation of achieving a sense of identity. Alienation of man from God which we described as contributing to the problem of identity-crisis is got over by becoming one with God, and love permeates his whole being; and the fellowship-feeling automatically results. As long as egoism continues, development of personality can be accentuation of that feeling, but when man consciously 'shifts himself out' into God, development of personality (which is the same as finding one's self or seeking identity-realization) yields the gratifying feeling of altruism. The *nāyanmārs* are the standing examples of genuine altruism which is after all the pre-requiste for fellowship-feeling.

We have argued thus that fellow-feeling is *not just a feeling* but very much more than that. We have not maintained, however, that it is a misnomer since it emphasizes the inner core of a *way of life* in which the individual, to put it baldly, takes kindly to the whole of humanity. One other reason why we have used the term fellow-feeling in spite of our references to the pitfalls into which it may lead us — unless the subjective aspect of the *view of life* implied by it is appreciated — is that it is a clear pointer to the 'others' who deserve to be 'considered.'

By analysing the logic of fellow-feeling we have brought out the fact that emotion *alone* does not give us the whole significance of the exhortation to be other-regarding. More particularly in the context of Śaivism we have felt it necessary to emphasize this point of 'de-religionizing' Śaivism (at times!) but our meaning has not been to dilute down the religious aspects of Śaivism but to point to the deep-rooted philosophy of religion that Śaivism presents. Even at the outset we indicated this by emphasizing that Śaivism more often than not gets to be understood as *religion* rather than philosophy and that such a position needs to be contended not by arguing that it *is philosophy* but that it is religion *and* philosophy.

By bringing in the ethico-social dimensions of religion, by emphasizing their philosophic significance and by bringing in the problem of identity-crisis that has attracted attention in contemporary discussions of philosophy, sociology and religion and above all by referring to the *nāyanmārs,* we have suggested that a philosophy of fellow-felling is rooted ultimately in a philosophy of love and that such a philosophy of love is ingrained in Śaiva theology. Śaivism as a religion, we have endeavoured to argue, exemplifies the way in which a philosophy of love can be put into practice. We have also shown in effect that the more truly religious cann ot but be *also* more universal, though in our paper we have attempted to do this purely from the point of view of Śaivism.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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2. *Ibid.*
3. See his essay on *Self-deception*.
4. William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience.*
5. Louis Schneider, *Sociological Approach to Religion.*
6. Emile Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (Glencoe: Free press, 1954).
7. *corpadaṅkadanda tollōn, Tirvācagam,* 3, 111-117.
8. *kaṇṇāliyānum kaṇḍen kāṇga, Tiruvācagam,* 3-58.
9. *aruparattoruvan avaniyil vandu*
   guruparanāgi aruḷiya pesumaiyyaic
   cirumai enrigaḻāde.
10. *Śivajñānabodham, Sūtra* II.
11. V. A. Devasenapathi, *Of Human Bondage and Divine Grace* (Annamalai Nagar : Annamalai University, 1963), p. 18.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
13. *Śivajñānabodham, Sūtra* II.
14. *Śivajñānasiddhiyār, Sūtra* XI, Verse 2.
15. V. A. Devasenapathi, op. cit., p. 44.
16. K. Sivaraman, *Saivism in Philosophical Perspective* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973), p. 279.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 280.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 293.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*, p. 294.
21. *Tiruvaruṭpayan,* III. 30.
22. Appar, *Tevāram,* 8.
23. *Tiruvaruṭpayan,* III. 23.
24. *Ibid.*, III. 25.
25. *Karma* and *māyā* are antidotes administered for the eradication or subjugation of *āṇava*. It might be asked as to how one impurity can remove another impurity. Tirumular, in answering this question, furnishes an illustration: "Even *pāśam* is endowed with a graceful tendency and it is magical artifice to free oneself from impurity and illusion. This process is akin to washing clothes wherein to free them of

their impurities further impurities are administered." (*Tirumandiram*, 2422)

Siddiyār adopts this illustration and explains this important truth how the body, organs and other attendants are of great utility to the soul to eradicate or to subjugate *āṇava*: "Body, sense organs and others are *malas*. Why should mention be made that impurities are washed away by God by further impurities? The dirt in clothes is removed by administering cowdung and the black mud. So God eradicates *āṇava* by administering *mala*." (*Supakkam*, 142).

Tirumūlar explicitly refers to the body as indispensable to cut off the bondage. "If the body languishes, the soul pines away. Real knowledge will not set in. After knowing the efficacy of this contrivance of fostering the body, I nurtured it. Consequently, I nurtured my soul as well. (*Tirumandiram*, 724)

Even Sundarar reiterates this idea: "God; my Master! By embodying me in a body which consists of the head, eye, mouth, ear and nose you have got rid of my *karma*." (*Tevāram*, 9).

26. A very significant verse in Tirumūlar's *Tirumandiram* gives us an insight into the all-pervasiveness of God: "The dame (*Tirodhāna śakti*), cornered in a dark chamber, wishing union with a blind old man cured him of his blindness, showed him her immense good nature, deluded him and married him." (verse 1514) The allegory is aimed at explaining how God wishing union with the soul, which is as old as He, lives in it unnoticed and when the soul ripens, manifests as a *guru*, imparts real *jñāna* and makes the soul identify itself with Him.

27. The distinction of these terms is a problematic disquisition dealt with in the sixth and seventh *sūtras* of *Śivajñānabodham*. The *sat* denotes god; the *asat*, the unintelligent matter or the world; and the *sat-asat*, the soul. The soul is capable of adhering to God and the world. When it attaches to God the world will be detached. When it fastens itself with the world, it forgets God and is in perfect union with *āṇava*.

Since matter is unintelligent, it cannot know God. As the soul is endowed with a little intelligence, it cannot know the omniscient Lord. But only when it is under the influence of the grace of God, it can know him. See M. Rajamanickam, *The Development of Śaivism in South India* (Dharmapuram Adinam, 1964), p. 295.

The *Tirumandirum* (1420) refers to God as *Śiva-sat,* soul as *sadasat* and matter as *saḍa-sat.*

28. *Sūtra* 8.
29. A verse in the *Tirumandiram* (1573) reads: "God holds the soul, subdues it, performs *dīkṣā* by placing the worshipful foot on its head, imparts *jñāna* in clear terms after removing all impurities...To the soul, God himself is *Śiva-jñāna* or Master Śiva.
30. *Sūtra,* 10.
31. *Sūtra,* 11.
32. *Sūtra,* 12.
33. *Sūtra,* 12.

9

ŚAIVISM AND TAMIL GENIUS

S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI

It is generally known that variety of philosophical doctrines go under the common name of Śaivism, though they differ one from another even in fundamental concepts, such as the identification of Śiva with a personal God or a super-personal Absolute, the relation of Śiva to the jīvas, the means of release, and so on. The belief that northern, (what is known as Kashmir) Śaivism is monistic, while southern Śaivism (known as the Siddhānta) is pluralistic (teaching a doctrine of identity in difference) provided, till recently, a comfortable basis of classification of these doctrines. But it was found that a good many northern (Kashmir) writers, like Rāmakaṇṭha, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha and others, were Śaivites, not of the monistic but of the pluralistic type. The territorial classification, and any theories based thereon, have therefore had to be given the go-by. The assumption may no longer be ventured that Kashmir Śaivism and the Śaiva Siddhānta owe their difference to the regional or temperamental peculiarities of northerner or southerner, Āryan or Dravidian.

There is however no doubt that the Siddhānta has its stronghold in the south. And it has there received certain developments at the hand of Tamil writers and commentators, which are worth noting. Whether they will afford the basis for a generalisation, however cautious, about Tamil genius, it is too early to say.

Śaiva Siddhānta, as taught in the south, is based on twelve Sūtras constituting the *Śivajñānabodha*. These Sutras, in their Sanskrit version, are said to form part of the *Raurava Āgama*. Tradition has it that the Tamil Sutras are translations made from the Sanskrit by the first of the Tamil Santāna-ācāryas, Meykaṇḍa Śiva. This tradition has been questioned in recent years, on patriotic grounds supported by some analysis of both versions. The internal evidence reveals, no doubt, a divergence here and there; but this of itself leads to no conclusion as to the priority of either the Sanskrit version or the Tamil; for what appears less developed doctrine may be, in truth, a reaction from what appears more developed, the appraisement of more and less depending on the philosophic view-point of the appraiser. External evidence, though not conclusive, may be of some help. The fourth of the Santāna-ācāryas, Umāpāti Śiva, who should have come within a century of Meykaṇḍa, was well versed both in Sanskrit and Tamil Śaiva lore, and he is credited with a bhāṣya on Pauṣkara Āgama. In this work (published at Chidambaram in grantha characters) there are at least four references to the Sanskrit version of the *Śivajñānabodha.*[1] As already stated, this is by no means conclusive; for even if Umāpati be acquitted of all intention to detract from the originality of his master's master, Meykaṇḍa, it is not finally established that he was the author of the *Pauṣkarabhāṣya* that we have. The general uncertainty is strengthened by the fact that the chapter on Pramāṇas contains a quotation from the *Nyāyāmṛta*, a late Mādhva work. However this may be, the discussion has lost much of its practical value in view of the fact, pointed out some years ago by Dr. Ramaṇa Śāstrin, that, behind the so-called Tamil Śaivism, there is a good deal of Sanskrit literature pre-supposed in the works of Sadyojyotis, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, Rāmakaṇṭha, Bhoja, and so on. Some of these books have been published by the Śaivāgamaparipālana Sabhā of Devakotah; and one of the important works, *Nareśvaraparīkṣā*, has been issued in Kashmir. A study of these will convince anyone that whatever may be the merit of the Tamil ācāryas (and there is no question of their merit), there is no point in seeking to ascribe to them a degree of originality not claimed by themselves or by their proximate disciples. One of the corner-stones of Tamil Saivism, the *Tirumandiram*, is the work of Tirumular, who, according to tradition, brought down Śaivism to the Tamil land from the north. There is no reason to discredit this tradition as entirely a fairy tale.

Though the question of Tamil originality in respect of the Siddhānta seems to defy solution, there would appear to be some grounds for assessing the reaction of the Tamil mind to the system in general. It is thought that the Tamilian is primarily practical; that, though not impervious to mysticism, he seeks to drive it in harness with his practical sense; that his philosophy, though it may bake no bread, will yet keep it in eatable condition. Some justification for this position may be found on a comparison of the Sanskrit and Tamil *Śivajñānabodha.*

There is a good deal of similarity between Śaivism, even of the Siddhānta type, and Advaita Vedānta. The 'original sin' is primal ignorance; it is not mere absence of knowledge, but is of a positive nature; it is called *āṇava* by the Śaiva, and *mūlāvidyā* by the Advaitin. Since our ills have ignorance for their cause, release can come only through knowledge. There are no doubt prescribed codes of conduct and ritual; these, however, are of service only in securing knowledge through the onset of grace. Grace, expressing itself as *dīkṣā*, is an absolute necessity according to the Śaiva-siddhānta; for ignorance is positive, and requires something over and above knowledge to remove it, inasmuch as knowledge as such can remove only its own absence. Such emphasis on the Lord's Grace is found even in Advaita Vedānta, though in a different form. Karma, however, is of service only as a channel to knowledge. This being the case, there should be admitted (1) release even while embodied, since, when knowledge comes, further delay is unintelligible, and (2) the inapplicability of prescriptions and prohibitions to the jīvanmukta. It is interesting to note that, while there is agreement between the Sanskritic and Tamil scholiasts on the first point, there is no agreement on the second.

The Sutra that relates to this matter is the twelfth. In the Sanskrit version, only the first half of it is of doctrinal value, the latter half merely purporting to give the name of the work, "Know thus the ascertainment of all topics connected with Śiva, from (this book) the *Śivajñānabodha.*". The first line is thus interpreted by the commentator, Śivāgrayogin: "(He who seeks knowledge) in order to secure release should get to (the company of) good people, adopt their marks, and do service to the temples of Śiva." The good ones are the assemblies of perceptors who wear rudrākṣa and sacred ashes, and delight in Śiva-knowledge. Their company is to be sought in order to serve them and obtain knowledge through their grace. Their marks are to be adopted;

i.e., sacred ashes are to be worn and so on, for the same purpose. Service in Śiva temples, such as cleaning, decorating, tending the flower-gardens, etc., is enjoined with the same end in view. All these have the effect of purifying the mind, preventing distraction and removing obscuration by *āṇava,* which, though removed, is never absolutely destroyed. As to this much, there is agreement; but for whom is the injunction? On this there is difference. Śivāgrayogin holds that the Sutra relates to him who belongs to the lowest grade of eligibles, who is competent only for the dāsamārga, the path of service, as contrasted with the paths of knowledge and internal devotion.[2] The last two have been disposed of in Sutras 8 and 11. The former runs thus: "'Having remained in the company of huntsmen, the senses, you do not know yourself (as a prince)'; being thus taught by the preceptor to be not other (than himself), and released from those (senses), the happy one attains that state (which is Śiva)." Release is knowledge or realisation, as of the forgotten gold ornament round one's own neck; knowledge is the exclusive cause of release, not karma, not another. The next Sutra (9) seems to enjoin the contemplation of Śiva and the recitation of the sacred pañcākṣara. Hence the commentator says that, for those who have realised, there can be no injunctions or prohibitions, and that the apparent injunction is only a description of the conduct of those who have realised. Or, in the alternative, he says, even an injunction may be intelligible since it is not for the sake of enjoyment in this world or the next, and for the released there is absence only of such injunctions as are worldly (for the sake of enjoyment here or hereafter). This is decidedly weak; if there are no injunctions for the released, it must be because there is nothing else for them to accomplish, and because there is not a Being other than them to enjoin; the worldliness or otherwise of the injunction is not relevant to this. It is in the realisation of this weakness that it has been offered as an alternative interpretation. Sutra 11 relates to those who are not directly eligible for knowledge, but have to seek it through intense devotion of mind. Such supreme devotion to Śiva is instrumental to knowledge and thence to release. "Even as the soul is the revealer (of objects) to the senses, Śiva is the revealer (of himself) to the soul; therefore (he who desires knowledge) should practise the most supreme devotion in regard to Him who (thus) helps the soul." There are other souls who cannot rise even to this level. For them is enjoined the path of the servant (dāsamārga), and this is what Sutra 12 relates to. Nor is it that there is any unintelligibility in the final Sutra turning to what is the lowest of the paths; for, the procedure is parallelled in the *Vedāntasūtras*, which, in Śaṅkara's interpretation, treat of the lower saguṇa-vidyā, in the final sections.

As against such an interpretation, the Tamil commentator, Śivajñānayogin, holds that Sutra to treat of the jīvanmukta and to enjoin on him various acts of service in order to guard against the overpowering of the knowledge he has secured by successive waves of the residue of all-powerful āṇava. Āṇava has been removed, but its saṁskāra is left, as also prārabdha-karma, because of which the present body persists. The enjoyment of the fruit of prārabdha-karma is likely to lead to fresh karma and fresh obscuration even in the residue of āṇava. This can be avoided only by seeking constantly the company of the holy, behaving as they do, wearing their external marks, and worshipping them and Śiva temples as Śiva himself. On the purificatory efficacy of what is prescribed and as to the prescriptive character of the Sutra there is no dispute; the difference is as to the person on whom the injunction lies, whether it is the jīvanmukta, or he who is eligible for the dāsa-mārga. On the hypothesis that the Sutra relates to the jīvanmukta, it may be yet possible to hold, as Sivāgrayogin does in respect of Sutra 9, that there is no injunction, but only a description, of behaviour. This is summarily rejected by the Tamil commentator on the basis of injunctive words like "worship (தொழுக)" occurring in Meykaṇḍār's elaboration of the Sutra though in the Sutra portion itself there is only a descriptive word (அரனெனத்தொழுமே). The whole Sutra is intended to lay down the objects of the conative, affective and cognitive powers of the jīvanmukta. He is to get rid of the threefold mala, since it communicates ignorance instead of knowledge; this should be his cognitive activity. His affective side should find expression in association with the saintly, and his conative side in the worship of saints and temples. In the words of Meykaṇḍār himself, there is little conclusive indication of these injunctions being intended for the mukta instead of the sādhaka. The only words that may be taken to be at all indicative are the vocative "அத்துவிதி" in a verse of the fourth adhikaraṇa, interpreted as "O thou that hast realised non-duality" and "பின்னை" in another verse of the same adhikaraṇa, which is taken to mean "subsequently to realisation." It is open to legitimate doubt whether these words are not capable of some other construction.[3] The *Siddhiyār* may be expected to throw some light on the disputed point since it is a simpler and more extensive work treating the same topics, and based on the Tamil *Śivajñānabodha.* Unfortunately, the verses here too, with the exception of the first, are ambiguous. The first alone seems to refer to God-intoxication in unmistakable terms. The reference to the jīvanmukta is therefore *prima facie* plausible. It must be confessed, however, that the dāsa too may be God-intoxicated; and the possibility is not completely ruled out, in view of Śivāgrayogin's comment that this Sutra relates to bāhya-bhakti. But taking the verses by and large, it is the conduct of the jīvanmukta that seems to be inculcated in this Sūtra as handled by the *Siddhiyār*. Now neither Meykaṇḍār nor Aruḷnandi (the author of the *Siddhiyār*) has left us any book in Sanskrit. Though they must necessarily have known the Āgamas in Sanskrit, it may not unreasonably be presumed that they were not too much impressed with Sanskritic developments of Śaiva doctrine. In any case, we have in the third great Śaiva writer in Tamil, Umāpati Śivācārya, one who not merely knew both traditions, but left works in both languages. If the Sanskrit tradition be presumed to be antagonistic to the laying down of injunctions for the jīvanmukta, and if Umāpati was influenced by it, one may expect a trace of it in his writings. And that is just what one finds. The *Śivaprakāśam* makes no mention of prescriptions or prohibitions for the jīvanmukta. While, in the *Tiruvaruṭpayan*, there is an explicit description of the jīvanmuktas, their illimitable bliss, their immeasurable compassion, their non-cognition of worldly things, their freedom from aversion and attachment, and their freedom from all activity whether like that of the Lord or like that of bound souls, there is not a word about what they are bound to do or are prohibited from doing. On the contrary, in contrast with the supposed teaching of the *Śivajñānabodha*, that, in the enjoyment of the fruit of prārabdha, fresh karma would accrue, to avoid which a certain type of behaviour is necessary, we are expressly told in verse 98 that while prārabdha dies with the present body, and other karma that may accrue before bodily decease (and after realisation) is nullified even by the Lord's grace. The influence of the Sanskritic tradition would appear to have gone against jñāna-karma-samuccaya. Such a guess is reinforced by what we have already seen of the Sanskrit version of the *Śivajñānabodha* and Śivāgrayogin's commentary thereon.

May we then conclude that the emphasis on the practical, vaguely indicated in Meykaṇḍār and Aruḷnandi, and forcefully developed by Śivajñānayogin, is characteristic of the Tamil genius and constitute its contribution to Śaiva doctrine? The insistence in the Tamil Siddhānta on the centrality of the individual, the teaching that even in release it is he who sees, with the aid of Śiva, not Śiva who sees through him, these would square with a doctrine of jñāna-karma-samuccaya. But the guess is extremely hazardous, since the view that knowledge must be combined with karma is neither peculiarly Śaiva, nor peculiarly Southern. Vedāntins like Bhāskara have held this view, and, among Śaivas, Śrīkaṇṭha, about whose domicile nothing is known, also held that view. Further, Siddhāntins like Umāpati and Śivāgrayogin were also Tamilians. The most then that may be ventured is that, in so far as Śaivism appealed to the characteristically Tamil genius, it had a more practical turn than in other cases, and adopted doctrines like that of jñāna-karma-samuccaya. And this position derives some support from the fact that five out of six commentators on the *Śivajñānasiddhiyār* favour the view of an injunction applicable to the jīvanmukta, the dissentient being Śivāgrayogin whose Sanskritic leanings have already been noted.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See pp. 14, 29, 256, 447.
2. See commentary on Sutra 12, *Śivajñānabodha*. So too in his commentary on the *Śivajñānasiddhiyār*, Sutra 12, verse 1, he says that the Sutra deals with *bāhyabhakti*, external devotion.
3. For instance, "பின்னை" may mean the same as the Sanskrit "tāsmat" in
"tasmāt tasmin parām bhaktim kuryād ātmopakārake."
(Sūtra 11).

10

AN OUTLINE OF THE SIDDHĀNTA EPISTEMOLOGY

V.A. DEVASENAPATHI

The word '*siddhānta*' in the title, Śaiva Siddhānta, is explained as standing not only for the conclusions reached in this system but also as indicating that it is the final conclusion established after reviewing all other systems. The other systems are parts (*aṅga*). The Siddhānta is the whole (*aṅgi*).[1] The title is said to bear a *yoga-rūḍhi* significance. Epistemology must hence play a very important role in this system, for purposes of exposition of its own tenets and for criticism of other systems. The source material for Śaiva Siddhānta epistemology is to be found in Sanskrit and Tamil works. Mention may be made of the following Sanskrit works: the *Pauṣkara Āgama*, the *Pauṣkara Bhāṣya*, the *Śaiva Paribhāṣā*[2] of Śivāgrayogin, the *Śaiva-siddhānta-paribhāṣā* of Suryabhaṭṭa. Śivāgrayogin's commentary on the *Śivajñānabodham* also may be included in this list. Among Tamil works, the *Śivajñāna-siddhiyar* (*svapakṣa*) gives a bare outline in fourteen verses. Of the six commentaries on this work, the most detailed is that of Śivāgrayogin, Maraijñāna Deśikar's commentary, though much less detailed, has some interesting features. Jñānaprakāśar's commentary is baffling because of the mix-up and distortion of Sanskrit and Tamil works in the printed text. Even this is not available now. It will be a great service to the Tamil literature on Śaiva Siddhānta if this commentary is re-printed after careful editing. It has been in disfavour as *Śivasamavāda* is not acceptable to the Siddhāntin. However, its distinctive features call for a close study.

The *Tattvaprakāśam*[3] of Sīrkāḻi Tattvaprakāśasvāmi (14th century) which is the only major Tamil Śaiva Siddhānta work dealing with all the four *pādas—caryā, kriyā, yoga* and *jñāna*—covers epistemology in nine verses. These are in the *andādi* form—the last word of the first verse being the first word of the second verse and so on. In explaining these verses, the commentator gives a twofold meaning, one which he calls *puṛam* (external) and another he calls *aham* (inner). The *Patipaśupāśappanuval* of Maṛaijñānasambandhar (early part of the 16th century) covers the *pramāṇas* (means of valid knowledge) in sixtyeight *Kuṛal* verses. The *Śivaneṛiprakāśam* of Śivāgrayogin (later half of the sixteenth century) devotes twelve verses to epistemology. Maṛaijñāna Deśikar quotes from a work called *Aḷavaiviḷakkam* which is not now available. Presumably this was a manual on Śaiva Siddhānta epistemology, meant for beginners.

The Tamil word *aḷavai* is used as an equivalent for *pramāṇa*. Derived from the word which means measuring, it is explained thus. According to their nature, physical objects—be they solids or liquids—are measured. We may (1) count, (2) take the length, etc., (3) weigh and (4) find the volume according to the suitability of these for what is measured. Likewise, in dealing with metaphysical realities, like *Pati*, *paśu* and *pāśa*, there is need to set forth the means by which we may acquire valid knowledge regarding them.

Pramāṇas: The various systems of Indian Philosophy differ in regard to the number of *pramāṇas* they accept. The Siddhāntin mentions the following ten, observing that they may be reduced to the first three among them and that there are some who recognise even more than these ten: (1) *pratyakṣa* (perception), (2) *anumāna* (inference), (3) *śabda* (verbal testimony), (4) *upamāna* (comparison), (5) *arthāpatti* (presumption), (6) *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension), (7) *pariśeṣa* (elimination), (8) *sambhava* (subsumption), (9) *aitihya* (tradition) and (10) *svabhāvaliṅga* (contextual meaning).

Though the Siddhāntin accepts only the first three, *viz. pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda* and endeavours to show how the remaining seven may be reduced to these three, he maintains that these three are also only ancillary to *citśakti* (intelligence energy). *Citśakti* is again viewed under two aspects: that which helps and that which is helped. The former is *Śiva-citśakti* and the latter is *jīva-citśakti*. It may be helpful, perhaps, to think of *Śiva-citśakti*, *jīva-citśakti* and the three ancillary *pramāṇas* as comparable to light, eye and spectacles respectively. Compared with Śiva's intelligence which is subtle, human intelligence is gross. The latter can know, only as enabled to know by the former. Śiva's help is said to be of two kinds, of seeing and showing (or helping to see). In other words, *Śiva-citśakti* illumines human intelligence and illumines objects. Śivāgrayogin sums up his discussion of the role of *citśakti* as a *pramāṇa*, with the observation that *Śiva-citśakti* is the *pramāṇa* both in the state of bondage and in that of release.

In his *Śaiva-siddhānta-paribhāṣā*, Sūryabhaṭṭa poses the question: Do not some of the *Āgamas* speak of *paśu-caitanya* (*jīva-citśakti*) as the *pramāṇa*? He answers: *Śivāgamas* give knowledge relating to all objects. In conformity with *Nyāya-śāstras*, they take *paśucaitanya* as (only) *laukika-pramāṇa*. He concludes the section entitled *pramāṇa-pariccheda* thus: "Therefore, *Īśvara-caitanya* which is eternal, pure (undefiled by *malas*) and without differentiations and the intelligence of souls (souls whose impurity have been and souls whose impurities are being, removed by His Grace) are *pramāṇa* for us."

Prameyas: On the principle that the less elaborate of the two topics, may be dealt with first, the Siddhāntin takes up *prameyas* (objects of knowledge). Objects may be studied under two aspects, *asādhāraṇa* (special) and *sādhāraṇa* (general). *Asādhāraṇalakṣaṇa* is the difference of an individual from (a) other members of its own class as well as from (b) members of other classes. *E.g.*, a brown cow differs from (a) cows of black, white, and other colours and from (b) horses, buffaloes, etc. Maraijñāna Deśikar gives the following example. *Sakalas* differ from (a) other souls (*vijñānākalas* and *pralayākalas*) and from (b) *pāśa* (bonds). *Sādhāraṇalakṣaṇa* is what an individual has in common with all members of its own class, as different from members of another class; *e.g.*, cow, for cows of all colours but as different from horses, etc. *Paśu* for all souls (*vijñānākalas*, *pralayākalas* and *sakalas*) but as different from *pāśa* (bonds).

Pratyakṣa: The Siddhāntin recognises four kinds of valid perception: *indriya* (sense), *mānasa* (mental), *svavedana* (self-conscious) and *yoga* (super-normal). It may be useful to study the latter two to see whether the Siddhāntin makes any special contribution to Indian epistemology. Could *svavedana-pratyakṣa* be included under *mānasa-pratyakṣa*? Is there any special significance in the Siddhāntin explaining *svavedana-pratyakṣa* in terms of *rāga, vidyā, niyati, kāla* and *kalā-tattvas*, special to Siddhānta, not recognized by other systems? Could *indriya* and *mānasa* be taken as *nirvikalpa* and *savikalpa* respectively? It is noteworthy that there is variant reading in regard to the *Siddhiyār* verse dealing with this: 'Without defect and differentiation' (*seyiroḍu vikarpaminri*) and 'without defect but with differentiation' (*seyirinri vikarpamoḍu*). We find increasing attention being paid currently to *yoga* techniques. The Siddhāntin speaks of Śivayoga. It is worthwhile studying the Siddhāntin's statement that by *yoga* the grip of impurities may be loosened and the aspirant enabled to pierce the veils of space and time and to become a spectator of the past, present and future and of everything near and far away.

Anumāna: We noted earlier that the commentator on the *Tattva-prakāśam* gives a general (or external) and special (or inner) meaning. Among the commentators on the *Siddhiyār*, Śivāgrayogin, here and there and Mariajñāna Deśikar, less frequently, give explanations with specific reference to the tenets of *Siddhānta*. In regard to the classification of *anumāna* as *svārtha* (for oneself) and *parārtha* (for others), Śivāgrayogin has the following comments: *Svārtha*, without being so taught by others, knowing oneself that where there is smoke, there is fire — it is the knowledge of pervasion (*vyāpti*); also knowing with certitude that Śiva exists. *Parārtha* is enabling others to have this knowledge (regarding smoke and fire); also the preceptor imparting knowledge of *Śiva, ātman* (*paśu*) and *pāśa*. *Anumāna* is the knowledge of the practicant after he has listened to *Siddhānta-śāstras* (*anumāna*, after knowledge, in this specific sense).

Hetu: Inference is proceeding from what is given in perception to what is not given therein, but has invariable connection with it. This is done by means of the *hetu* (probans). The Siddhāntin speaks of three kinds of *hetu, iyalbu, kārya* and *anupalabdhi*. *Iyalbu* (*svabhāva*) *hetu* is the meaning of a word according to its context. Thus in *mā taḷirttadu* (மா தளிர்த்தது), it could only mean that the mango tree is in sprout. Incidentally, according to K. Vajravelu Mudaliyar, the reading should be *maram taḷirittadu*. Śivāgrayogin says that we have here *dharmādharmi anumāna* and that such *anumāna* enables us infer from the existence of the universe, the existence of *pāśa, paśu* and *Pati*. He explains the inverse order of these categories thus: we must have vision of *pāśa* first; after removing *pāśa*, we must intuit *paśu*, and finally have vision of *Pati*.

Kārya hetu: From the invariable concomitance of cause and effect, given the effect (smoke), we infer the cause (fire). Śivāgrayogin adds that, likewise, given the cause, we can infer the effect. He gives this illustration also for *kārya hetu*: given the universe, we infer God; given the body (*acetana*), we infer the the soul (*caitanaya* — intelligence); given the universe, we infer *māyā*. Presumably, Śivāgrayogin infers at once from the universe, its efficient cause, God and its material cause, *māyā*. Extending the principle, on the Sāṅkhyan model may we not infer from the design, those for whom the design is meant? May we say, then, for Siddhānta, the design implies the *designer* and the *designee* — if we are permitted to coin this word?

Anupalabdhi hetu: This is arguing from absence of cause to absence of effect. When there is no snow (cause), there is no cold (effect). It is interesting to note Śivāgrayogin's examples for this from Siddhānta. If there is no creator (*kartā*), there will be no universe. If there is no soul, there will be no body. If there is no *māyā*, there will be no *tattvas* and *tāttvikas*. May we see these in relation to *modus tollens* (denying the consequent of a hypothetical syllogism) in Western deductive logic?

e.g. If there is no creator, there will be no world.

But there is a world.

∴ There is a creator.

This, no doubt, raises problems relating to the validity of perception, the ontological status of the world and so on. Interested readers are invited to pages 161-162 of the *Śivajñānapāḍiyam* where Śivajñānayogin discusses these problems and states the position of Siddhāntin.

Concomitance may be positive (*anvaya*) or negative (*vyatireka*). *Sādhya* (probandum) is what is sought to be inferred. The means by which this is done is the *hetu* (probans). That in which what is sought to be inferred is the *pakṣa* (subject). It is usual to speak of *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. In the first two, the probandum must be present. It must be absent in the third. Thus, for example, fire (probandum) must be present in the mountain (*pakṣa*) and kitchen (*sapakṣa*). It must be absent in the lake (*vipakṣa*).

The Siddhāntin says that *anumāna* may be stated with five members. The *Pauṣkara Bhāṣya* argues for the need of the five members as against those who hold that three are adequate and those who maintain that two are enough. The argument is as follows. We cannot begin with the *udāharaṇa* for where the probandum and probans have not been designated, there is no expectancy of the concomitance and the statement thereof would be a statement of what is not required. If, however, fire is first premised and then there is a question as to why it is premised and smoke is mentioned as the reason, there is need to know the concomitance between fire and smoke. The statement of the concomitance is, therefore, justified. Nor is it possible to stop with the *udāharaṇa* for we do not know that in the subject there exists the probans as qualified by the pervasion. Since the person who is instructed is ignorant of the existence of the probans as so qualified, it will not be possible for him to make the necessary inference. Even the *nigamana*, the statement of the conclusion as established, is of service in that it indicates the absence of *bādhā* (sublation) and *satpratipakṣa* (counter-probans).[4]

> *Anvayānumāna*:
> This mountain has fire. (*pratijñā*)
> Because it has smoke. (*hetu*)
> Whatever has smoke, has fire, *e.g.* kitchen. (*udāharaṇa*)
> This mountain has smoke such as is accompanied by fire. (*upanaya*)
> ∴ The mountain has fire. (*nigamana*)

In regard to *vyatireki anumāna*, the argument proceeds from absence of fire to absence of smoke. The example given is the lake to illustrate the point that where there is no fire, there is no smoke.

Three varieties of *anumāna* are mentioned:

(1) *Pratyakṣānumāna*: (also called *pūrvakkāṭci* or *pūrva-darśana*): This is when we infer from fragrance that it must be emanating from a particular flower, on the strength of previous experience of the

two together. Śivāgrayogin says that this is only a case of *dharmādharmi-anumāna*.

(2) *Anumānānumāna* (*karudal anumāna* or *vacanaliṅgānumāna*): An example of this is inferring the quality of intelligence from a person's speech.

(3) *Āgamānumāna* (*uraiyāl anumāna*): The scriptures say that our present pleasures and pains are due to our *karma* in previous lives. We may proceed to infer from our present deeds our pleasures and pains in the future.

Āgamas (*Śabda-pramāṇa*) are the works of Śiva whose intelligence is beginninglessly pure. They fall into three parts: *tantra*, *mantra* and *upadeśa*. *Tantra* (*karma-kāṇḍa*) consists in understanding the primary and secondary significance of the words of the scriptures, in the *karma-kāṇḍa*, avoiding contradictions. Śivāgrayogin says that *caryā* and *kriyā* are covered by *tantras*. *Mantra* stands for *yoga*, and *upadeśa* for *jñāna* (*vidyā*).

Śivāgrayogin gives elaborate comments. He meets the objections of the *Mimāṁsakas* that the *Vedas* alone are valid *pramāṇa* as they have no author (*apauruṣeya*) and as they are accepted by the majority of worthy people and by the *Smṛtis*. On the other hand, *Āgamas*, as having an author, are not eternal, are not accepted by the *Smṛtis* and by worthy people. The following are the main points in Śivāgrayogin's comments.

The *Vedas* are called eternal, because they emerge from Śiva who is eternal. Compare the expression *tirumukham* (literally sacred face) for an epistle. The epistle as emerging from the face (mouth) is figuratively called *tirumukham*. *Padmā* is a name for the Goddess *Lakṣmī* because she emerged from a lotus (*padmam*): *tadutpannatvāt tadvyapadeśaḥ* (it is called so because it has come from that). As for *āptavacana* (statement of a reliable person), we are reminded that he is an *āpta* who is not deluded himself and who is not out to delude others. Śiva is the Supreme *āpta*.

Śivajñānayogin's comments in his *Śivajñānapāḍiyam* are also worth studying in this context. Śivajñānayogin poses the question whether there is not the defect of circular reasoning in accepting the *Vedas* as eternal on the ground that they are the works of Śiva and establishing Śiva'se xistence on the authority of the *Vedas*. He replies that the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas* are *jñāpaka hetu*, as enabling us to have knowledge of God. It is by *kāraka hetu* that God's existence is sought to be established. In other words, from the universe (both *śabda-* and *artha-prapañca*) as effect, we infer God as its cause. More than that, it is by His Grace we are led to accept His existence. It is worth recalling here the prefatory verses in the *Siddhiyār* wherein Aruḷandi Śivācārya, its author, says that Śiva is beyond the ken of *Vedas*, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, speech, mind and valid reasoning (fault-free logic). Yet, *given His Grace*, we may know Him through the scriptures, gain clarity about His existence through reasoning and, by the onset of *jñāna*, get rid of delusion, intuit Him in oneself (one's mind), remove the darkness of deluding births and abide with devotees. Śivāgrayogin's comment is: through union with the Lord's *kriyā śakti*, the soul's *kriyā śakti* removes bonds; through union with His *jñāna śakti*, the soul's *jñāna śakti* which is its real form (*svasvarūpa*) is enabled to intuit Śiva in itself — as not other than itself (*ananya*), and become the experiencer of the bliss of Śiva. Śivāgrayogin says that being with the devotees of Śiva is conducive to such *jñāna*. May we extend this principle and say that in union with Śiva's *icchā śakti*, the soul's *icchā śakti* makes the souls desire and stay in the company of devotees?

What is the relation between the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas*? Some say that the *Vedas* alone are valid and that the *Āgamas* are either not valid or subordinate to the authority of the *Vedas*. Others hold them to be of equal authority. The view of the Siddhāntins (Tirumūlar is quoted in this context) is that both are the works of the Lord. The *Vedas* are general in character whereas the *Āgamas* are special. Śivajñānayogin's exposition of the Siddhānta under the title *Śaivāgamapprāmāṇiyam*, in the prefatory portion (*Sirappuppāyiram*) in his great commentary, may be read with profit.

Fallacies (*Pōli*): The *Siddhiyār* lists sixty-five fallacies as hereunder:

Pakṣābhāsa (fallacies relating to the subject) ...	4
Hetvābhāsa (fallacies relating to probans coming under three heads) ...	21

Dṛṣṭāntābhāsa (fallacies relating to example)	... 18
Nigrahasthāna (occasions for reproof)	... 22

Maraijñāna Deśikar and Śivāgrayogin alone explain and illustrate the fallacies in some detail. It will be interesting to make a comparative study of the explanations given by these commentators. Śivāgrayogin observes at the end of his comments on fallacies that in his commentary the views of other schools will be refuted as committing these fallacies and the exposition of the *Siddhānta* will be such as to be free from such fallacies.

Theory of Error: How does the Siddhāntin account for errorr in knowledge? Different theories are put forth by the different systems. The Siddhāntin's theory may be taken as *anyathā khyāti*, usually associated with the *Nyāyadarśana*. Doubt and error, it may be said, in general, are possible where there are two things, entitatively different but having some features common. In this respect, there must be (1) shell and (2) silver; (1) rope and (2) snake, if the first of them is to be mistaken for the second. Take the old copy-book maxim, 'There are no snakes in Iceland'. Could we say that a rope is likely to be mistaken for a snake? Śivajñānayogin in his evaluation of *Māyāvāda* (II Sūtra, 2nd *adhikaraṇa of Śivajñānapāḍiyam*) refuses to accept the position that Brahman which is *caitanya* could be mistaken for the world *jaḍa* with its objects like pot and so forth. There is no similarity between Brahman and the world, such as there is between rope and snake, in respect of common features in the latter (rope and snake) such as being coiled, etc. Incidentally, he asks us to consider the validity of perception in such cases as perception of a pot which to all normal persons will appear only as pot.

The *Dvaita* theory of error is called *abhinavānyathākhyāti* (a new version of the *Naiyāyika's anyathākhyāti*). The *Dvaitin* agrees with the *Naiyāyika* that the snake is not in the place where it appears. But, whereas, the *Naiyāyika* says, that it is elsewhere, the *Dvaitin* says that the fact of its existence or presence elsewhere, is irrelevant. It will be rewarding to study the Siddhāntin's view of error, not only in relation to views differing from it like *anirvacanīyakhyāti*, but also in relation to those similar to it, like the *Naiyāyika's anythākhyāti* or the *Dvaitin's abhinavānyathākhyāti*. We may be thus able to see how epistemology influences and is influenced by the metaphysical standpoint of each *darśana*.

Validity: Does knowledge have self-validity (*svataḥ-pramāṇya*) or is it to be validated by other-and-extraneous means (*parataḥ-prāmāṇya*)? The Siddhāntin holds the former view. In this respect, he parts company from the *Naiyāyika* who holds the view that it is *parataḥ-prāmāṇya*. The *Naiyāyika* says that truth or error is to be determined by practical verification (fruitful activity, *saṁvādi-pravṛtti*). If we think we see *water*, can we drink it or use it in any manner in which water is used? Thus practical verification is a test. The Siddhāntin does not accept this view. Likewise he does not accept the somewhat similar view of the *Bauddha* that valid cognition is that whose content gives rise to fruitful activity. This view, he says, does not help us, with regard to inferences relating to the past or the future. Likewise, the view of the *Prābhākaras* that experience — *anubhūti*, other than remembrance (*smṛtijñāna*) — is valid knowledge also is unacceptable to the Siddhāntin. The Siddhāntin and the *Prābhākaras*, both accept the authority of the *Vedas*. Hence the Siddhāntin asks the *Prābhākaras* how they can do so, if remembrance of the word-sense of Vedic texts is not accepted? The Siddhāntin's view is that validity is intrinsic. It is invalidity which is extrinsic.

The validity of knowledge in respect of its origin (*utpattau*) and in respect of its ascertainment (*jñaptau*) so far as the Siddhānta is concerned may be studied in the light of Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri's remark (in his paper, *Truth in the Śaiva Siddhānta*, reprinted elsewhere in this Volume). "We see, then, that the Siddhāntin agrees with the Vedānta in accepting the self-evidence of knowledge, but differs in rejecting its self-dependence; but in proving that true knoweledge is dependant on condition other than those characteristic of knowledge in general, it does not appear to have been very successful." In brief, "in respect of its origin, truth is not self-evident but has to be otherwise guaranteed (*utpattau paratastvam*)." Could we, say then, that coherence is at once the *nature* of truth as well as a test or criterion of it? Such coherence will be natural in view of the fact that Śiva is the author of the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas*. Lack of coherence will result, from human finitude. Anyway, the Siddhāntin's position calls for a close study in relation to the *Nyāya*, *Mimāṁsā* and the *Vedānta* — (Absolutistic and Theistic).

Coherence: S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri's paper *Truth in Śaiva Siddhānta*, calls for very close study. Attention is invited to the following points. The Siddhānta conceives of Truth as a systematic whole. This is at some distance from the stage of looking to correspondence with eternal reality as the test of truth. Of the two-features of coherence, inclusiveness and harmony, inclusiveness receives greater attention. But this is affected by the Siddhāntin's insistence on more categories (thirty six in all) than are found in other systems (twenty four, as in *Sāṅkhya*). It is possible with fewer categories to achieve greater harmony. "In his desire to demonstrate that his system is verily the final synthesis, he would appear to have juxtaposed (this) correspondence-doctrine with the doctrine of Truth as a system, though it is certainly questionable if such juxtaposition can claim to be a synthesis at all."

Is the *Siddhānta* a juxtaposition or synthesis? Or something different from both, a synoptic vision? If it is an intuited or perceived whole, the parts would be organically related, not artificially assembled. Anyway, the following points are submitted for consideration. We do have such combinations as realism and idealism in the expression 'empirical realist, transcendental idealist.' The *nyāya* of 'the blind men and the elephant' is cited by the Siddhāntin also. We may recall an oft-quoted verse of the *Siddhiyār*: "There are many religions and many texts (books) dealing with (object of) Reality. These are in conflict with one another. Which of these is the religion and which the true text? Whichever of these is seen to stand forth without the querulous assertion '(only) this, not that' and in a just manner brings all of them together, that is the religion, that is the true text."[5] 'Brings all of them' — this is inclusiveness; 'in a just (appropriate or fitting) manner' — this is harmony.

The Siddhāntin's theory of self-validity (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*) is bound to differ from that of the *Mīmāṁsaka* (for whom the *Veda* is *apauruṣeya*), of the *Naiyāyika* (who, in spite of his theism subscribes to *parataḥ-prāmāṇya*) and of the *Vedāntin* (for whom knowledge must be self-evident and self-dependent). Yet, his system may find place for *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* and *anyatha-khyāti*.

Does the Siddhāntin juxtapose the materialist and the absolutist points of view? His doctrine of eligibility, not to be understood as a slur on other schools but as indicating stages in one's own spiritual growth, makes him bring the *Cārvāka* into his system. His acceptance of the *mahāvākya* is for practical purposes, *sādhana*, to get released from *pāśa*, in the manner of *garuḍa-bhāvanā* to draw out snake-poison. Thus both inclusiveness and harmony may be seen in the Siddhānta, not only as features of its theory of Truth but as a stamp and seal of the whole system.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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3. Edited and published by M. Arunachalam, Gandhi Vidyalayam, Tiruchitrambalam, 1965.
4. *Pauṣkara Bhāṣyā*, p. 538. Professor S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri translated it for me in 1936 when he guided my research.
5. ஓது சமயங்கள் பொருள் உணருநூல்கள்
   ஒன்றோடொன்றொவ்வாமல் உளபலவுமிவற்றுள்
   யாது சமயம் பொருள்நூல் யாதிங்கென்னில்
   இதுவாகும் அதுவல்ல தெனும்பிணக்க்தின்றி
   நீதியினால் இவையெல்லாம் ஓரிடத்தேகாண
   நின்றதியா தொருசமயம் அதுசமயம் பொருள்நூல்
   ஆதலினால் இவையெல்லாம் அருமறை ஆகமத்தே
   அடங்கியிடு மவையிரண்டும் அரனடிக்கீழ் அடங்கும்.

11

EPISTEMOLOGICAL IDEAS IN THE JNANAMRTAM

S. Gangadharan

The *Jñānāmṛtam* belongs to the pre-Meykaṇḍār period. The merit of this work lies in the fact that it proposes to give the digest of the wisdom part of the *Śaivāgamas* in accordance with the spiritual teaching heard from the master. The author of the *Jñānāmṛtam*, Vāgīśa Munivar, writes in a beautiful classical style of Tamil adopted by the authors of Saṅgam Literature. Let us consider the epistemological ideas as found in the *Jñānāmṛtam* under the three headings *viz.*, *paśu* (self), *pāśa* (bondage) and *Pati* (God).

Paśu

Vāgīśa Munivar uses epistemology in verses 11, 12 and 13, when he deals with the existence and nature of the soul. He establishes the reality of the sentient soul in the insentient body by means of an inferential proof in verse 11. The insentient body is actuated by a sentient self, for it has purposeful action. Whenever an insentient thing has useful activity, the action is communicated to the body by a sentient being, as in the case of a pot being brought to the house. Whenever no action is communicated by a sentient being, the insentient object continues to be at rest as in the case of a pot untouched. This inferential reasoning with affirmative and negative concomitance proves the existence of the sentient being, *i.e.*, the individual self in a living body. In the closing lines of this verse, the author gives the meaning of the terms *cetana* and *acetana* as being conscious and not being conscious.

It is worthy of note that one of the proofs for the existence of soul is given in the form of elimination (*pariśeṣa*). The author says that the evolved world is useful but neither the insentient world nor the supreme Being which is supreme bliss, will use it. Therefore there is a being for whose usefulness the world might have been evolved. Hence by elimination, we arrive at the truth of existence of an individual self which is profited by the changing world.

It is very interesting to note in verse 13 that in contrasting living body with a dead one, the author says that when there is soul in a body, the person recoils from touching the hot nice meal served before him. But when the soul leaves the mortal coil, the body is placed on hard wood and cakes of cowdung and set fire to. There the body does not complain against the trouble caused to it. Hence the author concludes that the body is insentient and when it lives, a sentient being that requires a soft and sweet smelling bed to recline on, warm and nice food, etc., resides in it.

The author distinguishes between physical body and the intelligent being, *i.e.*, the owner of the body, by bringing in two arguments. The first is that the body is known as something belonging to the person denoted by 'I'. In other words we know and say that "this is my body." We speak in the same way of gold, pearls and elephants which we clearly know as different from the self. Though gold and the body are both denoted by the expression 'mine', the disciple is sure that gold, etc., are different from him, whereas he cannot clearly know that his body is different from his self in the same manner. In the following manner, the master directs the disciple to know the body as something different from himself.

The physical body is made up of the constituents of food. But when we take food, only two thirds of it is absorbed into the bodily system and one third is thrown out as excreta. If the body is taken to be one's self, then the excreta should also be considered as one's self. But this is not the case. We may therefore assume that the body is quite different from the self as shown by the expression, 'this body is mine.' Also when a thing is known, the known object is always different from the knower.[1] The body is something known to the individual self. Therefore inasmuch as the body is the object of knowledge of the individual self that is inseparably connected with it, it is different from the self even like a chariot which is different from the charioter who drives it.

Pāśa (Bondage)

In verse 19, the author gives the exposition of the main principle of bondage, the *āṇava*. It is learnt that perfection, which is to become one with the Supreme, may be attained by man through certain practices. Now the element which has prevented the individual self from enjoying the final beatitude, or in other words, the element which when removed enables the soul to attain perfection, is the main principle of bondage, namely *āṇava*.[2] If we do not recognize the existence of *āṇava*, we would not be able to account for the soul's subjection to the vagaries of the senses. It should have complete independence, but in life it seems to have lost its independence and is fully dependent on the evolutes of *māyā* such as sense organs. Now it may be argued that it is subservient to the senses or the other evolutes. If it be so, then we cannot think of the state of perfection which is called *mukti*.[3] Therefore it is clear that the state of bondage is characterized by the soul's subservience to the evolutes of *māyā*[4] and the state of perfection is that when the soul identifies itself with the supreme Being and enjoys His consciousness-bliss.[5] This is what we have to understand as the difference between the state of bondage and the state of release.

The spiritual darkness should be conceived as a single element pervading all places and all the bound selves. Again, the souls attain release at various times according to their maturity. Therefore *mala* should also be considered to have innumerable potencies, each potency affecting a particular self and leaving it at the time when the particular self attains maturity. Another point to be noted with respect to this spiritual darkness is that it is beginningless (*anādi*). If it be taken to have a beginning, then logically we have to assign a reason for its arrival at a particular time to affect the soul. On the other hand, if we conceive that it can affect the soul at any time without any reason, then we have to admit that even the released selves will be affected by it and all their efforts to gain wisdom would be in vain. In short, spiritual darkness is the main cause for the state of bondage. It is beginningless, but it will have an end. It affects every soul, with different potencies which will have their own end at a particular time when that particular self becomes matured.

It is held in inferential reasoning that an insentient thing with plurality will be ephemeral. But the spiritual darkness should be considered to exist till all souls get their release and the souls are infinite in number. Therefore out of philosophical necessity the spiritual darkness is considered to be one with a plurality of potencies. We may note here that sentient beings which are many can be eternal. For example, the souls are many, sentient and are eternal. The pots are both insentient and many and are subject to destruction. But *āṇava* which is insentient, is not many and so it is everlasting.

The author gives in verse 20, a basis for proving the existence of the bondage called *karma*. All the souls desire to be happy and enjoy pleasure. But it is known that some enjoy pleasure and are happy whereas others suffer from misery and are unhappy. Also consider the matter of farming of two persons who do the required actions equally well, but reap the fruits of their actions differently. While one gets the maximum yield, another man fails to get the minimum.[6] The latter example is expressed in Tamil by the maxim *'Paṇṇiya puṇṇiyam payiril teriyum* (the merit done in previous birth will be seen in the harvest that a man reaps in the present birth). The above two cases suggest strongly the existence of previous *karma* which should be taken in addition to one's present efforts as a factor in the judgement of man's pleasure or pain, happiness or unhappiness.

In verse 21, the author deals with *māyā*, which is one of the bonds. *Māyā* is one and everlasting. It has the potentiality to originate all the forms of material things including the constituents of psycho-physical organism. It is all-pervasive. The soul reaps the benefit of its *karma* only from *māyā*. The proof of exisence of *māyā* is an inferential one even as God is inferred from the existence of the world. The inferential form may be given in the following manner.

The visible world, which is an effect, should have its own material cause, for it is an effect. A piece of cloth which is an effect, has its material cause the cotton thread. Since the effects of *māyā* are all insentient, *māyā* also must be insentient. There is a school of thought which says that the material world has originated from Brahman which is pure consciousness. But we should know that it is wrong to assume that the effects of a sentient being will be insentient. This is against the nature of the relation between cause and effect. Therefore such a view will seriously violate the conception of all causal relations.[7]

This *māyā* is the ultimate real cause. If it be considered to be an effect of some other thing, then we have to assume the existence of that particular thing and give it a name. Therefore this kind of argument will lead to endless regression, and so we give the name *māyā* to the ultimate material cause from which all material things have their origin. Its all-pervasiveness is seen from its potency to give the fruits of *karma* to all the souls wherever they are placed. Again, since it is insentient and everlasting, it is bound to be a single entity. This follows from the dictum that a thing which is both insentient and plural, is subject to origination and destruction.[8]

From the example of a piece of cloth which is a product of a number of threads, it may be stated that several causes go to make one effect, but a closer examination of the case will convince us that the threads are also effects and the ultimate cause which is the cotton seeds, is always one which causes different and various effects. Those who assert that an insentient effect has for its cause a sentient being, may as well say that water gives rise to a column of smoke.[9] Therefore, it is absurd to say that.

It may be felt that in the universe one thing is destroyed while another thing is being created. Therefore, we do not see destruction of the universe as a whole at a particular point of time. This is the view expressed by the materialist. But a thing which is destroyed is known to be liable to destruction by means of its very constitution. Since the whole universe is so constituted being liable to destruction, no one can prevent the destruction when it occurs at the right time. This can be inferred as in the following case. When we see innumerable persons die, we naturally conclude that every person will die.

Vāgīśa Munivar explains the theory of *satkārya-vāda* in verse 22. This theory maintains that an effect is involved in its material cause. A piece of cotton is got from cotton-threads only after the process of weaving with the help of weaving machinery. It may be argued: since the cloth is produced only after the use of the instruments, the effect is something new which is not to be found in its material cause. But we should know that cloth cannot be got from mud and it can be got only from the cotton threads. Every man knows that a particular product can be got only from a particular material cause appropriate to it. Even the nature of the product can be inferred from the nature of the thing out of which it is to be produced. Therefore it is concluded that all products are involved in a subtle form in the corresponding material cause. The purpose of the operation of the instruments is only to make the subtle form assume a gross form which we make use of. This is established both affirmatively and negatively. When we see the cotton thread, we infer the nature of the cloth which can be made out of it. This is affirmative reasoning. But when we see a lump of clay, we do not think that a cloth can be made out of it. This means that as there is no cloth in the lump of clay, we cannot expect to produce it from the clay. This is the negative form of inference. In order to make the idea vivid, the author cites the example of placing a new clothing inside a mud pot whenever it is not used. When the person wants to make use of the clothing, he takes it out of the pot, spreads it and clothes himself with it. So long as the clothing was in the pot, it was invisible. When it is taken out of it, it is visible. He explains *satkāryavāda* further by making the distinction between creation and manifestation.

The question arises: What is the use of the effort with the instruments if the effect is already there in the cause? One may as well ask if the implied effect can be made use of without the use of instruments and the connected efforts. The answer is that the connected instruments is to make the implied effect manifest and available for practical use. This may be compared to finding the water that is already under ground by digging a well. Water is already there and digging is only to make it manifest and available for use. In digging a well, we get the impression that water has been manifested, but in making a pot the impression is that the pot has been created from mud. The opponent of the *satkāryavāda* insists on the difference between the two. In the well,. water has been there in gross form and is hidden by gross things like sand and mud. Therefore our impression is that water has manifested itself there. But in the case of the pot, it is hidden in its subtle state in the clay and by means of effort and useful activity with the connected instruments, it assumes its gross state in which we find use for it. Therefore correspondingly our impression is that the pot has been created from the mud.

The following inferential form will convince one of the reality of the existence of the pot in the mud: There is the pot in its subtle form in the lump of clay, for it comes out from there. Whatever is not in a thing will not come out of it, as in the case of the absence of oil in sand and the non-existence of horns in the head of hares.

Pati

Vāgīśa Munivar gives a proof for the existence of God in stanza 57. The proof is in the form of positive concomitant inference. It is as follows: "the evolutes, etc., and the visible things hill, etc., which go to constitute this seen universe are effects. So they should have an intelligent agent for their manifestation. In other words, this seen universe has an intelligent agent, for it is a product. Every product has an agent for its manifestation from its material cause as in the case of a mud pot." Now, the author takes up the possible objections that may be raised against this argument.

The first objection is as follows : a man who has seen a mud pot and its maker at one place sees the product namely the mud pot alone at another place. His knowledge of concomitance between the agent and the product induces him to infer the existence of the agent in the case of the other mud pot. But in the case of the universe we have not seen the creator and the universe at the first instance so that when another universe is seen without the appearance of the creator, we may infer the existence of the creator. So, how are we to make sure that the inferential process will take place and bring the valid knowledge of the existence of God to the observer?

For this the author's reply is as follows : a man seesa sm all column of smoke and its concomitant fire in his kitchen and other approachable places. Then on a particular occasion, he sees a huge column of smoke at the distant top of a hill. Naturally he infers that there should be a huge fire on the invisible side of the hill. Here there is a lot of difference between the quantities of smoke seen in the kitchen and on the hill. In spite of difference between the quantities of smoke, the inference takes place based on the general element that is common to both cases.

The common element is that the smoke is always the effect of fire. So the smoke is always co-existent with its cause. If one accepts this common principle, then he relies on inference. If he refuses to believe in the existence of huge fire on the hill, simply because there is difference between the quantities of smoke, then he is a believer in perception alone.[10] He does not take into consideration the case of inference. In the same manner wherever there is a product, it is always co-existent with its material cause, the instrumental cause and the agent, the efficient cause. On this generality if the universe is known to be a product which it is because of its forms and names, it should have its efficient cause and that is God.

Another question arises here. Since ether forms part of the universe, it is asked whether ether too can be taken as a product. The author proves it to be a product on two counts. One is that it has parts in it. Whatever has got parts which can be separated in it, is a product as in the case of a mud pot or a piece of cloth. Another count is that even as earth which has smell as its quality is a product, so also ether is a product inasmuch as it has for its quality, the sound. Here to be more scientific, sound means the electro-magnetic waves which traverses through ether. Finally the master impresses on the disciple that whatever has its origin, will also have its end and all those things that have ends, should be considered to be things created or made. Since this universe has form, it is a product and the product should have been produced by a creator.

In verse 58 the author continues to give another inferential argument to prove the existence of God. This universe should be moved by an intelligent principle, for it is insentient and exhibits movement of evolution and involution. Whatever is insentient and at the same time possesses motion is always moved by an intelligent principle as in the case of a chariot.[11] Also, whatever is not actuated by an intelligent being and is insentient, is devoid of motion as in the case of a book lying on the table. Thus the existence of God is established by an inference which has both positive and negative concomitance. Some objections are raised while propounding this kind of inference. They are given and met with as follows.

It may be said that even insentient things possess the power of motion, for example, cow's milk enables the calf to grow. Also magnet which is insentient attracts iron filings. In the first case, milk is produced only from the udder of a live cow. No one can expect a dead cow to produce milk which will bring up the calf.[12] Again, even in the case of magnet and the iron filings, there should be an intelligent agent to bring the filings within the magnetic field so that they may be attracted. Otherwise the filings will not move towards the magnet. So it is clear that things do not move nor do they cause motion unless they are attended to by an intelligent being. Hence the original position stands.

This argument necessarily leads to another question. The universe consists of sentient beings as well, *i.e.*, the individual selves. They are intelligent. So it may be argued that the process of evolution and involution found in the insentient part of the universe may be induced by the individual selves themselves. But this argument fails to take into consideration the nature of the individual self. Though the selves are sentient, yet they cannot behave like intelligent beings, unless they are provided with the psycho-physical organism which we call body. So they themselves require some other intelligent beings in order to provide them with the requisite body in order that they manifest their cognitive potency. So that self-conscious being which makes the insentient universe undergo changes and also provides the individual selves with the requisite body is the Supreme Being of pure consciousness which is not the universe.

Another question crops up. Philosophers believe in the released souls. They also conceive of the released souls as having omniscience like the Supreme Being. So one of the released souls may perform the cosmic functions which are attributed to the Supreme Being. In order to refute this fallacious argument the author resorts to a question. The question is whether such a released soul is ever released or was released at a point of time in the course of evolution. If it is answered that it is ever released, *i.e.*, it is *anādimukta*, then it is the same thing advanced by the master. *Anādi Mukta* is the Supreme Being Himself. If on the other hand that soul got release at a particular point of time, then that soul must have resorted to the help of another released soul, which has got its release prior to it. This will lead to endless regress and ultimately it lands the disciple on the conclusion that it is the Supreme Being that is responsible for the release of any of the individual self.

In verse 59, the author in a brief statement gives an argument for the existence of the Supreme Being. All the things that are known, are insentient and are subject to change. So there should be one conscious entity to administer this change in the seen universe and that entity itself should be changeless. That immutable conscious pre-cosmic entity is the Supreme Being.

In verse 61, the author asserts that the omnipresent Lord can be seen only by those who are gifted with the eye of grace. There are endless layers of worlds under the earth as well as above it. The Supreme Lord has the universe for His body. The above mentioned innumerable worlds and time itself which acts as being present, past and future, form part of His body. One may wonder why such a Lord is not comprehended by men. The proper answer is that the Lord though omnipresent yet transcends the human comprehension, otherwise He should become as changing as any other thing which is comprehended by the living beings. Now the question arises whether such a Lord is not apprehended at all by any one. If the question is answered in the affirmative, the answer leads to the conclusion that such a Lord is non-existent. But the scriptures and Godmen assert His existence. So the conclusion is that the Lord can be realized only by those who have the eye of grace or supra-normal consciousness (*jñāna-niṣṭai*). The Lord is self-luminous and is bright as the sun and so it can be seen only by those who have eyes. A blind man cannot see the sun which is luminous and all-pervasive. Similarly men who are not gifted with supra-normal consciousness cannot perceive God, but can only infer Him from the nature of the universe.

This truth can be illustrated by another example. Persons who are possessed behave in an extraordinary manner. From the extraordinary behaviour of the person, we infer that he or she is possessed by some extraneous spirit. But all the same one cannot see the spirit. The master asks the disciple to concentrate his attention and understand the truth about God, the ultimate cause of the world. It is to be observed that so far as the commentary is concerned, there seems to have crept in some kind of misunderstanding with respect to the proof adopted in the verse by the author. One version is that it is an inference admitting of negative concomitance (*vyatireka vyāpti*) alone. But there is a footnote which conveys the very opposite view that it is an inference admitting of positive concomitance (*kevala anvayī*) alone. But the meaning of the verse can be given in the form of an inference admitting of both positive and negative concomitance in the following manner.

God cannot be perceived without the eye of grace (Proposition); as He is changeless (ground); whatever is changeless cannot be seen without the eye of grace, *e.g.*, the ultimate material cause called *māyā*. This example shows the co-existence of the ground and the conclusion. The Example: whatever is perceived by ordinary senses is subject to change, as a mud pot," shows the co-existnece of the conclution and the ground. So this inference admits both positive and negasive (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*) concomitance.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. ஞானாமிர்தம், 14:12-13.
அறிவோர்க்கு அறிவ அந்நியம் என்பது
அறிவோய் அறிதி.

2. *Ibid.*, 19:1-3.
ஆருயிர் யாது ஒன்று அகலின் மாசு இரீ
பதியது தன்மை படர்ப; மதிதர!
அன்னது பாசம்.

3. *Ibid.*, 19:10-13.
பரதந்திரியங் கரைகழி பந்தம்
சித்தென நித்தமாயின் மற்றது
முத்தி கூடுதல் முடியாது.

4. *Ibid.*, 19:8-9.
பந்தத்து ஒன்றினர் ஐம்புலன்
ஏவலின் நின்றனர்.

5. *Ibid.*, 19:6-7.
பந்தம் அகன்றோர் போகிய
ஈசத்தன்மை இயைந்தோர்.

6. *Ibid.*, 20:5-7.
செய்வினை ஒத்தக்கண்ணும் மையறு
சாலி மேவினர் பலரே பலரதன்
வாலிய விந்துவு மருவாதோரே

7. *Ibid.*, 21:13-15.

காரண நியமம் என்னும் பேரிசை
எல்லா முடைக்கும் பொல்லாத்தோடம்
வல்லே யெய்தும்.

8. *Ibid.*, 21:19-20.

... ... யாது பலவாய்ச் சேதனம்
அன்றது தோற்றத்து ஒன்றும்.

9. *Ibid.*, 21:25-27.

சித்தில் அசித்தின் குற்றமில் தேற்றம்
என்பவர் புனலை வன்புகை அதனின்
மான அளவைத் தாம் அளவின்மை.

10. *Ibid.*, 57:10-15.

கிரிவளர் கழைஞெலி தூமமதனின்
எரிவள ரட்டிற் புகையய லெனவுணர்ந்து
ஒட்டினை பிறங்கல் ஒள்ளலல் ஒட்டிய
தென்னை? விசேட சமனியத் தியாதிற்
பன்னெனில் விசேடம் என்னின் அன்றே
காட்சியது அலதிலை.

11. *Ibid.*,58:4-6.

....அசத்து உலகு அறிவனை விநாஅக்
குறிவரல் போதல் கூடாது; உறுதேர்
ஆதிபோல.

12. *Ibid.*, 58:9-14.

கன்று வளர்பாலினுஞ் சென்றின்று ஈன்கோச்
சேதன மாதலின் ஓதிய உயிர் போஒஞ்
சுரபி தீம்பால் சொரியிற் புரையில்
தீம்பால் வளர்த்தது அன்றென ஓம்பாது
உரையாடுநர் எவர்.

12

ON THE NATURE AND EVIDENCE OF PERCEPTION

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN

I

The basic tenets of a school are set forth in the *sūtra-work* of that school. Unless the *Sūtras* themselves initiate epistemological discussion by stating the views of the school as in the case of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, the author of a commentary (*bhāṣya*) on the *Sūtras* does not provide a separate section or chapter on epistemology, though he may discuss epistemological issues from the standpoint of that school in several places as the occasion demands. For example, the commentaries which Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja wrote on the *Brahma-sūtras* do not contain a separate chapter on epistemology. The same is the case with Śivajñānayogin's *Śivajñāna-pāḍiyam* which is a commentary on the *Śivajñāna-bodham*, the basic *sūtra-work* of the school. Aruḷnandi's *Śivajñāna-siddhiyār* is an exception to this. Since the metaphysical position of a school is sought to be justified by its epistemology, Aruḷnandi must have felt the need for providing a separate section on epistemology in the *supakkam* of the *Śivajñāna-siddhiyār*. 14 out of the 328 verses contained in the *supakkam* are devoted to epistemology; and 6 out of these 14 verses are devoted to the definition and classification of perception. Though it may appear that the section on epistemology in the *siddhiyār* is negligible considering that only 14 out of 328 verses are devoted to it, the fact that Aruḷnandi has chosen to state the *pramāṇas* and explain them before commenting on the first *sūtra* of the

Śivajñāna-bodham is significant for two reasons. First of all, it emphasizes the importance attached to epistemology, which is the basis for metaphysical discussion. Secondly, it states, though briefly, the basic position of the school in its epistemology and thus provides room for elaboration and elucidation of the basic position by other writers of the school.

II

After stating the three *pramāṇas—pratyakṣa* (=*kāṇḍal*), *anumāna* (=*karudal*) and *śabda* (=*urai*)—accepted by the school (v. 7), Aruḷnandi defines them in the immediately following verse (v. 8). According to him, valid perception is cognition of an object with its differentiating features such as name, class, qualities, function, and worth, without doubt and error.[1] Thus, valid perception, according to Aruḷnandi, is determinate perception (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*). The definition has been so formulated as to differentiate valid perception from those cases of perception which are not valid. First of all, valid perception is different from doubtful perception, *i.e.* perception in which there is doubt about the object perceived. Consider the case of a person who, in a given situation, is not able to perceive *what* the object is which is in front of him, though he is aware that there is something in front of him with the result that he is not able to decide whether it is a post or a man. When he says, "It is either a post or a man," it is a case of doubtful perception (*saṁśayam*=*aiyam*). Secondly, valid perception is also different from erroneous perception (*bhrama*=*viparyaya* =*tirivu*) in which one object is wrongly perceived as something different, *e.g.* a rope as a snake. Thirdly, it is also different from indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*). The way in which Aruḷnandi brings out the nature of indeterminate perception is significant. He says that *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* is "பொருளின் உண்மை மாத்திரத்தின் விண்டலில்லா அறிவு" which means cognition of the nature of an object without its differentiating features. Issues connected with *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* will be examined later. What is necessary to point out at this stage is that, according to the commentators on the *Siddhiyār*, when something is perceived in a general way without noticing its specific nature, it is indeterminate perception. Explaining Aruḷnandi's statement, Śivāgrayogin says that indeterminate perception is *sāmānya-pratyakṣa* which is different from the perception of an object as such-

and-such with its name, class feature, etc. He adds that the latter is valid perception.[2] Śivāgrayogin says that doubtful and erroneous perception are *pratyakṣa ābhāsa, i.e.* pseudo-perception; and so they are different from valid perception. A perception in which the given object is not known to be such-and-such in a determinate way is not worth anything; and so indeterminate perception which does not fulfil the criterion of a valid perception must be grouped along with doubtful and erroneous perception.

After differentiating *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa,* which alone is valid, from doubtful, erroneous and indeterminate perception, Aruḷnandi speaks of four kinds of perception (v. 10)—*indriya-pratyakṣa, mānasa-pratyakṣa, svavedana-pratyakṣa* and *yoga-pratyakṣa.* A brief explanation of each of these four kinds of perception will suffice to understand the principle of classification followed by Aruḷnandi. *Indriya-pratyakṣa* is sense-perception in which an external object is perceived by the *cit-śakti* passing through the senses. Commentators other than Śivāgrayogin hold the view that *indriya-pratyakṣa* is indeterminate perception. This difference of opinion arises because, while Śivāgrayogin reads the relevant text of the *Siddhiyār* as "செயிரின்றி விகற்பமோடு", others read it as "செயிரொடு விகற்பமின்றி".[3] *Mānsa-pratyakṣa* is determinate perception of an object as such-and-such through reflection on what is presented by the senses. Though *buddhi* plays the decisive role in this perception, it is still called *mānasa-pratyakṣa* since this process of perception started with the functioning of the mind going through the stages of *doubt* with regard to the nature of the object, *desire* to know what it is, and determination to ascertain its nature by noticing its class and other properties.[4] While *svavedana-pratyakṣa* is perception of pleasure and pain, *yoga-pratyakṣa* which is perception of things without restriction of place and time is super-normal perception. There are two points which require consideration here. If *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* alone is valid, *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa,* its nature being what it is, cannot be considered to be valid by the Siddhāntin. It may be noted that the denial of validity to indeterminate perception will not be detrimental to the epistemological as well as metaphysical standpoint of the Siddhāntin.[5] So it may be said that Aruḷnandi first of all classifies perception into valid and invalid by identifying the first as *savikalpaka* and placing *nirvikalpaka,* doubt and error under the second category.

Secondly, he gives another classification of perception into normal and super-normal. While *indriya-pratyakṣa*, *mānasa-pratyakṣa* and *svavedana-pratyakṣa* come under the first category, *yoga-pratyakṣa* comes under the second category. Assuming that *indriya-pratyakṣa* is indeterminate perception, it can be said that the object perceived through normal perception may be an undifferentiated one (as in the case of *indriya-pratyakṣa*) or a differentiated entity (as in the case of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*), or subjective states of pleasure and pain (as in the case of *svavedana-pratyakṣa*).

If we follow Śivāgrayogin's commentary on the *Siddhiyār*, we will have a different classification. Aruḷnandi first of all classifies perception into valid and invalid—*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* alone being valid and others consisting of doubt, error, and indeterminate perception being invalid—and then divides *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* into four, *viz.* *indriya-pratyakṣa*, *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, *svavedana-pratyakṣa* and *yoga-pratyakṣa.*[6] Though the *Siddhiyār* enumerates four kinds of perception, Śivāgrayogin remarks that the third one, *i.e.* *svavedana*, in this list can be subsumed under the second, *i.e* *mānasa*, in order to reconcile this list with the one found in the *Pauṣkara Āgama* according to which perception is of three kinds.

In the *Śaiva paribhūṣā*, Śivāgrayogin explains the different kinds of perception closely following the *Pauṣkara Āgama*. After defining perception as immediate knowledge (*sākṣātkāri-pramā*), he classifies it into two kinds — *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*. While the former is the cognition of the mere object (*vastumātram*) bereft of name, class, and other features, the latter is the cognition of an object along with name, class and other features. It may be noted that Śivāgrayogin does not say here that *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* alone is valid though he holds this view following the *Siddhiyār* in his commentary thereon. *Savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* is of three kinds — *indriya-pratyakṣa*, *mānasa-pratyakṣa* and *cit-pratyakṣa*. The first one is the cognition of an external object by *cit-śakti* with the help of the senses. In the second one, the object presented by the external sense is contemplated by *cit-śakti* taking the assistance of the mind which is the internal organ. The third one is the immediate cognition of one's self (*svātmāparokṣa-jñāna*) by *cit-śakti* without seeking the help of the external sense and the internal organ.[7]

III

There are two issues to be considered in connection with *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* as presented by the Siddhāntin. While one of them relate to its stage, the other is about its validity. According to the Siddhāntin, determinate perception is always preceded by indeterminate perception. On this issue, the Siddhāntin's position is the same as that of the Naiyāyika. Why is it that the Siddhāntin holds that indeterminate perception comes first and that determinate perception follows it? First of all, the object is perceived in a general way as "some thing" without its differentiating features, though all these features are present even then. From the fact that the differentiating features are not perceived in the first stage one should not conclude that they are non-existent at that time. If they are really non-existent, they can never exist and be apprehended subsequently, for what is non-existent earlier can never be existent subsequently and what is existent at a later stage must have existed earlier, implicitly or in an unmanifest form. This is in accordance with the *satkārya-vāda* to which the Siddhāntin is committed. Explaining the relation between *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* and *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, Śivajñānayogin says that the former is the cause of the latter, and that what is implicit in the cause becomes explicit in the effect.[8]

The Siddhāntin's view that *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* follows *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* cannot be accepted. This objection also holds good against the Naiyāyika, the Mīmāṁsaka, and the Viśiṣṭādvaitin all of whom hold that *nirvikalpaka* is followed by *savikalpaka*, even though they may differ from one another in the interpretation of certain features of *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*. There is substantial agreement between the Naiyāyika and the Siddhāntin in the explanation of the nature of *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*. Earlier reference was made to the definition of *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* as given in the *Siddhiyār*. "பொருளின் உண்மை மாத்திரத்தின் விண்டலில்லா அறிவு" is *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, according to the *Siddhiyār*. Śivāgrayogin defines it as "*nāma-jātyādiyojanāhīnaṁ vastumātrāvagāhi jñānam.*" The Naiyāyika explains it as *niṣprakāra-jñāna*, *i. e.* knowledge of an object as not characterised in any way, as *vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhi*, *i.e.* non-relational. It may be noted that even the Advaitin defines it as knowledge of an object without relation to its differentiating features, (*samsargānavagāhi jñānam*). There is nothing in the definition given by the Siddhāntin and others to suggest that *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* should precede *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*. All that is emphasised in the definition is that *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* is knowledge of the "mere object" (*vastumātram*) without its name, class, etc. If so, this knowledge can occur after *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*. Consider the following case. When, on seeing a person whom I am able to identify, I say, "This is David," it is a case of *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, because it is perceptual knowledge of an object as characterized by name. That is to say, it is relational knowledge of the given object (*vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi-jñānam*), and so the Naiyāyika, the Mīmāṁsaka, the Siddhāntin and the Advaitin agree that it is *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*. Let us suppose that the same person, David, is seen by me for the second time in a different place and context. And on perceiving him for the second time, I say, "This is that David." Here, I have knowledge of the identity or oneness of the person whom I perceive. When I say "This is that David," I *intend* to convey the identity or oneness of the person *as such* without reference to place, time, context and other features which are the determinants. The person who was seen earlier in a certain place and in a certain context is identical with the one whom I see now, at this place, and in this context. The two sets of determinants, *viz*. time, place, and context, which qualify David are different; and so when I perceive the identity or oneness of David and give expression to it in the form of a judgement, "This is that David," the two sets of determinants which are the differentiating features are not taken note of. Since it is a case of apprehension of the "mere object" (*vastumātram*) as not characterized in any way (*niṣprakārakam*), it is *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*; and the judgement through which this knowledge is conveyed is called identity judgement. Here the relational judgement, "This is David," which expresses *savikalpaka* knowledge is followed by the identity judgement, "This is that David," which conveys *nirvikalpaka* knowledge. Therefore, it is wrong to say that *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* precedes *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*. There is nothing in the definition of *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* as given by the Siddhāntin to justify this claim.[9]

The issue of validity of *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* may be considered now. The *Siddhīyar*, we have noted, defines valid perception (மாசு அறு காட்சி) as knowledge, free from doubt and error, of an object with its differentiating features (விகற்பமுன்னு=சவிகற்பகமாக). This definition excludes validity to *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* on the ground that it is not knowledge of an object with its differentiating features such as name, class, quality, function and worth. M. Tiruvilangam, a modern commentator on the *Siddhiyār*, after bringing out the meaning of the text, points out in the explanatory note that, since the nature of the given object as it is is not apprehended not only by doubtful and erroneous perception but also by *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, all these three are invalid perception.[10]

The Siddhāntin is not justified in denying validity to *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*. The real issue which is involved here is whether the knowledge at the *nirvikalpaka* stage is definite or not; and if it can be shown to be definite, there is no reason why it should not be accorded validity. The Siddhāntin proceeds on the assumption that *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* gives us knowledge of an object which is not determined to be such-and-such and that it is not, therefore, definite knowledge (*niścaya-jñāna*) to be relied on for the purpose of transacting any business. Also, his understanding that *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* is prior to *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* made him think that the former gives us only indefinite knowledge which cannot be the basis for any action. For one thing, the way in which he defines *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* does not warrant him to hold this view. He calls it as "*vastumātra-jñāna*," "பொருளின் உண்மைமாத்திரத்தின் விண்டலில்லா அறிவு." Such a knowledge is as definite as *savikalpaka* knowledge. Secondly, from the analysis given above of the nature of *nirvikalpaka* knowledge conveyed by the judgement, "This is that David," it is obvious (1) that knowledge at the *nirvikalpaka* stage involves judgement which can be expressed through language, (2) that it is definite, (3) that we can act on the basis of *nirvikalpaka* knowledge, and (4) that the judgement which conveys this knowledge has truth value.

IV

The Siddhāntin does admit perceptual error. It will be of interest to consider how he accounts for it in the light of his theory of perception and classification of the different kinds of perception. This problem, in spite of its importance, has not been discussed elaborately in the Siddhānta works. In the course of the explanation of the nature of error (*viparyaya*) Umāpati discusses, though briefly, this problem in his commentary on the *Pauṣkara Āgama*. It is said that the Siddhāntin, like the Naiyāyika, advocates *anyathā-khyāti* for the purpose of the explanation of perceptual error.[11] This, of course, does not mean that the Siddhāntin follows the Naiyāyika both in the explanation of the nature of perception and the classification of the different kinds of perception.

While the Naiyāyika explains perception in terms of sense-object contact,[12] the Siddhāntin does not do so, because mere sense-object contact without the functioning of *cit-śakti* cannot, according to him, produce perceptual knowledge. Śivāgrayogin, as stated earlier, defines perception as immediate knowledge (*sākṣātkāri-pramā*). It may be noted that this definition which will overcome the objections raised against the definition of perception as given in the old school of the Nyāya is in agreement with the one given by the Prābhākaras and Advaitins.[13] Though the *yoga-pratyakṣa* of the Siddhāntin is similar to *yogaja* of the Naiyāyika inasmuch as both of them are super-normal or extraordinary—what the Naiyāyika calls as *alaukika*—the Siddhāntin does not admit *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and *jñānalakṣaṇa* which are two other kinds of *alaukika-pratyakṣa* accepted by the Naiyāyika. In fact, the Siddhāntin is not favourably disposed towards the six kinds of sense-object contact[14] admitted by the Naiyāyika. It is true that Śivāgrayogin, following the *Pauṣkara Āgama*, refers to these six kinds of sense-object contact both in the *Śaiva-paribhāṣā* and his commentary on the *Siddhiyār*. If the *Pauṣkara Āgama* or any Siddhāntin refers to them, it does not mean acceptance of them. It is just a re-statement of what has been accepted by other schools. The standpoint of the Siddhānta in all these respects, declares Śivajñānayogin, must be ascertained from *Āgamas* such as *Sarvajñānottara*, which highlight the special features of Śaiva Siddhānta.[15] Whatever may be the differences between the Naiyāyika and the Siddhāntin in these respects, the latter, it appears, cannot explain perceptual error as *anyathā-khyāti* without admitting *jñānalakṣaṇa* as the Naiyāyika does. Whether the explanation of perceptual error through *jñānalakṣaṇa* perception is satisfactory, is an altogether different question which will be taken up for consideration in the sequel.

The *Pauṣkara Āgama* says that *viparyaya* is cognition of a given object as other than what it is (*anyathā-jñānam*). Or, when a quality which does not belong to a given object is seen as a quality of that object (*atadrūpa-pratiṣṭhitam*), it is *viparyaya*.[16] Let us consider the stock example of mistaking a piece of shell for silver in order to see how the

Naiyāyika explains perceptual error. Though the object in front is only a shell, the silver which is elsewhere (or silverness which is the specific quality of silver which is elsewhere) is associated with the given object, which is seen only in a general way as "this", resulting in error. The object in front which is seen in a general way as "this" is real (*sat*). The silver which is elsewhere is also real (*sat*). Error arises as a result of the synthesis of what is elsewhere with what is in front. But, how is it, it may be asked, that what is elsewhere is perceived in unity with the object in front? By invoking *jñānalakṣaṇa*, which is *alaukika-pratyakṣa*, the Naiyāyika answers this question. There is normal sense-object relation in respect of the object in front; and there is extra-normal sense-object relation, what the Naiyāyika calls *jñānalakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti*, in respect of the silver which is far away. The elsewhere existent silver with which the person is in contact through *jñānalakṣaṇa* is seen in relation with the object in front, and hence there is the cognition, "This is silver." This is how the Naiyāyika accounts for perceptual error; and this mode of explanation is known as *anyathā-khyāti*. Umāpati in his commentary on the relevant text of the *Pauṣkara Āgama*, which explains the nature of *viparyaya*, justifies *anyathā-khyāti* by answering first of all the objections raised against it by the advocates of the theory of *akhyāti*. Following this, he examines and rejects the explanation of perceptual error offered by the followers of Madhva and Rāmānuja, and then by the Vijñānavādins and the Advaitins. Since the Siddhāntin favours *anyathā-khyāti*, it is enough if we consider here how Umāpati justifies it.

It will be useful to identify the important features present in the problem of perceptual error for the purpose of evaluating the soundness of the explanation offered therefor. First of all, as in the case of veridical perception, even in erroneous perception there is a *cognitum* (*viṣaya*) which is the objective reference to which the cognition is related. Secondly, the cognitum which is seen in erroneons perception is immediate (*aparokṣa*). What distinguishes perception from inference and other sources of knowledge is its immediacy. Thirdly, there is cognition (*pratīti*) of the object as existing then and there; *e.g.* the perceptual cognition is in the form, "This is silver." Fourthly, the sublating cognition (*bādhaka-jñāna*) which follows denies the immediate presence of the cognitum and disproves the claim made by the earlier cognition, *e.g.* it is in the form, "This is not silver, but shell." Any theory of perceptual error, to be acceptable, must explain the above features noticeable in perceptual error.

In the course of the refutation of *akhyāti*, Umāpati points out that non-apprehension of difference (*bheda-agraha*) between two objects does not and cannot explain why and how a certain object which is in front is wrongly perceived as something different. Error that takes place is positive and not negative. It is not a case of *failure* to notice the difference between two objects. On the contrary, it is a case of wrongly *perceiving* the given object as such-and-such, as shown by the cognition, "This is silver." In other words, the cognition which arises here is *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, *i.e.* the cognition of the object as characterized by a specific quality—the "this" as possessing "silverness"; and on the basis of this *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* the person, let us say, preforms a certain act—the act of stooping with a view to pick up the object. In the absence of *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* it is impossible to account for the subsequent activity (*pravṛtti*) both in veridical and erroneous perception. The object in front, let us say, is silver. Seeing it as silver, a person tries to pick it up. Here *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* is the cause of the *pravṛtti* which follows it. In the other case also, though the object in front is only a shell, a person perceives it as silver, and on the basis of this *viśiṣṭā-jñāna*, he performs some activity. It follows that perceptual error, which is positive, takes place not because of *bheda-agrahaṇa* (non-apprehension of difference), but because of *anyathā-grahaṇa* (otherwise-cognition, *i.e.* wrong cognition). Also, it will be obvious that the object in front must have been apprehended earlier as such-and-such, *i.e.* in association with a specific nature. For example, the object in front (shell) must have been apprehended as silver. If this be not the case, then the sublating cognition which follows will be meaningless, for what is apprehended alone can be denied. So on the strength of the sublating cognition, we have to say that earlier there must have been *viśiṣṭa-jñāna*, and not just *bheda-agrahaṇa* as claimed by the advocates of the theory of *akhyāti*. So Umāpati concludes that the theory of *akhyāti* championed by the Prābhākaras and others is untenable.

How does Umāpati, the Siddhāntin, who favours *anyathā-khyāti* account for the *viśiṣṭa-jñāna* in this case, *i.e.* the cognition of the shell which is in front as silver, even though silver which is elsewhere cannot be contacted by the visual sense? His answer is that contact with the "elsewhere silver" can be explained in terms of *jñānalakṣaṇa*, which is a super-normal perception accepted by the Naiyāyika, or in terms of some special defect (*doṣa-viśeṣa*) which is responsible for relating the "elsewhere silver" with the object in front.[17] But neither explanation is satisfactory. First of all, is the Siddhāntin justified in invoking *jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa* for solving the problem? The answer is in the negative. What is possible for the Naiyāyika is not possible for the Siddhāntin, the reason being that while the former has a built-in provision for this mode of explanation in the very classification of super-normal perception (*alaukika-pratyakṣa*), the latter cannot adopt this mode of analysis without accepting *jñānalakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa.*[18] To resort to *jñānalakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa* just for the purpose of tackling the difficulty of sense-contact with a distant object, is a case of *deus ex machina*. Even if the Siddhāntin resorts to this way of explanation in terms of *jñāna-lakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa* following the Naiyāyika, his explanation is not satisfactory, for the objections raised against the Nyāya theory of *anyathā-khyāti* also hold good against him. It is enough if we consider the problem in the context of the sublating cognition (*bādhaka-jñāna*), *e.g.* "This is not silver, but shell," which follows the cognition, "This is silver." The sublating cognition purports to deny that the object in front ("this") is silver. To put it differently: it denies the presence of silver in front. If the "elsewhere silver" is perceived as claimed by the Naiyāyika and the Siddhāntin, then the sublating cognition must deny the "elsewhere silver" and not the silver in front. Inasmuch as the sublating cognition denies only the presence of silver in front, it is obvious that the contention that the "elsewhere silver" is in sense-contact through *jñānalakṣaṇa* is not satisfactory.[19]

Nor can the Siddhāntin account for the perception of the "elsewhere silver" by invoking the help of some "special defect" (*doṣa-viśeṣa*). It is intelligible to say that an object which is in front and is fit enough to be perceived under normal conditions is not perceived as it is, but is wrongly perceived as something different, due to some defect such as *prameya-doṣa*, *pramātṛ-doṣa* and *pramāṇa-doṣa*. But to say that what is elsewhere in a distant place can be an object of perception due to the work of "some defect" is not at all convincing. Indeed, a defect, being a hindrance, can disable perception, or decrease its efficacy; it cannot increase its efficacy or confer a special power on it such that a far off thing becomes an object of perception.

V

The Siddhāntin relies upon the evidence of perception to prove not only the existence of the pluralistic universe, but also its reality. Since his position in this regard is diametrically opposed to that of the Advaitin, he is constrained to review and then reject the arguments of the Advaitin, as they are not acceptable to him. In the Siddhānta polemics against Advaita, only those issues which relate to the evidence of perception will be examined here. Śivajñānayogin discusses this problem in detail in his *Śivajñāna-pāḍiyam.*[20] He first of all re-states elaborately the standpoint of Advaita calling it "the view of *Māyā-vāda*" and then refutes it. Śivāgrayogin in his *Śaiva-paribhāṣā* takes up this problem in the context of vindicating the reality of *māyā.*[21] If the world of diversity is shown to be real, then *māyā* which is its cause must be real. It is in this context that Śivāgrayogin examines the Advaita view which holds that difference (*bheda*) is not real and that consequently the world of diversity is not real, as there is no evidence of perception (*pratyakṣa*) and other *pramāṇas* therefor. Reference may be made to another Siddhānta work, the *Ratnatraya*, in which the Advaita position is stated and criticized with reference to the evidence of perception.[22] It will be of interest to note that Aghora Śivācārya, the commentator on the *Ratnatraya*, quotes a line from Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi* when he re-states the Advaita position for the purpose of refutation.[23] The method of argument pursued in all these works against Advaita on this issue is the same. In fact, if we compare the arguments presented by Śivāgrayogin and Śivajñānayogin on this issue, they are almost identical, though the latter is much more detailed in his criticism than the former.

Maṇḍana says that perception by its very nature can only reveal an object; it cannot show the difference between one object and another. That is to say, it can reveal a pot; but it cannot distinguish a pot from a cloth. His statement which occurs in the *Brahmasiddhi*, "*āhurvidhātṛ pratyakṣam, na niṣedhṛ vipascitaḥ*" has become classic. It is frequently quoted in the Advaita tradition as the most authoritative statement which brings out the nature of *pratyakṣa*. It is also referred to, directly or indirectly, by the critics of Advaita for the purpose of refutation. Aghora Śivācārya, in fact, quotes the entire line in his commentary on the relevant text of the *Ratnatraya*. Śivāgrayogin also refers to this when he says, in the course of presenting the *pūrvapakṣa*, that *pratyakṣa* (according to the Advaitin) being *vidhi-viṣayaka* cannot comprehend difference.[24] Again, Śivajñānayogin in the course of the statement of the Advaita position, refers to this point emphasised by Maṇḍana without mentioning his name,[25] and supplements it by others which are relevant in this context. The Advaita position, as presented by Śivajñānayogin, can be summarised as follows.

(1) Though perception can reveal the world which is existent at present, it cannot prove that the world is real all the time—past, present, and future.

(2) Perception can reveal an object as a pot, as a cloth, and so on; but it cannot distinguish one object from another such that we can say in the form of negation: "This object is not a cloth," "This object is not a pot," etc.

(3) Difference is not possible without negation. In order to differentiate one object from another, say a cow from a horse, one object must be negated from the other. We establish the difference between a cow and a horse by negating the horse from the cow. So the notion of difference involves negation. But negation of one thing from another will not be possible without presupposing difference. Thus, there will arise the defect of *anyonyāśraya*.

(4) *Savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, which may be cited as the evidence for the existence of a diversity of things, is not valid.

(5) Since perception is not the *pramāṇa* for the existence of the world of difference, *anumāna* and *śabda* also are not the *pramāṇas* therefor.

(6) Even if it be said that *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* is valid, it will not prove the reality of difference (*bheda*), because (i) cognition of difference is not possible without the cognition of oneness; (ii) only what is affirmed can be denied; (see Maṇḍana's statement, "*vidhānamanteraṇāto na niṣedhasya sambhavaḥ.*"[26]) (iii) oneness or *abheda* which comes first must be accepted as valid; and (iv) since *bheda* which comes later is dependent on *abheda*, it is not valid.

(7) Since the cognition of difference is not valid, the world of difference does not really exist.

(8) Even if the cognition of difference and its cognitum, *viz.*, *bheda-prapañca*, are accepted as existent, their relation cannot be

figured out. That is to say, their relation cannot be explained through any of the following relations: (i) *tādātmya*, (ii) cause-effect relation, (iii) *saṁyoga*, (iv) *samavāya*, and (v) *viṣaya-viṣayi* relation.

Śivāgrayogin closely follows the *Pauṣkara Āgama* in refuting the Advaita argument which centres round the nature and evidence of perception. It is his contention that perception which follows doubt does apprehend difference. A person, let us say, is doubtful whether the object he perceives is a post or a man. Subsequently he perceives the object as a post excluding the other alternative. The perceptual knowledge he has at this stage may be expressed in the form, "This is a post and not a man." Since this perceptual knowledge arises by eliminating one of the alternatives, it is not only the post which is the object of perception, but also the difference between the post and the man. Śivajñānayogin, too, criticises the Advaita view in the same way. First of all, the argument of both Śivāgrayogin and Śivajñānayogin is vitiated by the unwarranted assumption that perception in a determinate way is always preceded by doubtful perception. This, however, is not the case. We do straightaway, without passing through the stage of doubt, perceive an object as such-and-such, *i.e.* as a pot, as a cloth, and so on. Even if they do not hold as a general rule that determinate perception is always preceded by doubtful perception, the way in which they argue in the present case giving the illustration shows that they do admit cases of determinate perception which follows doubt. Even then, can it be said that perception apprehends not only a given object, but also its difference from another object? This will take us to the second objection against both Śivāgrayogin and Śivajñānayogin. Here we have to consider Maṇḍana's view that perception by its very nature can only reveal an object and that it cannot distinguish one object from another.

Maṇḍana's analysis of the several issues involved in defending his thesis is not only detailed, but also elaborate. However, there is hardly any attempt either by Śivāgrayogin or by Śivajñānayogin to refute Maṇḍana's specific arguments. Aghora Śivācārya who quotes Maṇḍana's statement does not even attempt any refutation of it. It will be useful to identify, following Maṇḍana, the different possibilities that one can think of with regard to the work of perception. Maṇḍana enumerates the following five alternatives: (1) perception reveals an object; (2) it distinguishes one object from others; (3) it simultaneously reveals and distinguishes it from others; (4) it first distinguishes one object from others, and then reveals the nature of the object; and (5) it first reveals an object, and then distinguishes it from others.[27] Maṇḍana argues that the work of perception is restricted to manifesting an object; and of the five alternatives mentioned above only the first is tenable according to him. Even granting that perception in a determinate way is preceded by doubt, as stated by both Śivāgrayogin and Śivajñānayogin, perception can only reveal an object as such-and-such. In the present case it reveals the object in front as a post; and its work comes to an end after giving the knowledge of the object. The knowledge of difference, *i.e.* the knowledge that the object in front is not a man, is not conveyed by perception.[28] To say that difference is perceived without showing how perception is capable of perceiving it, is a dogmatic assertion.

The Advaitin holds that, since the notion of difference cannot be proved by perception and other *pramāṇas*, it is not valid. Though we speak of difference and also carry on our day-to-day business of life on this presupposition, it cannot be justified by any *pramāṇa*. As the Advaitin would put it, difference is *prasiddha*, but not *pramāṇa-siddha*. The Advaitin, therefore, holds that the cognition of difference (*bheda-jñāna=savikalpaka-jñāna*) is illusory. Since it is illusory, the world of diversity which we claim to perceive is also illusory. It may be noted that when the Advaitin says that the pluralistic universe is illusory, he does not mean that the world is totally non-existent (*asat*) like the sky-flower. It does not follow from this that the world, according to him, is real (*sat*). What is real can never suffer sublation. But since the world suffers sublation at the time of Brahman-realization, the Advaitin says that it is not *sat*.

The Advaita argument that *bheda-jñāna* (=*savikalpaka-jñāna*) is illusory is not acceptable to the Siddhāntin. When it is decided through shape and hollowness that the given object is only a post, the object is what it is, and it does not suffer any sublation (*bādha*). Also, my cognition of it as a post is not subject to correction. If so, how can it be said, asks Śivāgrayogin, that *bheda-jñāna* as well as the world of diversity is illusory?[29] This objection completely ignores what is urged by the Advaitin. It is true that the sublation that takes place in the case of rope-snake illusion is well-known to us. And this sublation arises only when one gets the knowledge of the substratum, *e.g.* the rope. This argument, the Advaitin says, holds good even in the case of the things of the empircal world. At the onest of Brahman-knowledge, the empirical world gets sublated, and the knower of Brahman, as the *Upaniṣad* says, sees everything as Brahman.[80] Since there is sublation for the world of plurality, Advaita holds that the empirical world is illusory, in the same way as the rope-snake is illusory. From this one should not draw the conclusion that the Advaitin does not make any distinction between the things of the empirical world and the objects of erroneous perception. The truth is that the Advaitin does not mix them up, though both of them in a very important sense are *mithyā*. With a view to draw a practical distinction between them, the Advaitin calls the objects of erroneous perception (as well as dream objects) as *prātibhāsika* and the objects of the empirical world as *vyāvahārika*. The solid material tree which is *vyāvahārika* does suffer sublation in the state of Brahman-realization in the same way as a dream object suffers sublation in the state of awakening.

Śivajñānayogin claims that perception proves the reality of the world, because the object of valid perception is apprehended in the same way at different times. For example, in the case of veridical perception I see a tree as a tree; and it is seen as a tree subsequently also. But this is not the case in erroneous perception. Though a rope is seen as a snake now, it is seen as a rope a little later. Considering the nature of valid perception we have to say, so Śivajñānayogin argues, that the world comprising a plurality of objects is real. This argument is not satisfactory. It does not come to grips with the real issue that is involved here. The Advaitin admits that, unlike the rope-snake, an empirical object which is "public" remains the same to the same individual at different times and to different individuals at the same time. That is why he calls it *vyāvahārika* with a view to differentiate it from an object which is *prātibhāsika*. Notwithstanding this, he says it is not real because it is subject to sublation, and what is real (*sat*) will not be subject to sublation. A tree is a tree so long as the state of *vyavahāra* continues; but it ceases to be a tree at the time of Brhman-intuition. In other words, even an empirical object, the Advaitin urges, does not remain the same all the time. Consequently, Śivajñānayogin's other claim that an empirical object which is real now will be real at other times as well cannot be accepted. It is well-known that a pot prior to its production was clay and that after destruction it becomes pot-sherds; and so it does not ramain the same. If it be said that clay which is the essence of pot remains the same all the time, whether it is in the lump-like shape, or the pot-shape, or the shape of broken pieces, the same argument holds good even for the Advaitin. What exists is Brahman all the time, though in the *vyāvahārika* state it appears as the world, in the same way as clay appears as pot. Pot and other objects which are *kalpita* have no nature of their own, no existence of their own, other than that of the substratum (*e.g.* clay in the case of pot) on which they are superimposed. This is the truth conveyed by the *vācārambhaṇa* text of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad.*[31]

The problem of chronological priority of *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* over *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* and the presence of the differentiating features in *nirvikalpaka* in an implicit or unnoticed form which Śivajñānayogin discusses in order to show that the reality of difference must be admitted by the Advaitin, have already been dealt with. However, two other objections which he raises may be considered. One of them relates to *bheda-jñāna* and its relation to *abheda-jñāna*. Invoking the principle that what is affirmed alone can be denied, Śivajñānayogin argues that, since the Advaitin denies *bheda-jñāna*, the prior experience of *bheda-jñāna* must be admitted by him. This objection is really ineffective. The acceptance of the experience of *bheda* which gets sublated subsequently is not detrimental to the Advaitin. Just as there is the cognition of the rope-snake, even so there is the cognition of difference; and both of them, the Advaitin says, suffer sublation because they are not *pramāṇa-siddha*. The very fact that they are sublated is conclusive evidence to show that the cognition in these two cases — snake in the case of the rope-snake cognition, and difference in the case of the cognition of difference — is not real. This is exactly what the Advaitin has been arguing. The Advaitin does not say that we do not experience *bheda*. He only insists that it is no more valid than the experience of the rope-snake on the strength of the sublating cognition (*bādhaka-jāñna*) which follows.

The second objection is about the relation between *bheda-jñāna* and *abheda-jñāna*. While the Advaitin holds that *bheda-jñāna* presupposes, and is dependent on, the cognition of the object as one, Śivajñānayogin, reversing this relation, argues that *abheda-jñāna* also is dependent on *bheda-jñāna*. Let us first analyse the nature of *bheda-jñāna*. We have already said that the notion of difference involves negation. For example, when I say, "The cow is not a horse," the notion of difference conveyed by my statement carries a reference to two objects, *viz.* cow and horse; and the one is differentiated from the other through negation, *i.e.* by negating the horse from the cow. It means that I must have known the cow and the horse earlier such that I could say, "The cow is not a horse." In other words, without the prior knowledge of *pratiyogin* (counter-correlate) and *anuyogin* (correlate), difference which involves negation is not possible. The knowledge of cow as such, of horse as such, is *abheda-jñāna* which is presupposed by *bheda-jñāna*. In simple language, the notion of "two" presupposes the notion of "one". This being the case, it is not clear as to how Śivajñānayogin could reverse the relation and argue that *ābheda-jñāna*, too, is dependent on *bheda-jñāna*. Further, the Advaitin does not say that *abheda-jñāna* is valid just because it comes first. Validity of a cognition is never decided on the basis of chronological priority. If that were the case, snake-cognition (*sarpa-jñāna*) (in the case of rope-snake illusion) could as well be valid, because it precedes rope-cognition (*rajju-jñāna*). Advaita holds that *abheda-jñāna* is valid because it remains unsublated.[32]

If validity of a cognition is decided on the basis of unsublatability or non-contradiction, Śivajñānayogin suggests that *bheda-jñāna* alone should be judged valid and not *abheda-jñāna*. Consider the cognition, "A cloth is different from a pot." Śivajñānayogin says that, since this cognition of difference remains the same all the time, it is valid. But the cognition of a person who says, "A cloth is not different from a pot," gets sublated in the future, and so being subject to change, it is not valid, according to him. Though this argument *prima facie* appears to be plausible, it is not tenable. Śivajñānayogin chooses to be conveniently vague without specifying the sense in which a cloth and a pot are said to be different or non-different.[33] One can argue that they are different or non-different by applying different principles or criteria. If I pay attention to form, colour, or utility of both pot and cloth, I could say that they are different. On the contray, I could also say that they are non-different as substance (*dravya*). Even though I say at the present moment that "A cloth is different from a pot," I might as well say due to a change of perspective in the future that they are non-different. The same argument *mutatis mutandis* holds good in the case of the cognition, "A cloth is not different from a pot." To argue for a position in terms of deliberate generality smacks of sophistry.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. "மாசறு காட்சி ஐயந் திரிவின்றி விகற்ப முன்ஞ
   ஆசு அற அறிவதாகும்."
2. "புத்தி தத்துவத்தைக் கூட்டி நாம ஜாதியாதி விசேடத்தோடு காண்பது பிரத்தியட்சம் ..நாமம் ஜாதி குணம் கன்மம் வஸ்து என்னும் ஐவகையும் பகுத்தறிவது நல்ல பிரத்தியட்சம்."
3. See V. A. Devasenapathi, *Śaiva Siddhānta* (University of Madras, Reprinted, 1974), p. 29, footnote 26.
4. See Śivajñānayogin, *Śivajñāna-pāḍiyam* (The South India Saiva Siddhanta Works Publishing House, Madras-1, 1968), pp. 188-189.
5. Determinate perception is dependent on indeterminate perception without requiring its validity.
6. The Nyāya school holds that the content of super-normal perception (*alaukika-pratyakṣa*) is *savikalpaka*. See S. C. Chatterjee, *The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge* (University of Calcutta, 1978), p. 189.
7. See *Śaivaparibhāṣā of Śivāgrayogin*, Ed. R. Balasubramanian and V. K. S. N. Raghavan (Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1982), pp. 12-15.
8. See his *Śivajñāna-pāḍiyam*, p. 151.
9. See R. Balasubramanian, *Some Problems in the Epistemology and Metaphysics of Rāmānuja* (The Professor L. Venkataratnam Endowment Lectures 1975-76, University of Madras, Madras, 1978), pp. 9-10, for the discussion on the *nirvikalpaka-savikalpaka* distinction with reference to Nyāya, Advaita, and Viśiṣṭādvaita.

10. M. Tiruvilangam (Ed.), *Śivajñāna-siddhiyar Supakkam* (The Jaffna Co-operative Tamil Books Publication and Sales Society Limited, Jaffna, Second Edition, 1971), p. 18.

11. K. Vajravelu Mudaliar holds the view that the Siddhānta theory of perceptual error may be called *sādṛśya-khyāti*. See p.121 of the present Volume. His explanation cannot be accepted for two reasons. First of all, his explanation without answering the problem begs the question. That there is similarity, *e.g.* between shell and silver, is accepted by all the schools which seek to explain this problem of perceptual error. In this case, similarity is one of the contributory factors for the occurrence of error. The real issue here is not the perception of similarity (*sādṛśya*), but the perception of one thing as another on the basis of similarity for which explanation is required. To say that this is a case of *sādṛśya-khyāti* is no answer to the problem. Secondly, there is an unwarranted assumption that perceptual error arises only in those cases of objects where there is similarity. In the case of a white conch which is perceived as yellow, there is no similarity between the whiteness of the conch and yellowness. Nevertheless, error does arise. It is obvious that the term "*sādṛśya-khyāti*" can never be applied to cases of error which arise in spite of the absence of similarity between two objects.

12. See *Nyāya-sūtra*, 1.1.4.; also *Tarka-saṅgraha*, Section on Perception: "*indriyārthaksannikarṣa-janyaṁ jñānaṁ pratyakṣam.*"

13. It may be noted that the modern school of the Nyāya objects to the definition of perception in terms of sense-object contact. Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* defines perception in terms of its immediacy. He says: "*pratyakṣasya sākṣātkāritvam lakṣaṇam.*" See S.C. Chatterjee, *The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 126-127.

14. These are: (1) *saṁyoga*, (2) *saṁyukta-samavāya*, (3) *saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*, (4) *samavāya*, (5) *samaveta-samavāya*; and (6) *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*.

15. See Śivajñānayogin, *Śivajñāna-pāḍiyam*, p. 363; also M. Tiruvilangam's commentary on the *Siddhiyār*, p. 27: "சையோகம்

முதலிய இவ்வாறும் சித்தாந்தத்திற்கு உடன்பாடலனவாயினும் பிறர் மதம் பற்றி எடுத்து வழங்கப்படுகின்றன."

16. *Pauṣkara Āgama, sūtra* 845: "*viparyayo'nyathājñānam atadrūpa-pratiṣṭhitam.*"

17. See his commentary on the *Pauṣkara Āgama, sūtra* 845: "*jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣasya doṣaviśeṣarūpa-sannikarṣasya vā kalpanāt.*

18. The Siddhāntin does not accept *jñānalakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa.* The only super-normal perception he accepts is *yoga-pratyakṣa.*

19. See R. Balasubramanian, *Advaita Vedanta* (Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1976), pp. 57-64 for a detailed criticism of *anyathā-khyāti* of the Naiyāyikas as well as *viparīta-khyāti* of the Bhāṭṭas, which is very close to *anyathā-khyāti.*

20 *op.cit.*, pp. 148-150.

21. *op.cit.*, pp. 193-194.

22. *Ratnatraya* with Aghora Śivācārya's commentary, Ed. N. Krishna Sastri (Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam, 1925), vv. 206-210, 224-225.

23. See his commentary on v. 207. The text reads: *sā vidhātrī padārthānāṁ na niṣedhati kiñcana.*" The line he quotes from Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi* is: *āhurvidhātṛ pratyaṣkam na niṣedhṛ vipaścitaḥ.*" See *Brahmasiddhi*, Ed. S. Kuppuswami Sastri (Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Series, No. 4, 1937), p. 39.

24. See his *Śaivaparibhāṣā, op.cit.*, p. 193: "*pramātrādhibhedarūpasya itaraniṣedhasya 'ghaṭamahaṁ jānāmi' iti vidhiviṣayaka-pratyakṣaviṣayatva abhāvāt.*"

25. See his *Śivajñāna-pāḍiyam, op.cit.*, p. 149: காட்சியளவையானே இது குடம் இஃது ஆடையென விதிமுகத்தாற் காணப்படுவதன்றி, இஃது ஆடையன்று இது குடமன்று என மறுதலைமுகத்தாற் காணப்படாமையின்..."

26. *op.cit.*, p. 44, v.2.

27. See R. Balasubramanian, *Advaita Vedanta, op.cit.* pp. 147-151, for an analysis of the different alternatives presented by Maṇḍana.

28. "*vidhimātra-vyāpāram ca pratyakṣam.*"

29. *Śaiva-paribhāṣā, op.cit.*, pp. 193-194.

30. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 3.14.1: "*sarvaṁ khalu idaṁ brahma.*"

31. 6.1.4.

32. "*pramātvam abādhitārtha-viṣayaka-jñānatvam.*"

33. Śivajñānayogin presents the Advaita argument indicating clearly the sense in which a pot is said to be non-different from a cloth by the Advaitin. The argument is: "A pot is not different from a cloth, because it is a substance." Why should he not specify the sense in which they are said to be different or non-different in his refutation of the *pūrvapakṣa*? Here Śivajñānayogin is not fair to the opponent in his refutation. Again, in the statement of the Advaita *pūrvapakṣa* Śivajñānayogin says that *viṣaya-viṣayi-sambandha* also does not hold good between the cognitum and cognition according to Advaita. This is wrong. Advaita does admit this relation between them, whether the cognition is valid or invalid.

13

ON THE EPISTEMIC STATUS OF *SAṀŚAYA*: A STUDY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA

P. Balasubramanian

Prologue

The statement that 'the epistemic status of a concept in epistemology depends on its strength to withstand the criticisms of rival theories' is not in doubt. If the different positions of all rival theories against a given theory can be viewed as attempts to falsify it, then we may say that the strength of a theory lies in resisting all such attempts of falsifications. In what follows an attempt is made to present such a kind of analysis of the concept of *saṁśaya* pertaining to Śaiva Siddhānta. Thus the present paper aims to present an epistemic appraisal of the Saiva Siddhāntins' thesis on *saṁśaya* by considering some of its antitheses and counter theses. In this way the present paper tries to answer the question "Can the thesis of Śaiva Siddhānta be disproved?" instead of trying to answer the question "Can the thesis of Śaiva Siddhānta be proved?" But certain semantic considerations about the word *saṁśaya* seem to be necessary and inevitable, not only to answer the above questions but also to place the problem of *saṁśaya* in a proper perspective. If discussions about *saṁśaya* are restricted to the psychology of *saṁśaya*, then semantic considerations about it are unnecessary. On the other hand if discussions on the concept of *saṁśaya* are extended so as to include the logic of *saṁśaya*, then certain semantic considerations seem to be unavoidable.

Semantic Considerations About the Concept of Saṁśaya

The word '*Saṁśaya*' is invariably translated as doubt and this English word has its origin in the Latin '*dubitare*', which itself is due to '*dubare*', i.e., to be in two minds. While explaining the usage of the word 'doubt' H.W. Fowler suggests that the expression "doubts whether" must be preferred to the expression "doubts that".[1] The word 'whether' according to the *Oxford English Dictionary* stands for the introduction of mutually exclusive alternatives, i.e., to express exclusive disjunction. The word 'doubt' on the other hand is explained in terms of uncertainty by the same source. The contrast between doubt and certainty is not alien to Indian Thinkers. Jayanta for instance contrasts *saṁśaya* with *nirṇaya* and maintains that "...in doubt both the alternatives have equal strength and none of them is specific with the result the mind oscillates between the two and does not carry with it any definite assertion. In *nirṇaya* the doubt is removed by hearing or assessing arguments advanced by the conflicting parties, and a final judgment is taken in favour of one of them."[2]

The Lexical interpretation of the word 'doubt' given above gives rise to some important consequences to any theory of *saṁśaya*. They may be stated as follows.

(i) That which is *saṁśaya* is not *nirṇaya*.

(ii) That which is *nirṇaya* is not *saṁśaya*.

(iii) One must prefer the expression "*a* doubts whether *p*" instead of the expression "*a* doubts that *p*".

In this context some comments must be in order. Is lexical interpretation final? It seems that there are also other interpretations. To Wittgenstein for instance the meaning of a word is a function of its use. Some theories of meaning try to elucidate the meaning of a word in terms of referent, idea, behavioural disposition, etc.

If alternative versions of meaning are possible, then the very possibility to construct a meaningful sentence in the form "*a* doubts that *p*" must be a proof positive to express doubt in such a way.

In this way if the semantic possibility is also a sign of epistemic possibility, then the cases cited below are all possible tokens for expressing doubt.

(a) *a* doubts that *p*.

(b) *a* doubts whether *p*.

(c) *a* doubts that (*p* or *q*).

(d) *a* doubts whether (*p* or *q*).

(e) *a* doubts whether *p* implies *q*.

(f) *a* doubts whether *p* and *q*.

(g) I am in doubt whether *p*.

(h) *X* doubts *Y*.

This list can be lengthened by including several other cases.

(iv) If we are to restrict our attention to the form "*a* doubts whether *p*" and if the word "whether" is to be interpreted as stating exclusive disjunction, then the possibility to express doubtful judgments in the form of inclusive disjunction and another variation of disjunction called the denial of conjunction must be ruled out. The question "Can we express doubtful judgments as inclusive disjunctions and denial of conjunctions?" is dealt with in the sequel.

The problem of seeing whether all the semantic considerations introduced above are adopted by Śaiva Siddhāntins remains. This will be possible only by seeing what exactly the Śaiva Siddhāntins say regarding *saṁśaya*. So let us turn our attention to this aspect and in so doing let us also state some of the rival positions as a contrast to Śaiva Siddhānta.

The Position of Śaiva Siddhānta in Contrast with Some of its Rivals

The Siddhāntin accepts *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda* as *pramāṇas*. "The ultimate *pramāṇa* for him, however, is *ātma citśakti* (soul's intelligence), illuminated by *Śiva Citśakti*."[3] *Saṁśaya* or doubtful cognition is according to Siddhāntins a form of *Ayathārtha Anubhava*. It is due to immediate experience (*anubhava*) but belongs to the non-valid (*ayathārtha*) form of knowledge. Thus I may doubt whether a thing I see is a post or a man because tallness is common to both.

But there seems to be a controversy between Śivāgrayogin and Śivajñānayogin regarding the epistemic status of doubt.

(i) Śivajñānayogin regards doubtful cognition as neither true nor false, but Śivāgrayogin seems to think that *saṁśaya*, *viparyaya* and *smṛti* are false perceptions.[4]

(ii) Further Śivāgrayogin recognises two kinds of doubt instead of one. This view is much against the general view of Siddhāntins who like Śaṅkara Miśra (in his commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* of Kaṇāda) say that doubt is of one kind only.

Doubt according to Śivāgrayogin may arise in the following two ways:

(a) Doubt which is due to "the cognition of a character common to two objects present in the object perceived."

(b) Doubt which is due to "the cognition of a single character presenting itself in two objects."[5]

Regarding different kinds of doubt there are also several other rival views. According to Vātsyāyana doubt is of five kinds. They are:

(a) Doubt arising from the perception of common properties to many things.

(b) Doubt arising from the cognition of some peculiar and unique property.

(c) Doubt which is due to conflicting testimony.

(d) Doubt arising out of irregularity of perception, as in the case of mirage.

(e) Doubt arising out of irregularity of non-perception.[6]

According to the views of later Naiyāyikas such as Uddyotakara, Vācaspati and others, there are not five but only three or two kinds of doubt. Uddyotakara for instance thinks that Gautama is only discussing the conditions or causes under which doubt occurs. Doubt according to Uddyotakara occurs when

> "(1) we fail to know the differentia of *y*; (2) we perceive or infer a character held in common by *x* and *y*; and (3) we do not have a clear perceptual knowledge that what we see (or fail to see) is *x*, and not *y*."[7]

Praśastapāda distinguishes *saṁśaya* (doubting judgements) from *anadhyavasāya* (Indefinite or uncertain judgements). According to him indefinite judgements occur when we do not know the word for an object and thereby describe it vaguely. Vyomaśiva elaborates what Praśastapāda says about doubt and indefiniteness as follows.

> "Doubt is always about objects of a kind we are already acquainted with, while indefinite judgements may also be about objects of a kind we never before confronted,"[8]

(iii) Doubtful cognition according to Sivajñānayogin is neither valid knowledge nor false perception and it is a state of suspension of judgement. Thus doubtful cognition is not a cognition at all.

But Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is of the view that doubtful cognition is a positive entity which is due to defection in its cause of production. Further he feels that doubtful cognition is a vaild cognition as cogniton.

(iv) Śaiva Siddhāntins seem to restrict the scope of *saṁśaya* to perception, but some thinkers do not make any such restriction. Swami Satprakāshānanda, for example opines that "There can be doubt associated with any kind of knowledge (perceptual, inferential, or verbal), its means (*pramāṇa*), and its objects (*prameya*).[9]" From what the Swamiji says the following points emerge:

> Doubt can arise in the cases of (a) knowledge, (b) means of knowledge and (c) the objects of knowledge.

Concluding Remarks on the Epistemic Status of Saṁśaya

The problem of *saṁśaya* is conneted with several other epistemological concepts such as the following.

(i) *Saṁśaya* and *nirṇaya*.

(ii) Different kinds of doubt.

(iii) Knowledge and doubt.

(iv) Perception and doubt.

(v) Truth and falsity, and doubt.

(vi) Form in which doubt is expressed. So let us begin our epitemic appraisal by considering the contrast between *saṁśaya* and *nirṇaya*.

I. *Saṁśaya* and *Nirṇaya*

If the statements that "what is doubtful is not certain" and "what is certain is not doubtful" are acceptable, then we must ascertain whether this rule holds good in all kinds of doubt and certainty. Some thinkers distinguish logical certainty from psychological certainty. See for instance what Nehemiah Jordan a contemporary psychologist says:

> "It is a fact that psychological certainty, although probably correlated with logical certainty is most certainly (logically speaking) not univocally co-ordinated with it. It is the case that men will experience psychological certainty even when aware of logical uncertainty."[10]

If the contrast between doubt and certainty is acceptable to Śaiva Siddhāntins, then they must make clear the kind of certainty referred by them. Is *saṁśaya* in the scheme of Śaiva Siddhāntins stands for psychological uncertainty or logical uncertainty? This is important because what is psychologically certain may be logically uncertain. This point may demand some explanations. It is James Drever who defines psychological uncertainty or doubt as follows:

> "Doubt — absence of definite belief, usually with alternation between belief and disbelief; sometimes obsessional."[11]

Obsessional doubts are mental disorders which are certain to the person who is suffering from such doubts. They possess psychological certainty but not logical certainty. They are logically uncertain. Not only obsessional doubts but also doubts which are normal seem to possess psychological certainty even though they are logically uncertain. A logical uncertainty possesses universality and necessity. Logically uncertain doubt is doubtful for all persons without exception. But psychological doubt or uncertainty is not so. Doubting whether what is seen by *x* is a tree or man does not exhibit universality and necessity. The same kind of doubt in the same situation may not arise in the case *y* and *z*.

The problem of contrasting *saṁśaya* with *nirṇaya* takes a new dimension in the hands of Praśastapāda. He distinguishes doubtful judgements from uncertain judgements. If uncertain judgements are not doubting judgements then the formal conditions which hold between *saṁśaya* and *nirṇaya* must collapse. But this need not be the case, because the history of Indian logic shows that later writers, however do not maintain this distinction. Sivāditya for instance treats uncertain judgements as a species of doubting judgements. Śaiva Siddhāntins do not seem to be involved in this kind of distinction. In so far the Śaiva

Siddhāntins restrict their discussions about doubt to doubtful cognition and false perception, and restricting the examples to perception or seeing, *saṁśaya* in Śaiva Siddhānta can refer only to psychological uncertainty. Śaiva Siddhāntins do not take a wider view of doubt as Swami Satprakāshānanda does.

It is to be regretted that Siddhāntins have not distinguished logical uncertainty from psychological uncertainty.

How are we to distinguish logical uncertainty from psychological uncertainty? What are the conditions under which such a distinction can be maintained? Answers to the above questions will also be answers to the controversies regarding different kinds of doubt.

II. *Different kinds of Doubt.*

It appears that doubt can be interpreted in the following three ways:

(a) Doubt as a mental condition.

(b) Doubt as a value of a proposition.

(c) Doubt as a methodological procedure.

(a), (b) and (c) cited above can be designated respectively as psychological doubt, logical doubt and methodological doubt.

Doubt as a mental condition like all other mental conditions (such as forgetting, retention, recall, learning, anger, joy, etc.) stands for the occurrence of a behavioural disposition. In this sense doubt is a mental event or mental state of affair. Thus doubt as a kind of behavioural disposition stands for psychological uncertainty. Roderick Chisholm distinguishes the epistemic sense of "certain" from the psychological concept expressed by "feels certain", by saying that the expresion, "*S* feels certain that *h* is true", stands for psychological certainty.[12] Chisholm defines the epistemic certainty as follows:

"*h* is certain for *S*=*Df* *h* is beyond reasonable doubt for *Ś* and there is no *i* such that accepting *i* is more reasonable for *S* than accepting *h*."[13]

From what Chisholm says follows certain conclusions which are important for any theory of *saṁśaya.*

(a) psychological certainty is different from epistemic or logical certainty.

(b) psychological uncertainty can be expressed by saying that "*S* feels uncertain that *h* is true".

If the distinctions made above are acceptable, we must examine whether the concept of *saṁśaya* in Śaiva Siddhānta refers to psychological uncertainty or epistemic uncertainty. From what is described as epistemic certainty by Chisholm we can infer the following definition of epistemic uncertainty.

> *h* is uncertain for *S* = Df *h* is not beyond reasonable doubt for *S* and there is an *i* such that accepting *i* may be more reasonable for *S* than accepting *h.*

When this definition of uncertainty is applied to the case of doubt discussed in terms of post and man, by siddhantins then it takes the following form. We may be in doubt whether what we see is a post or a man. Here there are two alternatives corresponding to *h* and *i* in Chisholms version. So we can obtain the following case.

Seeing a post is uncertain for us=Df Seeing a post is not beyond reasonable doubt for us, and there is a case of seeing a man such that accepting the case of seeing a man may be more reasonable for us than accepting the case of seeing a post. The same varsion can also be given for 'seeing a man is uncertain for us'.

Chisholm's interpretation of epistemic uncertainty differs from the interpretation of Siddhāntins in one respect. According to Chisholm doubt can arise in the case of only one alternative. He asks "Is it a post" or "Is it a man" and does not ask "Is it a post or a man." Notice the fact that doubt is expressed in the form "*a* doubts that *p.*"

Let us now turn our attention to the nature of logical doubt. Logical doubt is to be construed as a value of a proposition. It is not at all like feeling uncertain about something or our mind osillating between two alternatives or suspension of judgment. In a sense logical doubt on the other hand seems to posses certainty by having the properties of universality and necessity. The role of the concept of doubt in logic can be explained in two ways depending on the two different systems of logic called two-valued system and many-valued system. In both the systems doubtful judgements are expressed in some form of proposition or other. So, while stating the nature of logical doubt let us also try to deal with the propositional forms in which doubt can be expressed.

As already stated if we are to follow the lexical interpretation of the word 'doubt' then we must adopt the form "*a* doubts whether *p*". Śaiva Siddhāntins adopt the lexical interpretation and they express doubt in the form of exclusive disjunction, i.e., *p* or *q* but not both. *Pauṣkara Āgama* for instance holds that doubt is a knowledge arising out of the cognition of properties common to two objects or involving two alternatives. Thus I may doubt whether what I see is a post or a man. The form *p* or *q* adopted by the Siddhāṇtins is one of exclusive disjunction. This rules out the possibility of expressing doubtful judgments in the form of inclusive disjunction, i.e., *p* or *q* or both, and another variation of disjunction called denial of conjunction, i.e., Not both *p* and *q*. If inclusive disjunction is to be true atleast one alternative must be true whereas if the denial of conjunction is to be true atleast one alternative must be false. It seems that both the cases are possible candidates for expressing doubtful judgments. In an inclusive disjunction doubt may arise about the third alternative, namely 'or both.' Consider the case 'This student is either intelligent or industrious". In this case the student may be both. Douht can very well arise about this third alternative. Is he really intelligent and industrious? The same is the case with the form of denial of conjunction.

In traditional logic we deal with doubtful propositions in the context of Opposition of Propositions. Among contraries for instance if one is false, the other is said to be doubtful. Similarly traditional logicians refer to doubtful propositions in the cases of subaltern and subcontrary oppositions. The doubtful proposition in the case of contrary opposition follows necessarily from the falsity of the original or given. Thus if All S is P is false, then its contrary, No S is P must be doubtful and *vice versa*. In the case of subcontrary a doubtful proposition follows necessarily from the truth of the original or given. Here doubt becomes the value of a proposition and the nature of doubt discussed here is certainly something different from the nature of psychological doubt.

Śaiva Siddhāntins seem to take into account the doubt arising in the cases of the two alternatives which constitute an exclusive disjunction but not the doubt which can arise about the exclusive distunction itself as a whole. In many-valued logic such distinctions are introduced and adopted. A proposition according to the many-valued system is either true or false or doubtful. Thus the expressions 'p is true,' 'p is false' and 'p is doubtful' are all allowed. In this way the expression 'a doubts that p' gains currency. Further this system describes the conditions under which compound propositions such as disjunction, implication and conjunction can have the value doubtful. See the tables given below:

Exclusive Disjunction

p	q	$p \wedge q$
T	T	F
T	F	T
T	D	T
F	T	T
F	F	F
F	D	D
D	T	T
D	F	D
D	D	D

Inclusive Disjunction

p	q	$p \vee q$
T	T	T
T	F	T
T	D	T
F	T	T
F	F	F
F	D	D
D	T	T
D	F	D
D	D	D

If doubt is to be expressed as denial of conjunction, then the following conditions must hold good,

~	(p	&	q)
F	T	T	T
T	T	F	F
D	T	D	D
T	F	F	T
T	F	F	F
T	F	F	D
D	D	D	T
T	D	F	F
D	D	D	D

Study also the tables provided for conjunction and implication.

⊃	T	D	F
T	T	D	F
D	T	D	D
F	T	T	T

&	T	D	F
T	T	D	F
D	D	D	F
F	F	F	F

All the tables introduced above explain the nature of logical doubt discussed in many-valued logic.

The third kind of doubt called methodological doubt clearly falls outside the scope of Śaiva Siddhānta. This can be characterized as a methodological procedure. Doubt is a method of arriving at truth. Descartes methodological doubt as the name goes is an apt example for this kind of doubt. This becomes evident from the statement that "it is regretted that the Śaiva Siddhānta school of philosophy is defective as every other Indian school of philosophy is in this respect."[14] The above statement refers to methodic doubt.

Even though Ponniah is of the opinion that all Indian thinkers have missed the methodic doubt which starts an inquiry, Jayanta the author of *Nyāya Mañjari* seems to come very near to this. He has formulated a theory of doubt in which doubt is defined as the starting point of logical investigation.[15]

In a discussion about the different kinds of doubt the following two cases can also be included which appear to fall outside the scope of Śaiva Siddhānta. In contemporary western thought the proposition know that I know that *p*' is discussed. If this approach is extended so as to include the concept of doubt, then we can deal with the following cases.

(i) I doubt whether I doubt that p.

(ii) I am in doubt whether I doubt whether p. In short, discussions about doubt about doubt are also epistemically interesting cases.

In the light of the discussions on the different kinds of doubt we can safely conclude that doubt is not only one kind but more than one. Doubt is of only one kind if and only if it is interpreted as a mental condition.

(III) Can a doubtful cognition be true?

Is a doubtful cognition neither true nor false or simply false? In answering this question Śivajñānayogin differs from Sivāgrayogin. As already stated Śivajñānayogin feels that a doubtful cognition is neither true nor false whereas Śivāgrayogin opines that it is a case of false perception. If the expression 'neither true nor false' is subjected to a kind of formal analysis, then we can see that there is scope to treat doubtful cognition as false.

First let us approach this problem from the angle of traditional logic of the west. Study the following four cases.

(a) All dogs are white—False
(b) No dogs are white—False
(c) All dogs are donkeys—False
(d) No dogs are donkeys—True

We know that (b) is the contrary of (a), and (d) is the contrary of (c). According to the rules of contrary opposition if (a) is false, then (b) must be doubtful and in the same way if (c) is false, then (d) must be doubtful. But notice the facts that (b) is false and (d) is true when the given propositions (a and c) are false. This shows that what is described as doubtful can be true in some cases and false in certain other cases. The word 'doubtful' is explained by logicians in two ways and they use the expressions 'neither true nor false' and 'uncertain' as synonyms of doubtful. If this is acceptable then a doubtful cognition which is said to be neither true nor false can also be interpreted as false. Both Śivajñānayogin and Śivāgrayogin agree that doubtful cognition is not true. They disagree only in attributing falsity to it. Only Śivajñānayogin treats a doubtful cognition as neither true nor false. If the expression 'neither true nor false' can be shown to stand for falsity as we have done, then what Sivāgrayogin says must be true. The above analysis can hold good if and only if the expression 'neither true nor false' is reducible to 'false' or to "true and false". This can be carried out with the help of symbolic logic.

Study the proof given below :

Neither true nor false = Df. It is not the case that either true or false.

It is not the case that either true or false } = $\sim (p \vee q)$

$$\sim (p \vee q) = (\sim p \;\&\; \sim q)$$

$\sim p$ = (p is not true) or (p is false)

$\sim q$ = (q is not true) or (q is false)

$\therefore$ $(\sim p \;\&\; \sim q)$ = p is false and q is false.

If the kind of reduction introduced above is acceptable, then what Sivāgrayogin says must also be acceptable, i.e., a doubtful cognition is false perception.

Further if the expression 'neither true nor false' is interpreted in the system of many valued logic, we obtain the following results.

~	(p	∨	q)
F	T	T	T
F	T	T	F
F	T	T	D
F	F	T	T
T	F	F	F
D	F	D	D
F	D	T	T
D	D	D	F
D	D	D	D

$\sim (p \vee q)$ by being the translation of the expression 'neither true nor false' the truth table for it is introduced above. It is interpreted as inclusive disjunction involving two alternatives p and q. Under three conditions the expression under consideration becomes doubtful, i.e., neither true nor false. What are they?

(a) When p is false and q is doubtful.

(b) When p is doubtful and q is false.

(c) When both p and q are doubtful.

From (a), (b) and (c) follow the fact that $\sim (p \vee q)$ is doubtful if and only if at least one of the alternatives is false and the other doubtful or both doubtful.

If the truth table for the denial of exclusive disjunction is considered, we obtain the same results. Study the table given below:

~	(p ·	∧	q)
T	T	F	T
F	T	T	F
F	T	T	D
F	F	T	T
T	F	F	F
D	F	D	D
F	D	T	T
D	D	D	F
D	D	D	D

As it is evident from the two tables introduced above one can safely conclude that what is described by Sivajñānayogin as neither true nor false is not logical doubt.

(IV) *Knowledge, Validity and Doubt*

Doubt according to 'Śaiva Siddhānta is a non-valid form of knowledge. It is not valid knowledge. In the same way Sivajñānayogin holds that doubtful cognition is not cognition at all. But as already pointed out Kumārila Bhaṭṭa opines that it is a valid cognition. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's view gets strength from some western thinkers also. Bertrand Russell for example, says that knowledge means a true belief and hence knowledge is always true. It is a contradiction to speak of non-valid or invalid knowledge.[16] Knowledge is here contrasted with belief. A belief can be false as well as true. This is the reason why epistemic modal logic stipulates $K\,a\,p \supset B\,a\,p$ but not $B\,a\,p \supset K\,a\,p$, i.e., (*a* knows that *p*) implies (*a* belives that *p*) but not the other way round. Contemporary west views this problem of knowledge as a linguistic necessity. See what a contemporary writer in epistemology says on this issue. "You can only call a fox a 'vixen' if it is a *female* fox. If it is not a female, then it is a semantic rule of English that it should not be called 'vixen'. In this way, you can only speak of 'knowledge' if the thing said to be known is in fact the case. If it is not the case, then it is a semantic rule of English that the Cognitive attitude involved is not to be called 'knowledge'"[17] The expression "cognitive attitude" in the above quotation is more revealing. Doubt or *saṁśaya* is only a cognitive attitude. So the problem of attributing truth or falsity must depend on the possibility to attribute truth or falsity to cognitive attitude. But true and false themselves are cognitive attitudes and hence a doubtful cognition as cognition must be valid. It reveals the true nature of doubt.

While dealing with the relation between knowledge and doubt it becomes necessary to discuss the view of Swami Satprakāsānanda.' He feels that doubt can arise in the case of knowledge, instruments of knowledge and objects of knowledge. *Pramāṇas* by being instruments of knowledge cannot be doubted, because *pramāṇas* can be distinguished from the use of *pramāṇas*. The use of *pramāṇas* may be correct or incorrect, i.e., may give rise to doubt. *Pramāṇas* themselves cannot be doubted. Doubt can arise in the case of *pramāṇas* in only one way, i.e., is it a genuine *pramāṇa*?

Yet another point of interest is the so-called epistemic modal systems of logic. They deal with the relation between knowledge, belief and doubt. But they do not seem to agree with what the Siddhāntins and others say about the nature of doubt.

Allan M. Hart in his recent article entitled 'Towards a Logic of Doubt' presents a formal account of doubt pertaining to Berkeley's view of doubt by using the symbolic notations of epistemic logic. He draws our attention to the following facts.

(1) $D\,a\,p = \mathrm{Df}\,(\sim B\,a\,p\ \&\sim B\,a \sim p)$

(2) $D\,a\,p \supset (\sim B\,a\,p\ \&\ \sim B\,a \sim p)$

The author gives his reason to reject (1) and to accept (2).

(1) and (2) are to be rendered as follows.

(1) a doubts whethe p ≡ Df a does not believe that p and $\bar{a}$ does not believe that not-p.

(2) a doubts whether p (implies) a does not believe that p and a does not believe that not-p.[18]

Notice that this kind of interpretation of doubt falls outside the scope of Śaiva Sidhānta.

Epilogue

The two expressions 'knowledge about doubt' and 'Doubt about knowledge' convey two different senses and they have two different referents. Śaiva Siddhāntins seem to be concerned with the first and not with the second. If they are concerned with the first, then they must cxplain the following issues:

(i) How is doubtful cognition a form of non-valid knowledge?
(ii) How is knowledge about doubt possible?
(iii) Is our knowledg of doubt also non·valid?

These questions and several others which precede them may suggest that the present paper raises several questions but many are left unanswered. Some are left unanswered, because they are obvious and self-evident. Further the very aim of the paper lies in introducing several problems connected with the idea of *saṁśaya* and not in presenting an alternative theory.

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